Section — Marc, Institutiones Morales
§ 2. On the Promulgation and Cognition of Natural Law
- PRINCIPLES. I. Natural law is promulgated and begins to oblige as soon as man obtains the use of reason. For natural law arises from the essences of things and from the divine perfections: therefore, as soon as man, using reason, knows God and the essential relations to him, which is to use reason, he knows natural law, and is bound to observe it. But until the use of reason is present, natural law remains promulgated only in first act, through the connatural habit of first principles (cf. H. Ap., I, 53).
- From these things you will gather: 1. Since the promulgation of natural law becomes known through the light of reason, by that very fact it is subject to the imperfection of human reason. Hence, in order that law can be known integrally, easily, without doubt and error, another and more perfect promulgation is morally necessary; this is made both through the supernatural revelation of God and also through the infallible magisterium of the Church.
"The promulgation which obliges (in second act) is made when the creature knows the precept by the light of reason, or hears it from the Church, or from wise men who teach him" (H. Ap., I, 50).
Those sin who induce the insane, or children not yet capable of reason, to something which is against natural right (H. Ap., II, 36). For children and the insane, although they cannot sin formally, nevertheless in act they are in first act subject to the laws of nature. Hence blasphemy, for example, or a base act, is in them a material sin; and formally guilty of this is he who compels them to such a deed, or exhorts them to it. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 226. See below n. 193.
As to sins of deed, there is no difficulty. As to sins of speech, or of this sort, which require advertence and knowledge, it must be said that, if sin is lacking under the head of the delict to which they are induced, nevertheless it is present under the head of the depraved habit which is introduced into the insane, or under the head of scandal. Cf. Sweens, n. 408; Reuter, Neo-Conf., p. 100.
- II. Natural law is always sufficiently promulgated as to first principles; it is sometimes unknown as to nearer conclusions; it is often unknown as to remote conclusions. So commonly against traditionalists and rigorists.
Once ignorance of fact has been admitted, by which namely man, generally conscious of the law, does not know that this or that is contained under the law, or does not advert to this, the question is made concerning ignorance of right, that is, of obligation. For this the precepts of natural law are divided into a threefold class (H. Ap., I, 5). The first embraces universal principles of morals which are known of themselves and are dictated by synderesis: for example, "good is to be done, evil avoided; what you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another." These principles can by no means be unknown by a man capable of reason, and are indelible in each one, because they are innate through synderesis. The second comprehends immediate conclusions, deduced from the first principles with moderate consideration, such as most of the precepts of the Decalogue. Concerning these there is not given invincible ignorance, except among the uncultivated and for a brief time, or unless a circumstance apparently rendering honest has been added, for example, as to an officious lie. The reason is that such things become known to all by the very light of nature and do not require an intricate reasoning, which nevertheless can fail in a case, for example among uncultivated peoples. The third extends itself to mediate or remote conclusions, which, through a subtler discourse, are deduced from the precepts of the Decalogue; such as are the precepts concerning not entering into usurious contracts
usurious, concerning avoiding certain scandals, and similar things. These indeed can be invincibly and inculpably unknown, and often are unknown even by holy and learned men, as is clearly proved from so many and so great controversies which have existed, and still exist, among the doctors themselves in every matter, where definitions of the Church either are desired or are not known.
Everyone knows the text of St. Augustine (de Serm. Dom. in monte, l. 1, c. 16, n. 50), where he doubts whether a wife, with the consent of her husband, in certain circumstances, ought to commit adultery. Thus also many could, at least for a time, believe that civil divorce dissolves the bonds of matrimony, or, in places where public prostitutes are permitted, come to this, that they admit fornication is not so great a crime. Cf. Genicot, I, p. 113; Cathrein, Philos. mor., n. 178.
- THE RIGORISTS OBJECT. God is faithful; he has promised to hear the one praying. If therefore we do not obtain light, we are at fault.
Resp. If we do not obtain light for avoiding formal sin, we are at fault, I concede; if we do not obtain light for avoiding material sin, we are at fault, I deny. Just as there is given a twofold sin, one material, the other formal, so two kinds of light must be distinguished. One light, by which material sin is avoided, is the cognition of the individual things which God commands or forbids. This light God has by no means promised to the one praying, as not necessary for salvation, since material sin does not involve an offense of God. The other light, by which formal sin is avoided, is an illumination of divine grace, by which we know the foulness of sin and the price of divine friendship, and are inclined to carry out that which conscience dictates has been commanded by God. This light God has promised to the one praying, and will never deny it (I, n. 174; ed. G., I, p. 156).