Section — Marc, Institutiones Morales
§ 2. On the Diversity of Total Objects
It must be noted beforehand. The total or adequate object is called that which morally constitutes something one and integral in itself, so that it is neither part nor complement of another; which so terminates one act that it divides it morally into several. Wherefore it must be observed that some objects, physically distinct, can coalesce into one moral object; others cannot. Thus diverse things estimable by price, as sheep, oxen, houses, etc., of the same owner, coalesce into one good of fortune. On the contrary, the lives of several men, whether of body or of soul, cannot coalesce into one; nor the honors or reputations of several men, or temporal goods, unless perhaps these last are possessed by common ownership (Kon., n. 226). In this matter common estimation has very great force.
- PRINCIPLE. There are as many sins numerically distinct as there are total objects, or objects morally diverse. Thus St. Alphonsus (V, 45; VII, 28; H. Ap., III, 64), with Tournely, Salmant., Croix, D'Annibale (I, n. 286), and others.
This rule is indeed not admitted by some for those cases where those several objects are reached by one external act, for example, if someone by one detraction wounds the reputation of several persons, or by one blow kills several. The reason alleged by them is that a multiple total object multiplies only the malice of the act, and that malices are not to be confessed. But the second opinion, which can be called the more common, teaches that, even in this case, diversity of total objects well constitutes sins diverse in number. The reason: just as one act regarding several objects diverse in species includes several sins diverse in species, to be explained in confession, so an act regarding several objects includes several sins diverse in number. For a sinful act is a movement or tendency of the will into its object as into its term; whence it follows that, if the object is total, the act also is totally terminated or individuated as many times as there are total objects. Besides, there ought to be as many sins as there are morally distinct rights wounded. This is clear by an example admitted by all: "if a married man has copula with a married woman, no one denies that he commits a double injustice: one, because he violates the right of his own wife; the other, because he cooperates so that she violates the right of her husband. Therefore, by the same single act, there can well be several sins diverse in number against the same virtue."2
(2) There are not lacking some, for example, Lehmkuhl (I, n. 352), who do not remember even by a word the opinion defended by St. Alphonsus. We wish it to be noted besides that Lugo (whose footsteps Lehmkuhl follows) concedes that it is not without difficulty to deny universally that malices are multiplied on account of order to several objects (cf. Gaude, vol. II, p. 741).
- From these things you will resolve: I. He commits several sins:
Who by one shot of a gun kills several men; or by one detraction defames many members of one family; or by one speech is a scandal to several.
Who, by one act, commits theft against several persons: but this is not understood if he steals the goods of a monastery or chapter, because those goods belong to the community, but not to the individuals.
Who, by one act of the will, proposes for several days to omit the Office or fasting; or wishes evil to several persons; or wishes (that is, efficaciously desires) to approach several women, or several times the same woman.
II. He commits one sin:
Who denies several articles of faith; for since there is one formal (and total) object of faith, namely the veracity of God revealing, he who denies one article is just as much an unbeliever as he who denies all.
Likewise, probably he commits one sin who, by the same act, blasphemes against the twelve Apostles; because the college of the Apostles is one total object, and besides, all blasphemies against the Saints take their malice from one relation to God, or from one congregation of Saints.
Similarly, he who desires several evils for an enemy, for example, infamy, death, etc., but apprehends them under one aspect of evil, namely as means to his destruction, probably commits only one sin, which is sufficiently declared by these words: I desired grave evil for my neighbor. But he who efficaciously desired for his enemy diverse evils, specifically and in particular considered, certainly ought to confess all those things distinctly, because they are diverse sins (V, 46, 50; H. Ap., III, 64, 65).
- Questions. QUAER. 1. Whether he commits diverse sins who detracts from someone IN SEVERAL MATTERS, or affects him with diverse contumelies?
Resp. More probably he commits several sins. The reason is because diverse rights to reputation or honor, which belong to the other, are wounded; for by the fact that someone has been defamed in one crime, he is not therefore defamed in another.
"Yet here it must well be adverted that little women and common people, who while quarreling together from the same impulse load each other with diverse contumelies, commit one sin (and this light). The reason: because, according to common estimation, these do not wound reputation and honor, since, on the one hand, insults among persons of this kind are not apprehended as grave; and on the other hand, those hearing give no faith to them, and therefore such quarrelers for the most part are excused from mortal sin, unless perhaps they reproach the adversary concerning some particular fact" (V, 48).
QUAER. 2. Whether he who detracts from someone BEFORE SEVERAL PERSONS commits several sins?
Resp. Probably he commits only one sin of detraction. "The reason is because to detract before several persons is only an aggravating circumstance, since the right to reputation is one among all, not multiple." Nevertheless easily, in the case, there will be scandal, by reason of which he commits as many sins as there are persons to whom the detraction is a scandal (V, 49).
QUAER. 3. Whether a priest who, in mortal sin, successively absolves SEVERAL persons or ministers the sacred Eucharist to SEVERAL persons commits several sacrileges?
Resp. to the first. Some deny it, because formally he inflicts one irreverence upon God; as he who steals several sacred vessels commits one sacrilege. "But more truly Concina, Croix, and others teach that he commits as many sacrileges as he imparts absolutions, because each absolution is an individual sacrament."
Resp. to the second. A priest who, in mortal sin, ministers the Eucharist successively to several persons more probably commits only one sacrilege, because there is one administration, and therefore one banquet (V, 50, q. 6).
Note. In practice it must be said that per se a penitent ought not to be vexed with questions concerning the total object, because, as the learned D'Annibale says, only the conscience of those sinning numbers sins, and it everywhere ignores subtle and exquisite things. Yet per accidens, for example, for rightly forming the judgment of the confessor, questioning and confession are urgent.