§ 2. On Dispensation of Vows

641. DEFINITION. Dispensation is the absolute condonation of the obligation of a vow, made in the name of God by him who has the power of ecclesiastical jurisdiction (III, 250). - It differs from irritation, which is made in the proper name of the one irritating, and for its validity does not require another cause than the will of the one irritating.

642. PRINCIPLES. I. For valid dispensation of a vow, legitimate power is required. For since the obligation of a vow has been accepted by God and consecrated by his law, it can be relaxed only by divine authority. But this authority was conceded to those to whom Christ said (Matt., 16, 19 and 18, 18): Whatsoever thou shalt loose ... whatsoever you shall loose ... etc.; namely to those to whom spiritual and ordinary jurisdiction in the external forum was conceded (cf. n. 229). Such a power is necessary in the Church, on account of the mutability of the human will and the great number of doubts which must be resolved.

Hence by ORDINARY RIGHT they can dispense:

1. The Supreme Pontiff, with respect to all the faithful, in all vows whatsoever. Nor are solemn vows to be excepted, whether of clerics in sacred orders or of religious; for this is rightly judged to have been conceded to the Pontiff, to whom God conceded the government of the whole Church; and it is established from the practice of the Roman Pontiffs, especially of Julius III in the time of the Anglican schism, and of Pius VII in the time of the French disturbance¹ (cf. n. 2176).

2. Bishops, capitular Vicars, Abbots having episcopal jurisdiction, with their subjects, and the Apostolic Nuncio in his province, in vows not reserved to the Supreme Pontiff. But both the Vicar of the Bishop and the parish priest and other priests need special delegation. What the Bishop can do concerning vows of pilgrims, see n. 235, q. 1.

3. Regular prelates, not Abbesses, with their subjects, even novices, although the vows were emitted in the world, or the vow was one of passing into a stricter Order, provided it is known to be more useful for the religious to remain in his own. But vows of novices can also be dispensed by their own Bishop. Cf. III, 256, 257.

643. Let it be noted: 1. All Superiors who enjoy ordinary power can DELEGATE it to anyone initiated at least by first tonsure. 2. Those who can dispense with others can also do this with themselves. 3. Regular confessors, from privilege, have the right of dispensing in all non-reserved vows of any faithful whatsoever, whether within or outside confession. 4. With spouses joined in valid matrimony, both Bishops and Mendicants can dispense from the simple vow of chastity, whether emitted after or before matrimony. But concerning these things see n. 1992, 2096, 2191.

644. II. For valid and licit dispensation of a vow, a just cause is required.² For vows are made to God alone; therefore man cannot dispense in them except as a secondary Superior; but a secondary one cannot validly dispense without sufficient cause (n. 239). Yet in doubt whether the cause was sufficient, possession stands for the validity of the dispensation already conceded (cf. n. 241, q. 2).

JUST CAUSES of dispensing are: 1. The good of the community, or of the church, or of the family, or of the subject himself; for example, if dispensation is judged to be for his greater progress, if grave danger of violating the vow threatens him, if he is harassed by scruples. 2. Notable difficulty of fulfilling the vow. 3. Imperfect deliberation and liberty in the emission of the vow; for example, if the vow proceeded from sadness, anger, intrinsic fear, for instance of fire or shipwreck, or from extrinsic but light fear; likewise, if the vow was emitted in the time of impuberty. 4. If the impulsive cause of the vow ceases: in which case some commutation is to be mixed with the dispensation, as St. Alphonsus notes. 5. If such circumstances occur that it is doubtful whether the vow still subsists or obliges; for in such a doubt possession stands for the vow, and dispensation is needed (III, 251-252). Cf. above n. 248.

645. Questions. QUES. 1. Whether a Superior can dispense in vows which redound to the utility of a third person?

Resp. 1. In the affirmative, if it is a question of a gratuitous promise, or one not yet accepted by the promisee, or indeed accepted, but made principally in honor of God. The reason is that, according to a probable opinion, the promisee in such a case either does not acquire a true right, or if he acquires one, he acquires it dependently on God, to whom the promise was chiefly made.

2. Negatively, if the promise is onerous or mutual, as in the vow of perseverance which is emitted in certain congregations; or if it is indeed gratuitous, but made principally in favor of a third person, for example in favor of such a determined poor person, and duly accepted by him or by another in his name. For in these cases the vow follows the nature of the contract to which it is annexed, so that it cannot be dissolved without the consent of both parties (III, 225; H. Ap., V, 44). Cf. n. 615.

Note. The Supreme Pontiff can certainly dispose concerning the right which a religious congregation has acquired by reason of a vow of perseverance.

QUES. 2. Whether certain vows are RESERVED to the Supreme Pontiff, and what kind?

Resp. Besides vows emitted in a religious community, even temporary ones which precede perpetual vows, five are reserved: a) The vow of perfect and perpetual chastity. b) The vow of entering Religion in which solemn vows are emitted. c) The vow of making pilgrimage to Jerusalem, to the sepulcher of Christ. d) The vow of making pilgrimage to Rome, to the thresholds of the Apostles. e) The vow of making pilgrimage to Compostela, to St. James.

These five vows, that they may be reserved, must be PERFECT: a) By reason of liberty; wherefore they are not reserved if they were emitted from fear, even light fear, struck in by another. b) By reason of matter; on which account, a vow of making pilgrimage to Rome to the thresholds, etc., is not reserved unless it is from devotion and precisely of those places. Whence if someone vows to go to Rome to visit the image of St. Mary Major, or other sanctuaries, the vow is not reserved; nor is a vow of chastity reserved unless it is perpetual and excludes every venereal act, even internal. Thus, for example, vows of not marrying, of not fornicating, of not asking the debt, or of keeping the prerogative of virginity are not reserved, if the one vowing does not intend to promise abstinence from every venereal act; nor is the vow of entering Religion reserved if the one vowing intends an institute where simple vows are emitted.³ c) By reason of form; that is, they must have been made principally in honor of God, absolute and determined. Whence penal or disjunctive vows are not reserved, for example of Religion or of fasting, and this according to the more probable opinion, even if the reserved part has already been chosen, unless each part is among the reserved things; nor conditioned vows, that is, under a condition concerning a future contingent, for example I vow chastity if I come out unharmed. It is said: concerning a future contingent; because a vow under a condition concerning the past or present, or concerning a necessary future, is equivalent to an absolute vow; likewise a vow emitted from mere affection for virtue, if a condition was added only because of an impediment which, while it stands, makes execution of the vow impossible: for example if someone were to vow Religion with the condition: if my mother shall have died, that is, when she shall have died. d) By reason of obligation: for they would not be reserved vows if the one vowing had intended to oblige himself only under light matter (III, 258, 261; H. Ap., V, 45-46). - In doubt whether vows are reserved, they can be dispensed by the Bishop and by regular confessors (cf. n. 242, 1).

Let it be noted: 1. Vows are reserved as regards substance, not as regards circumstances. Hence, if someone, for example, had vowed entrance into a stricter Religion, the Bishop or regular prelate can dispense in such a way that it is licit for him to enter into a milder one. Likewise, if he had emitted a vow of entering without delay, the Bishop, with cause, can dispense so that the entrance be deferred (III, 258, note 3).

2. The faculty of dispensing over one reserved vow is valid for other reserved vows if these are less noble; otherwise not. Thus, for example, he who can dispense over reserved vows, even of chastity, possesses the same faculty as regards other reserved vows of inferior dignity, but not as regards the vow of religion. Nevertheless, on account of a special reason, he who has the right of dispensing over reserved vows, even of religion, cannot dispense over the vow of chastity, because its observance is more difficult; for he who vows religion is held only to make an attempt. In the formula: of dispensing from vows, even of chastity, other reserved vows are not included.

3. In reserved vows, Bishops and those having similar jurisdiction can also dispense or commute when and insofar as necessity urges.

We said: a) when necessity urges, that is, if there is not easy access to the Pope, and in delay there is danger of grave harm, whether spiritual or temporal, one's own or another's; b) insofar as necessity urges, because if it suffices that the vow be suspended, it cannot be dispensed. Likewise, if dispensation is given in a vow of chastity so that someone may marry with a certain woman for repairing her honor, he cannot marry another. There are also other faculties, even for the vow of chastity, which are accustomed to be conceded to Bishops when they ask (ibid., note 2).

QUES. 3. Whether an OATH of chastity, or of Religion, is reserved equally with a vow?

Resp. The more probable opinion denies that such an oath is reserved, if namely someone wished to oblige himself by the bond of oath alone; for an oath induces a lesser obligation than a vow, as St. Thomas teaches (2.2, q. 89, a. 8). But if he wished to bind himself by two bonds, namely by vow and oath, the vow indeed is reserved, but not the oath. But in doubt whether a vow was added to an oath, the common rule now holds: a vow doubtfully emitted does not oblige (III, 259).

From what has been said you will resolve: To one conceding dispensation it must be established: 1. that the vow, in the case, is not certainly reserved to a Superior; 2. that by dispensation a right acquired by a third person is not wounded; 3. that a just cause is given; in doubt concerning the sufficiency of the cause, it must be supplied by some commutation. For the rest, some commutation is laudably joined to any dispensation. - Recall what was said concerning dispensation from law (n. 237).

QUES. 4. Whether one having a delegated faculty of dispensing in vows can also dispense in oaths?

Preliminary note. It is not a question of vows to which an oath has acceded in the same matter, sworn vows; it is a question of oaths which were emitted independently from a vow in the same matter.

Resp. It is disputed. The first probable opinion denies, because the bond of a vow and of an oath is diverse. The second opinion, no less probable, to which many moderns assent, affirms, because in order to dispensation a vow and oath are equated.

The former opinion, which St. Alphonsus (III, 190) says must altogether be held, by force of the principle of possession, is favored by the declaration of the S. C. de P. F., May 19, 1845: "The faculty of dispensing from vows does not of itself include the faculty of dispensing from an oath." Cf. also the response of the same Congregation, May 3, 1828 (Coll. Prop. Fide, n. 2085 and 2087). This opinion is also favored by a vehement conjecture, arising from this, that from the style of the Curia the faculty as regards oaths is specially conceded. Cf. Vind. Alph., I, p. 307.