Section — Marc, Institutiones Morales
§ 3. On Commutation of Vows
- Definition. Commutation is the substitution of another honorable work in place of that which had been promised by vow, under the same obligation.
DIVISION. Commutation can be done in three ways: into a better work, into an equal work, into a less good work. But that is called BETTER which is such in relation to the spiritual utility of the one vowing and more pleasing to God (III, 243; Lehmkuhl, I, 625).
It is useful to add some examples of commutations into an equal work from Reuter, II, n. 374. One can commute: the fast of one day into one confession; daily recitation of the Rosary into weekly confession; a vow of avoiding external sins of lust, or a vow of not marrying, into monthly confession for life; a pilgrimage to be made into fasting, etc. See Lehmkuhl, I, 632.
- PRINCIPLES. I. Commutation of a vow into an evidently better work can be made by the one vowing himself, even without a special cause. For the lesser is contained in the better. It is established from Canon Law (c. de Jurej.): "For he does not break his purpose or promise who commutes it into something better."
Hence he who, for example, vowed to offer a candle in a church will be able by his own authority to change this vow into the offering of a chalice. Yet vows in favor of a third person and accepted by him are excepted; likewise reserved vows, unless the change is made into the religious state (III, 243).
- II. Commutation of a vow into an equal or less good work must be made by ecclesiastical authority. The reason for the first is that, a vow having been posited, it is more pleasing to God that the promised thing be furnished than another thing, even if equal, but not promised. Besides, in commutation, as D. Thomas says (in 4, D. 38, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 4), there is a certain contract which cannot be perfected without the consent of him who acts in place of God on earth, namely the prelate. - The reason for the second is that commutation into a less good work is a species of dispensation (III, 244; H. Ap., V, 38; 2. El. qq. ref., n. 8).
In either case, a reasonable cause is required. If this is lacking, only commutation into a less good work would become invalid. Yet commutation into an equal work made without cause would not exceed venial sin. - But if commutation into an equal work has already been made by one's own authority, and the commuted matter has already been furnished, it suffices that the one vowing supply something.
- Let it be noted: 1. He who can dispense, even from delegation, can likewise commute vows: for "he to whom what is greater is licit, to him indeed what is less is licit"; but not vice versa, because the greater power is not included in the lesser (Reg. 53 in VI).
He who can dispense or commute the vows of others can likewise do so for himself (III, 249).
He who enjoys the faculty of commuting, but not dispensing, must commute the vow into an equal work; because if he changed it into a lesser one, he would already dispense in part. Nevertheless, equality is to be estimated not mathematically but morally; for otherwise the matter would become liable to innumerable difficulties and scruples (III, 247).
Just as a lesser cause is required for commuting than for dispensing, so a lesser cause suffices for commuting a vow into an equal work than for commuting it into a less good work. Concerning this matter St. Alphonsus says thus: "Any reasonable motive can be held as a cause. It is sufficient that from the commutation of the vow there be less danger of transgression ... Let the confessor ask the penitent what works he is accustomed to exercise besides those owed from precept, or toward which he has greater inclination; and into those let him commute the vows" (Praxis, n. 26). But in doubt whether the cause of commutation was sufficient, D. Thomas teaches that the one vowing can acquiesce in the judgment of the one commuting (III, 245, end).
A personal vow can be commuted into a real one, and vice versa; likewise a perpetual one into a temporary one. But the safer commutation, in every kind of vows, will be the frequency of the sacraments (III, 247 and 248).
When a reserved vow has been commuted by a Superior or his delegate, the substituted matter more probably is not reserved, although it has the same bond of vow. Thus commonly (III, 249).
Sometimes the faculty of commuting by dispensing is granted, sometimes of dispensing by commuting. In the first case, commutation into a less onerous thing is rather regarded; in the second, dispensation, not indeed total, but with some burden.
- Questions. QUES. 1. Whether, commutation having been made, it is licit to return to the first work?
Resp. In the affirmative, because the commutation of a vow conceded by a Superior is a favor; but no one is held to use a favor. Nevertheless, although the one vowing has returned to the first work, he can go back to the second substituted one. - But if he has vowed the first or second work again, in this case he would be held to either one by a new bond of vow (III, 248).
QUES. 2. Whether the one vowing ought to return to the first work if the second becomes impossible?
Resp. 1. In the affirmative, if the one vowing by his own authority commuted into something better; because, in this case, the obligation of the vow has not been extinguished.
- Negatively, if the commutation was made by a legitimate Superior; for then the bond of obligation has been transferred into the substituted thing, and therefore the first obligation is extinguished. This holds even if the substituted thing, by fault of the one vowing, has been made impossible. He indeed sinned by rendering it impossible, but he is not held to return to the first vow, truly extinguished (III, 249).