Treatise V: On Virtues

379. DEFINITION. Virtue, in a broad sense, is taken for any perfection whatsoever, especially for that which consists in the power or faculty of operating. In the stricter sense, virtue is defined by St. Augustine (de lib. Arb., l. 2, c. 19, n. 50): "a good quality of mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly." And by others commonly: a habit perfecting the rational power, and inclining it to good operation.

It is called 1. Habit, that is, a quality or stable disposition, differing both from power and from act, inclining the power to act, and rendering it able for it.

Whence good acts which do not proceed from the habit of virtue are not, in the strict sense, acts of virtue, although it is usual for the name of that virtue to be imposed on acts of this kind, from whose formal motive they are elicited.

2. Perfecting the rational power. Under the name of rational power here come also the powers of the sensitive soul, according as they operate from the command of reason (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 50, a. 3).

3. Inclining to good operation. For virtue is not only a dispositive habit, as health is, but also and chiefly an operative one, essentially inclining the power to acting well and perfectly.

Thus virtue is distinguished both from habitual grace, which immediately affects the essence of the soul, giving it supernatural being; and from those habits which sometimes have themselves toward good, sometimes toward evil, for example, from opinions, which have themselves toward true and false (1.2, q. 55, a. 4).

From these things gather: a) Perfect virtue renders man victor over himself and unconquered toward all things; or, as St. Bernard speaks (in Cant., serm. 85), it is vigor of soul forcing and directing all things to reason.

b) The more perfect virtue is, the more easily it restrains the movements of the passions; whence the arduousness of restraining passions denotes the imperfection of virtue more than its perfection. The greatness of virtue is to be measured more according to the notion of good than according to the notion of the difficult (2.2, q. 123, a. 12, ad 2).

380. DIVISION. Virtues are distinguished in many ways:

1. By reason of object, some are divine or theological: these have God as their immediate object, as the author of grace and glory; others are human: these have for their immediate object the good which can be attained by human reason (1.2, q. 62, a. 1).

2. By reason of subject, human virtues are divided into intellectual and moral. Intellectual virtues perfect the intellect in the knowledge of truth. They are four in number, namely: understanding, science, wisdom, and art. Moral virtues perfect the will in pursuit of the good. Four likewise are numbered, namely: prudence (which also belongs to the intellectual virtues, because it pursues the honest good under the aspect of truth), justice, fortitude, and temperance. All the rest are referred to these four (cf. n. 390).

3. By reason of efficient cause, virtues are either infused, which are produced immediately by God in the soul, as faith, hope, charity; or acquired, which are obtained by the powers of nature through frequentation of acts, as temperance, etc.

But some infused virtues are called such per se, which namely can be had from God alone; others per accidens, which, although they can be prepared by human effort, nevertheless sometimes by a special gift of God are infused into the soul. But a virtue of this kind does not differ in species from an acquired one (Polman, Brev. Theol., 2.2, n. 20).

4. By reason of perfection, some virtues are formed by charity, others unformed. Virtue formed by charity is that which is joined with habitual charity. Virtue is called unformed when it is in a subject destitute of charity. Nevertheless it is true virtue, although not perfect, for example, faith, hope in sinners.

5. By reason of grade, virtues are common or heroic. Common is said of virtue which operates in an ordinary or common way. Heroic, which operates expeditely, promptly, delectably, and with abnegation of oneself, above the common mode of operating, that is, impelling to an act befitting a superior nature (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 54, a. 3, and 3, q. 7, a. 2, ad 2; Bened. XIV, de Beatif., l. 3, c. 21, n. 10 and 11).

Besides virtues, there are given in the just soul certain other habits, which are called GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT. These are infused habits by which man is well disposed to receiving and executing divine inspiration promptly (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 68, a. 1 and 2). See Muller, Theol. mor., I, § 120.

With these things premised concerning the notion of virtue, we shall briefly treat: 1. of certain properties of virtues; 2. of the specific distinction of virtues; 3. of the acquisition of virtues and their loss.