§ 2. On Justice and the Virtues Annexed to It

398. NOTION. Justice, taken generally, designates the complex of all virtues. For that is called just which equals its measure.

But justice, as a cardinal virtue, is customarily defined: "The constant and perpetual will of giving each one his right." Thus defined, it comprehends all moral virtues which are toward another, that is, toward God or toward one's neighbor (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 57).

The material object of justice is a thing or action in some way owed to another. But the formal object is the notion of debt, or the special honesty which shines forth in rendering to each one his own (Lessius, de Just., l. 2, c. 1).

For true and perfect justice three things are required, namely: 1. that it be altogether toward another; for, since the name of justice imports equality, from its nature justice has this, that it is toward another; for nothing is equal to itself, but to another; 2. that it be occupied about a rigorous debt, that is, about a debt from whose violation not only moral baseness is contracted, as in all those things which are owed from the title of honesty (for example, of gratitude), but a strict obligation of restitution or reparation arises; 3. that it render to equality, that is, as much as is owed (2.2, q. 58, a. 2).

Between father and son, husband and wife, Creator and creature, there is not justice properly and simply so called in those things, namely, which they owe as son, as father, etc.; because the son, as son, is not considered diverse from the father, but something of the father; similarly the wife is considered one flesh with the husband, etc. It is otherwise if such persons should come together in some contract, as fellow citizens and distinct parties; for then the status of the persons would be something secondary, and their agreement would regard a debt of justice alone. Likewise, if a son should kill his father, he would violate not piety alone, but also justice, because the father, considered as a man, has a right to life, as do the rest.

399. Parts of justice. I. The integral parts are: 1. to do good under the aspect of debt; 2. to decline from evil under the aspect of injury. Whence St. Ambrose (de Offic., l. 1, c. 24, n. 115): "Justice assigns his own to each one, does not claim what is another's."

400. II. The subjective parts, or species of justice, are assigned as three, namely commutative, distributive, and legal justice.

The reason of the division is that there is a threefold respect under which justice gives to another what is his: namely, the respect either of part to part, or of the whole to the part, or of the part to the whole. For the first is established commutative justice, through which a part renders to a fellow part what is his. For the second is placed distributive justice, through which the superior of the community dispenses the common goods according to the merits of individuals. For the third is assigned legal justice, through which all and each give what is owed to the community by reason and force of the laws (St. Alph., III, 486).

1. COMMUTATIVE justice is the virtue inclining a private man to render to another private man his strict right, an absolute equality of the thing to be rendered to the thing accepted being preserved (cf. n. 383). Nevertheless commutative justice can intervene between a private person and the community, but only where the community has itself after the manner of a private man.

It is called commutative, because it is founded chiefly upon various contracts and upon the innumerable exchanges which are accustomed to take place among men. It is also called strict or rigorous, because those three things which are required for perfect justice are present in it, and in it alone (n. 398, 2).

Note. Various species of injuries are opposed to commutative justice, concerning which in the last six precepts of the Decalogue.

2. DISTRIBUTIVE justice is the virtue which inclines the community, or its prince as minister, to distribute rewards, dignities and honors, and also common burdens, according to the proportion of merits or capacities.

This differs specifically from commutative justice, because it has a diverse formal object, namely the debt of the community, as such, to the parts; whence it comes about that it establishes or regards a diverse equality. For commutative justice regards arithmetical equality, such as there is between two equalities, for example ten and ten. But distributive justice looks to geometrical equality or proportion, which consists in the proportion of the thing to be distributed with the dignity and merit, or capacity, of the person to whom it is to be distributed, comparison being made to others to whom right also belongs in the distribution of goods or burdens. It is imperfect justice, because it is not founded upon strict right, but upon a debt of fittingness (2.2, q. 61, a. 2).

Note. Acceptance of persons is opposed to distributive justice; concerning this we shall speak when discussing the offices of the Bishop, prince, judge, etc. If something to be divided equally among several by strict right were divided unequally, for example a common treasury, a public foundation, etc., commutative justice also would be violated.

3. LEGAL, or GENERAL, justice is the virtue which inclines a private person, or a prince, to render all those things which are owed to the community, in order to the common good. It is called legal, because it is occupied about all things established by laws for the common good. It is called general, insofar as it commands and directs the acts of all virtues to the general prosperity of the commonwealth.

Nevertheless it is a special virtue, because it has a special object, namely public right, or the good of the whole, to be procured by the part, namely by the head or by a member. It is true justice, because between the community and citizens there is true equality, while one renders to the other all that he owes him according to the laws. But it falls short of the notion of perfect justice, because it is not perfectly toward another, since this other is something of the whole. Yet it is nobler than the other species of justice, since the common good, which it regards, is superior to the private good; and since the common good must be procured, or at least preserved, in such a way that private good is always subordinated to it.

Note. To legal justice is opposed: materially, every transgression of laws; formally, and as a special sin, contempt of law, or of the common good, whether on the part of private persons, when deliberately they act against it, as, for example, internationalists, socialists; or on the part of the prince, and of other persons set over others, when they neglect the common good which is endangered, or prefer private good to it (Lessius, l. c., l. 2, c. 1, n. 11).

It is asked: What is VINDICATIVE justice?

Resp. It is the virtue inclining the prince or magistrate of the community to punish the guilty according to the laws. The object of this justice is punishment to be done according to merit; the subject is the judge constituted by legitimate authority, to whom alone it belongs to take vengeance concerning delicts.

This justice primarily pertains to legal justice. Yet often it also pertains to commutative justice: both because the judge, from office and on account of salary, is bound to protect and preserve the public good; and because he ought so to punish delicts that he also exact and procure reparation of the damage which has been inflicted upon private persons. Hence not rarely judges, on account of their negligence in punishing, are obligated to restitution, whether toward the community or toward private persons (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 62, a. 7).

401. III. The potential parts, or virtues annexed to justice, are those which indeed regard another, but in some way fall short of the notion of perfect justice. Nine virtues of this kind are numbered, distributed into three classes (2.2, q. 80, a. un.).

The FIRST CLASS comprises those virtues which fall short of the notion of justice for this reason, that the debt which they render to another cannot be rendered to equality. These virtues are: religion, piety, and observance. See the things to be said at n. 530 and 687 seqq.

402. The SECOND CLASS comprises those virtues which fall short of the notion of justice because the debt which they render to another is not indeed required by force of justice, but only from the honesty of virtue; yet it is so required that its omission is a sin. - Of this kind are: truthfulness, gratitude, and vindication.

1. TRUTHFULNESS, or truth, inclines to always saying what is true. To this virtue are recalled: a) FAITH or fidelity in promises; b) SIMPLICITY, by which someone exteriorly exhibits himself in words and deeds as he is interiorly.

2. GRATITUDE inclines to compensating a benefit received. But recompensation is made: a) by affection, through kindly acknowledgment, or estimation, of the benefit received; b) by effect, through opportune giving of thanks and requital of the benefit.¹

3. VINDICATION, or severity, repels force or injury, and whatever is going to harm, by defending or avenging. The special object of this virtue is vengeance, required and to be taken by a legitimate judge; not with the mind of harming, but either from zeal for recovering honor unjustly taken away, or from love of that honesty which shines in the punishment of the malefactor, to whom punishment is owed of itself, just as thanks to a benefactor. See the things said (n. 400) concerning vindicative justice.

Related to vindication is penance, concerning which we shall speak at n. 1644.

403. The THIRD CLASS comprises those virtues which regard a certain debt contributing to greater honesty, and whose omission of itself involves no sin. The virtues of this third class are liberality and affability; to which equity can be numbered, although this is rather referred to legal justice.

1. LIBERALITY moderates the love of money, so that we may freely and promptly expend it for our own usefulness and our neighbor's, and for God's honor. To this is referred MERCY, insofar as it is a moral virtue inclining to relieving another's misery.

2. AFFABILITY (to which friendship, urbanity, and benevolence are referred) renders conversation with one's neighbor pleasing and decent. For man is bound, says St. Thomas (2.2, q. 114, a. 2, ad 2), from the natural debt of honesty, to live pleasantly with others.

3. EQUITY, or epikeia, inclines to acting contrary to the words of the law, when some higher consideration demands it. See the things said at n. 173.

404. Vices opposed to justice. Besides formal injustice, which, either by damaging or by taking away, wounds the goods of man, there are given multiple other vices which are opposed to the potential parts of justice, whether by excess or by defect.

To religion are opposed those things concerning which the first three precepts of the Decalogue treat.

To piety are opposed impiety, cosmopolitanism (defect), and nationalism (excess). Cf. Muller, l. 2, § 34, 40.

To observance are opposed irreverence and disobedience.

Contrary to truthfulness are: lying, simulation, and revelation of a secret.

To gratitude are opposed: indiscreet gratitude (excess) and ingratitude (defect).

Severity not tempered degenerates into cruelty or excessive lenity.

Enemies to liberality are prodigality (excess) (cf. n. 363) and avarice (defect).

Affability is a mean between flattery (excess) and moroseness (defect) or envy.