§ 3. On Doctrinal Interpretation

171. I. Doctrinal interpretation is a simple and private declaration of the mind of the legislator (I, 200).

This, of itself, does not obtain the force of law, since it is not made by one who has jurisdiction. Yet if almost all doctors agree in the interpretation of a law, moral certitude arises from this; the highest probability arises if very many and grave doctors agree; but if doctors, in almost equal number, go off into diverse interpretations, they must be weighed rather than counted. Recall what was said n. 63 ff.

II. It is lawful for any learned man to interpret laws doctrinally, provided it has not been prohibited by the legislator, and provided this is done according to the more received rules and the sense of the doctors. For since doubts often occur, and the legislator cannot always conveniently be approached, it was necessary to grant such a faculty to the wise.

Thus interpretations concerning the decrees of the Council of Trent are prohibited to private persons by Pius IV, as we noted above. Nevertheless, several doctors say that, by force of this prohibition, interpretations are not prohibited which would be made incidentally in some book, or orally or in writing, provided they are not committed to print; but only those which are made expressly through glosses, scholia, and commentaries given to print. For use has interpreted such a prohibition in this way (H. Ap., II, 75).

III. The rules of doctrinal interpretation are chiefly the following:

1. Attention is to be given to the PROXIMATE END of the law, or to the mind of the legislator. For that end is as it were the soul of the law, but the words are like its body.

Hence, if there is evidence concerning the mind of the legislator, one must stand by this more than by the bare words, as is clear from the condemnation of the Pharisees. Now the end of the law is understood both from its object and from the circumstances of times, places, and persons, and especially from the reason placed in the law, which namely impelled the Superior to make the law.

2. Attention is to be given to the FORM of the law, that is, to the manner in which it is expressed and promulgated.

In doubt, the words of the law are to be taken according to their proper sense, whenever something absurd or inequitable does not follow from this. But the proper sense can be either natural, such as is drawn from common use, and this is to be followed in penal and preceptive laws; or civil, which by legal fiction agrees with the words, for example, when under the name of legitimate son one who has been legitimated is also accepted, and this sense can be accepted in favorable matters. In a law expressed in general words, an exception is not to be made without a just and evident cause; for where the law does not distinguish, neither ought we to distinguish. But if something inequitable or absurd would follow from this, this other rule has force: "In order that the absurd may be avoided, the broadest interpretation ought to be made"; so that, if there is need, one must flee to an improper and metaphorical sense (cf. Porpora, tr. I, n. 364).

3. Attention is to be given to the MATTER of the law. For in odious matters a strict interpretation is to be made, in favorable matters a broad one. Understand this with the propriety of words preserved, whether natural or civil, as was explained above.

But to know whether a law is odious or favorable, attention must be given TO ITS PRIMARY MOTIVE (I, 200). Odious is whatever imposes an obligation or penalty, or injures the right of a third party, or is opposed to common right, even if this yields to the favor of another. Hence positive precepts, censures, irregularities, impediments of matrimony, exemptions, dispensations, privileges against the law, incapacities in civil law, are of strict interpretation, nor ought they be extended to cases not expressly determined. Favorable is judged whatever indulges liberty, or grants grace, without detriment of private persons, or of the community, or of right itself. Hence privileges which are beyond the law, and all rescripts of grace, are of broad interpretation (cf. n. 253, 3).

Sometimes, however, the law must be extended even as to odious things, if namely the primary motive is the granting of favor, as for example in the law made against those striking a cleric (cf. n. 1329); and similarly it is to be restricted as to favors, if the primary motive was the imposition of a burden (Salmant., de Leg., c. 4, n. 31). Cf. St. Alphonsus, de Privil., n. 7.

172. Questions. QUERY 1. Whether a law ought to be extended from case to case on account of parity of reason?

Resp. 1. If the reason is not the same, but only similar, the doctors teach that extension is not to be made, unless the case is expressed in the law only for the sake of example.

Hence it is that in law generally it is not lawful to argue from parity, indeed not even a fortiori: for not the reason of the law, but the will of the legislator manifested to subjects, has the force of law. Hence that saying: the reason of the law is not the law. Thus suspension, which by the statute of a Bishop is inflicted on clerics guilty of drunkenness, does not affect those who have violated chastity; although impurity involves in itself a greater sin than drunkenness.

2. If the reason is not only similar, but adequately the same, namely in such a way that the legislator would have to be accused of imprudence or injustice if the law were not extended, extension is to be made; for then the case not expressed must rather be said to be comprehended in the law than the law to be extended to it, and the rule has force: "Where the same reason is present, there the same disposition of law runs."

This happens: 1. in correlatives, as in husband and wife: for what has been sanctioned concerning one, for example, as to rights with respect to matrimony, is judged also concerning the other, if the same reason proceeds for each; 2. in things equated, as are eggs and milk foods in the law of fast; election, presentation, provision, in benefices; 3. in connected things, as are deacon and subdeacon; 4. in contained things: thus he who can make a testament can also make legacies. Likewise a law which decrees something on account of more frequent use also comprehends a less frequent case. Hence the law of St. Pius V, permitting nuns to go out from the monastery on account of fire or epidemic, is judged to grant the same on account of flood and the invasion of enemies (I, 200; H. Ap., II, 78).

QUERY 2. How are condemned propositions to be interpreted?

Resp. St. Alphonsus (III, 760): "Regularly speaking, condemned propositions are to be understood as they lie, and in the rigorous sense intended by their authors."

It is said 1. as they lie, that is, separately from the context, when the words are clear and perspicuous; 2. in the intended sense, when the words of the proposition are obscure or ambiguous; 3. rigorous, that is, not beyond the propriety of the words, because we are involved in odious matters. Therefore they never receive extensive interpretation, unless an evident reason demands it. Cf. Viva, Thes. damn.; Reuter, l. c., n. 19.