Section — Marc, Institutiones Morales
§ 4. On Temperance and the Virtues Annexed to It
- NOTION. Temperance, taken broadly, is that moderation of soul which pertains to all parts of life, and is common to every virtue. Taken strictly, it is a cardinal virtue which, according to the rule of reason, moderates the appetite in those things which most allure, namely in the delectations of taste and touch (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 150-170). Cf. Lessius, de Just., l. 4.
The material object of temperance is bodily delectations, namely those which are ordered to the preservation either of the individual or of the species, and are perceived from foods, drinks, and venereal things. The formal object is the honest use of the same, or the honesty of moderation which is applied in these, such as is consonant with the dignity of human nature.
The rule or measure of temperance, which reason assigns, is taken according to the necessity of the present life. St. Augustine beautifully expresses this thus (de Mor. Eccl., c. 21): "The temperate man has a rule in the things of this life..., that he love none of them, think none to be sought for its own sake, but use them for the necessity of life and of duties, as much as is enough, with the modesty of one using, not with the affection of one loving." Yet under the name necessity, understand also usefulness or fittingness, according to the condition of the person, state, occupation, etc.
- Parts of temperance. I. The integral parts which concur for the perfection of temperance are shamefacedness and honesty.
- Shamefacedness is fear or flight from a base act, and from the confusion arising from it. It is not properly a virtue, but rather a certain passion, yet good and praiseworthy. 2. Honesty is love and pursuit of decorum. Indeed honesty (the state of honor), generally, does not differ from virtue, nor from decorum or moral beauty; nevertheless, honesty and beauty are attributed by a special title to temperance, because it belongs to this virtue to repel altogether that which is most base in man.
- III. The potential parts of temperance are secondary virtues which imitate this principal virtue in an easier matter. Whence moderation of any inordinate movement is a potential part of temperance.
Virtues of this kind are especially numbered as seven, namely: continence, meekness, clemency, humility, modesty, studiousness, and eutrapelia.
CONTINENCE is a virtue which resists movements of concupiscence provoking to intemperance. To contain oneself (2.2, q. 155, a. 1, ad 2) is the same as to hold oneself in oneself, according to reason. Continence differs from temperance as the imperfect and begun differs from the perfect and complete. The temperate man has already overcome the concupiscences of foods, drinks, and venereal things; but the continent man so restrains the same concupiscences, still rebellious, that the superior part of the soul is not conquered.
MEEKNESS is a virtue which moderates anger according to the dictate of right reason, namely so that man does not grow angry except when, and as much, and in the way that he ought (St. Alph., Pratica d'amar G. C., c. 6 and 12).
CLEMENCY is a virtue mitigating punishments within the limits of right reason; or, it is the lenity of a superior toward an inferior, remitting something from due punishment, as much as justice, the good of discipline, the salvation of the delinquent, and public edification permit.
HUMILITY is defined by St. Bernard (de Grad. hum., c. 1, n. 2): "A virtue by which man, by the truest knowledge of himself, becomes vile to himself." And by St. Thomas (2.2, q. 161, a. 1): "A virtue tempering and restraining the soul, lest it tend immoderately to lofty things." A twofold humility is usually distinguished: humility of judgment or cognition, by which we know that we are nothing before God; and humility of affection or of heart, by which we tread underfoot the glory of the world. Wherefore St. Thomas (ibid., a. 6) says: "Humility consists essentially in appetite, according as someone restrains the impulse of his soul, lest he tend inordinately toward great things; but it has its rule in cognition,"
"namely, that someone not judge himself to be above that which he is; and the principle and root of both is reverence which one has toward God." See St. Alph., Vera Sposa, c. 11.
Note. HUMILITY pleases God exceedingly; for it is a certain profession of truth, which especially redounds to his honor. But how necessary it is to man for obtaining eternal salvation is gathered from the words of Christ the Lord saying (Matt. 18:3): Unless you become as little children, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Cf. also ibid., 11:29. Whence St. Augustine (Ep. ad Dioscorum) says: "The first virtue is humility; the second, humility; the third, humility; and as often as you would ask, I would say this" (cf. n. 386, 1).
- MODESTY is defined: A virtue by which someone keeps himself within the mode and limits congruous to him, as regards internal and external movements (2.2, q. 160 and 168). Yet only moderation of externals pertains to modesty strictly so called. It is twofold: a) Modesty OF MOVEMENTS, which arranges the movements of the body, in words and actions, according to the mode of reason. b) Modesty OF CULT, which applies the moderation of reason in exterior arrangement, or in clothing, furniture, banquets, according to the condition of person, time, place, etc. See St. Thom., l. c., q. 169.
This virtue indeed has humble matter, but by right great praise: for the exterior man is the indicator of the interior, nor easily can man in exterior habit act constantly according to the norm of right reason, unless interiorly he has all things well ordered and is furnished with other virtues. But on the contrary, the exercise of modesty also helps much toward acquiring, preserving, and increasing other virtues (Lehmkuhl, I, n. 876).
STUDIOUSNESS is a virtue which moderates the appetite of knowing, and study itself, according to right reason. The office of this virtue is: a) to restrain the excessive appetite of knowing; b) to incite to diligently learning matters fitting to the condition and capacity of each one (St. Alph., H. Ap., VII, 52); c) to refer study and acquired knowledge to the due end, namely to one's own or another's usefulness, and to the glory of God (2.2, q. 166).
EUTRAPELIA (modesty in playful things) is a virtue preserving mode and decorum in sayings and deeds instituted for the recreation of the soul (2.2, q. 167). - "I will that at last you spare yourself," says St. Augustine (de Musica, l. 2, at the end): "for it pleases that the wise man sometimes relax the attention decently intent on things to be done." Cf. St. Alphonsus, III, n. 178; ed. G., I, p. 483.
Vices opposed to temperance. To temperance are directly opposed: a) by excess, insensibility toward delectable things, such that one refuses to use them even if one ought. Of itself, this is venial, but for some persons (for example, for spouses) it can become mortal; b) by defect, intemperance, by which someone immoderately pants after pleasures, contrary to the rules of reason (2.2, q. 124, a. 4).
To the SUBJECTIVE PARTS, the species of temperance, many vices are opposed, namely: to abstinence, gluttony (cf. n. 364); to sobriety, drunkenness (cf. n. 757); to chastity, lust (cf. n. 767); to modesty, immodesty (cf. n. 769).
To the POTENTIAL PARTS of temperance several vices are opposed, whether by defect or by excess:
To meekness are opposed irascibility (defect) and excessive indulgence (excess).
Clemency holds the mean between cruelty (defect) and lenity (excess). Cf. n. 403, 3.
To humility is opposed inordinate self-abjection (excess), for example, if a father casts himself down beneath a son, and pride (defect), concerning which we have already spoken at n. 360.
To modesty are opposed both courtliness and luxury (defect), and rusticity and neglect of fitting arrangement.
Studiousness holds itself as mean between curiosity (excess) and negligence of studies (defect).
Finally, eutrapelia is equally hostile to moroseness (defect) and to buffoonery (excess), concerning which the Apostle speaks to the Ephesians, 5:4. See n. 2231, concerning games prohibited to a cleric.