Treatise — Marc, Institutiones Morales

TREATISE VII: On the Seventh and Tenth Precept of the Decalogue

¶1.

You shall not steal.
You shall not covet your neighbor's house ...
nor anything that is his.
(Exod., 20, 15, 17).

¶838.
  1. Things to be noted beforehand. The seventh precept, under the name of theft, prohibits any lesion whatever of the right which one's neighbor has in goods of fortune, and commands (indirectly) that each one show himself kind and liberal toward others. - The tenth is connected with the seventh precept, by which internal sins regarding the same object are forbidden. Hence, with the Roman Catechism (n. 14), "we advert that by the law of this precept it is forbidden to us that we greedily seek riches; ... but that, content with our state, whatever it may be, whether humble or exalted, we be satisfied."

It is not of our institute, in so broad a matter, to expound the several rules of law, in which there exist many varieties according to the various regions. - It will be enough to have handed down the principles of justice, especially according to natural law, with the principal dispositions of modern law indicated, and with places added where each one, at least insofar as there is question of the principal European States, will be able to learn the proper laws of his own country.

Obligation of Conscience Arising from Civil Law. We have already said (n. 151) that civil law is divided into old and modern.

  1. The old law, or Roman law, ruled peoples through many centuries. Today the Austrians, French, Belgians, Spaniards, Dutch, Italians, Germans, and Russians are ruled by proper Codes. The English do not have a Code, but old laws founded in the feudal system.01

  2. Roman law, although modern legislators have borrowed much from it, now flourishes nowhere. Therefore one must beware lest in our times we apply solutions of authors older than our century, which rest solely on this Law. But that these theologians may be read through more easily, we shall touch lightly in the present treatise on notions of Roman law as there is need.

As regards modern laws, to the question whether they oblige in conscience, the response must be made thus:

a) A civil law that transfers ownership or establishes rights on account of the common good obliges in conscience. Reason: civil law can determine the obscure matters of natural law, and order what is necessary for restoring peace, even in goods of fortune. This the Sacred Penitentiary recognized on January 21, 1873 (A. S. S., vol. 7, p. 211). Therefore he who violates, for example, the right of authors (cf. n. 856), the right of him who finds a treasure (n. 883) or a lost thing (cf. German Law, 965), or a right founded on legitimate prescription, sins against commutative justice.

b) A civil law that invalidates a juridic act (i.e. a human act from which a right is conferred or removed) on account of defect of a formality prescribed by law does not oblige in conscience. - See those things which we have already said in n. 168 seqq., and which we shall say in n. 1054, 1081, 1086, where there are examples.

c) Nevertheless, it is clear that an obligation in conscience is present if civil law invalidates juridic acts for this reason, that the things essentially required in every contract are lacking in them: for example liberty in contracting, due knowledge, etc.

This civil law invalidating juridic acts also obliges in conscience if the sentence of a judge accedes. This is required by the common good. - This obligation sometimes takes its origin from legal justice, sometimes from commutative justice alone. Cf. n. 933.

d) But a civil law that, as regards juridic acts, contradicts ecclesiastical law, for example as regards the marriage contract, etc., cannot oblige in conscience. - In these matters the Church alone is competent (cf. n. 149).

Note. a) Sometimes civil law declares juridic acts invalid by natural law to be rescindable. The authors think that here anyone can licitly follow civil law, which on account of the common good grants validity to these acts, until they are rescinded by the competent party. Thus, for example, the German Law (§ 119) names contracts entered with error as rescindable. Cf. Lehmkuhl, Das bürgerl. Gesetzbuch; Noldin, II, n. 356.

b) Often also civil law invalidates onerous contracts (sale, purchase, etc.) in contradiction to the law of nature. It can sometimes be admitted that these contracts do not have force in conscience. Reason: the contracting parties are judged to offer their consent only according to the norm of civil law.

Order of things to be said. We have already expounded above (n. 720) general principles concerning right and justice; therefore it remains that here we treat: 1. concerning the right of man in external goods; - 2. concerning lesion of right, or injury in external goods; - 3. concerning reparation of right, or restitution; - 4. concerning the transfer of right by the will of private persons, or contracts.

(01) Cf. Aertnys, Suppl. for Dutch, French, and German Law; for English Law, see Crolly, de Just. et Jure; for Belgian Law, cf. Genicot, de 7 Praec.; for North America, cf. Konings, de 7 Praec.; for Spain and Latin America, see Gury-Ferreres, I, App.; for France, consult Allegre, Le Code civil commente; for Italy, Berardi, Theol. mor., vol. III; for Germany, Lehmkuhl, Das bürgerl. Gesetzbuch; Barre, Das bürgerl. Gesetzbuch u. der Code civil; Pelt, Manuel de legislation civile; for Austria, see Noldin, Delama, Aichner, Pruner, Schindler, Gopfert.

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