Section — Marc, Institutiones Morales
§ 1. On the Obligation of Law in General
- DEFINITION. The obligation of law can be defined: "A moral necessity binding to the placing or omission of an act, so that moral evil, that is, sin, or at least penalty, may be avoided" (cf. n. 109).
DIVISION. The obligation of law is direct, or per se, and indirect, or by consequence. Direct obligation tends to those things alone which are indicated in the law. Indirect obligation comprehends: means to the law, and these easy and ordinary, and the removal of impediments; for example, to avoid dangers, not to induce others to violating the law, etc.
Concerning these latter things there will be discourse in their own place; here only concerning direct obligation.
- PRINCIPLES. I. Any law whatever obliges in conscience to something. This is of faith as to ecclesiastical laws, as is evident from Trent, Sess. VII, on Baptism, Canon 8: "If anyone shall say that the baptized are free from all the precepts of holy Church... let him be anathema." But as to civil laws, it is altogether certain from what was said above n. 148.
It is said 1. Law, that is, every true precept of the legislator, but not a mere counsel, exhortation, or admonition of the legislator, of which sort there are not a few improperly so-called laws in canon law, as St. Alphonsus notes, VI, n. 518; ed. G., III, p. 529-530.
- Any law whatever, whether it is merely penal or invalidating, since even these laws oblige to something in conscience.
A merely penal law obliges one to undergo the penalty if it is imposed on the delinquent; and it obliges the judge to impose it as it is determined by law. An invalidating law similarly obliges to something, namely at least to this, that someone not defend an invalid act as valid.
- Obliges. The reason is that every law essentially supposes in the legislator the right of prescribing and the will of obliging. But natural and divine right dictate that obedience must be given to such a legislator.
Nor is it required, in order that it oblige in conscience, that the legislator expressly intend obligation in conscience; but it suffices that he intend truly to command, since this obligation in conscience necessarily follows from command (Bouquillon, Theol. fund., n. 133 and 223).
- Obliges to something, that is, either to an act absolutely, whether to be placed or omitted; or disjunctively to the act or penalty; or to both at the same time; or only to a certain mode of acting, so that the act may obtain value and firmness. In the first case, the law is called purely moral or preceptive; in the second, purely penal law; in the third, mixed law; in the fourth, invalidating law.
Note. Since these things have force for any law whatever, by no means must credence be given to those who affirm that modern legislators do not bind conscience. In many things indeed they recede from God, and publicly protest that they are ignorant of God and conscience. Yet from this manner of speaking do not infer that such legislators, in those things which are truly useful and necessary for the common good, regard good morals or the mutual rights of citizens, do not bind conscience. Cf. Konings, c. 3, a. 1, n. 178.
- II. Human law obliges under light matter in light matter; but under grave matter in grave matter; unless from the circumstances of things, there is evidence that the mind of the legislator was different. The reason is that the gravity of obligation depends primarily on the very matter of the law, so that for grave obligation grave matter is always required; for grave obligation in matter altogether light would be unto destruction, not unto edification; and therefore it would be opposed to that property of law which prescribes that law be conducive to the common good.
It was said: unless there is evidence that the mind of the legislator was different; for the gravity of obligation, according to the more probable opinion, depends secondarily on the will of the legislator. For just as he could in no way oblige, by not prescribing, so he can oblige under venial matter only, even in a grave matter. And this is sometimes expedient (I, n. 143; H. Ap., II, 14).
- From these things you resolve: 1. "When the matter is altogether light, the one transgressing does not sin mortally, even if the Superior has prescribed under mortal sin, ... for example, that no one break silence, that no one eat a grape, that he close the door, etc.; because it is a small matter and incapable of so great an obligation. Nor does God himself, in small matter, oblige under mortal sin" (I, 141).
It would be otherwise if the matter otherwise light became grave by reason of circumstances, for example, of scandal, of a great common good, or of the end intended by the legislator. Thus abstinence from an apple in paradise, although small in itself, was nevertheless most grave from the circumstance of the end; thus the pouring of water into the chalice at the Offertory is reputed so grave that no excusing cause is given (Noldin, III, n. 109).
Contempt, if it is truly formal, namely if someone contemns the law as law, the Superior as Superior, "in any matter whatever is always a mortal sin" (I, 142). Except if someone contemns the thing prescribed, because it is esteemed little, or the Superior, because he is indignant against him. For then, of itself, grave sin is not present by reason of contempt; but it can be present by reason of great anger or rash judgment. But frequency of transgressions does not necessarily involve contempt of the law, says St. Alphonsus, IV, n. 161; ed. G., II, p. 588, citing St. Thomas (2.2, q. 186, a. 9, ad 3).
- IT IS ASKED. How can it be known that a law obliges under mortal sin?
Resp. The chief signs from which it can be known are the following: 1. If the matter is grave, and there is no evidence to the contrary concerning the will of the one prescribing. 2. If the precept is expressed in words having great force, for example: we prescribe under grave matter, under the indignation of God, in virtue of holy obedience, from all power, altogether, inviolably, and similar words. Simply imperative words: we will, we prescribe, do, abstain, and others of that kind, are ambiguous; wherefore from circumstances one must argue whether they impose a grave or light obligation. 3. If a grave penalty is added to an ecclesiastical precept, for example, the penalty of perpetual exile, excommunication, irregularity, ecclesiastical interdict, total suspension, or suspension from office or benefice for a notable time, for example, for a year. This nevertheless is understood if the censures are latae sententiae; otherwise if they are ferendae sententiae, according to the more probable opinion, or also if the law is merely penal (cf. n. 182 and 1263). 4. If use and custom among the skilled and timorous thus bear; because custom is the best interpreter of laws (cf. n. 337). This especially has place as to rubrics and fast. Cf. I, 144-146; VII, 33; H. Ap., II, 15.
Sometimes, however, although the Superior brings forth grave threats, it does not always follow from this that the matter about which it is treated obliges under grave matter: for example, only under light matter is there an obligation of not receiving tonsure unless confirmation has preceded, and nevertheless the Sacred Congregation of the Council severely prohibits that such a one, not rightly promoted, ascend to other things, etc. Cf. n. 1919.