Appendix: On Good Acts

The things which have hitherto been explained regard the principles of morality in general, insofar as they belong both to good and to evil acts. With respect to good acts, some things must be discussed more specially.

307. Resp. I. An act, in order that it be good, ought to be done from an honest motive. Thus St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 18, a. 9; St. Alphonsus, V, n. XLIV; ed. G., II, p. 709; and the Thomists against the Scotists, who admit an indifferent end. The reason is because man, when he acts deliberately, is bound to propose to himself an end consonant with an intellectual creature. Now, according to the order established by God for rational nature, only the honest good has the nature of an end. The useful good cannot have the nature of an end, because it is appetible not for its own sake, but for the sake of another: as are, for example, goods of fortune, which are sought not on account of themselves, but on account of something else. But neither is it lawful to pursue the delectable good as the ultimate end of action. For, as St. Thomas writes (Contra Gent., l. 3, c. 26, n. 7): "Delight is on account of operation, and not conversely." For delight is, as it were, a certain salt and seasoning, which serves for enticing one to actions necessary or useful for life; and therefore it is lawful to act with delight, or even by intending delight, as an intermediate end subordinated to an honest end; but never on account of it alone, so that one rests in it; because it is a disorder if the primary end is ordered to the secondary. And generally, it is not lawful to use things which are to be enjoyed, or to enjoy things which are to be used: in this, according to St. Augustine, is the whole perversity of life. Therefore only the honest good is to be sought on account of itself. Cf. St. Alphonsus, VI, n. 882, fin.; ed. G., IV, p. 64; Peter Lombard, Lib. Sent., I. D. I, n. 2-8.

Hence two propositions condemned by Innocent XI: 8th: "To eat and drink unto satiety, for pleasure alone, is not a sin, provided that it does not harm health; because the natural appetite can lawfully enjoy its acts." 9th: "The work of marriage, exercised for pleasure alone, is entirely without fault and venial defect."¹ See Vind. Alph., P. VII, q. 8.

From these things, however, it does not follow that the actual pursuit of an honest end is necessary. The arguments brought forward prove two things: 1. neither the useful nor the delectable can be the ultimate end of acting; 2. a rational creature ought to propose to himself an end consonant with reason.

If, therefore, someone, in using things to be enjoyed, or enjoying things to be used, does not directly attend to an honest motive (for example, the conservation of life), but uses them moderately, as befits a being endowed with reason, so that there is present a norm ruling and tempering all things, certainly by force of the action and in the action an honest motive will be present. Whence St. Alphonsus writes, V, n. XLIV, fin.; ed. G., II, p. 703: "If someone approaching the table does not think of the conservation of life, but only of the quality of the food, as Gonet says (Clyp., P. II, tr. 3, disp. 5, n. 38), he does not sin, because he wills such delight, at least virtually, on account of the conservation of life, and thus does not desire it inordinately." Cf. what Lehmkuhl has, I, n. 107.

II. An act, in order that it be good, ought not only to be done from an honest motive, but also to be referred to God. This is clear from the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 10:31): Whether you eat, or drink, or do anything else, do all things unto the glory of God. The Fathers more commonly teach that in these words there is contained not mere counsel, but a precept.² And the reason is because "the ultimate end of the human will is the highest good, which is God," as the Angelic Doctor speaks (1.2, q. 19, a. 9).

"However, an actual reference of all things, whether words or works, to the honest good is not required, which would be an unbearable weight and a thing entangled with six hundred scruples; but a virtual reference suffices" (V, l. c.).

But this is had sufficiently when, on the one hand, God as the ultimate end is not excluded, and on the other hand the act, contaminated by no disorder of mortal or venial fault, is sought on account of its own honesty, or is referred to some honest end, whether by its nature or from a preceding act of the will. For every honesty is, of itself, ordered to God, the fountain of all honesty.

Things to be noted. 1. Many theologians express their opinion thus: In order that an act be good, it suffices that implicitly, by force of the action, by the weight of the operation, they have an ordination to an honest end, and be referred to God. They call this implicit relation objective. Cf. what Noldin has, I, n. 86. St. Alphonsus (l. c.), with the learned Gonet, speaks only of a virtual relation. As is clear from the example of one approaching the table, by these words he intends a relation implicitly contained in the object; whence his opinion in reality does not differ from the sayings of the moderns. Nevertheless it could be affirmed, not without foundation in the thing, that for this reason such a relation ought rather to be called virtual: because, in any operation whatsoever which is regulated by reason, the preceding intention, directed at least at the beginning of the use of reason to the general goods of man (as are, for example, health, honor, reputation, liberty), and especially to God, as it were revives and acts.

2. A supernatural relation to God is not required in order that our actions be honest; otherwise all the works of unbelievers and sinners, who lack faith or charity, would be sins: which doctrine was condemned by the Church in the proscribed propositions of Baius: "25th: All the works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices," and "35th: Everything which a sinner, or a servant of sin, does is sin."

3. The words of the Apostle, according to some, establish the obligation of a supernatural reference of our acts to God. Nevertheless this obligation is satisfied through fulfillment of the precept of faith, hope, and charity (II, n. 7). For all know that man is bound at times to elicit a formal act of charity. But in this act, according to St. Thomas (1.2, q. 100, a. 10, ad 2), this relation is contained sufficiently. But if someone wishes to act more securely, let him often during the day, or at least in the morning, offer all his acts generally to God. Thus often actually, but always truly virtually, he will accomplish all things unto the glory of God. Read the words of St. Alphonsus, l. c., ed. G., II, p. 703.

308. An act, in order that it be simply supernatural, ought to proceed from a supernatural principle, and to be done on account of a supernatural motive.

Thus St. Thomas, de Malo, q. 2, a. 5, de Carit., a. 11, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, Op. Dogm. in Trid., Sess. 6, n. 88 (ed. Walter, I, p. 514); Suarez, de div. Gr., l. 12, c. 10, n. 15; Mazzella, de Grat. Chr., n. 54; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 368; and very many others.

The first part of the proposition scarcely needs proof, since it is evident that no act can be supernatural unless the eliciting principle surpasses the powers of nature.

The second part is supported by the words of the Apostle (Heb. 10:38): Without faith it is impossible to please God; and (Rom. 2:7): To those who seek glory, and honor, and incorruption, eternal life (he will render). By these words is indicated the necessity of tending toward incorruption, that is, heavenly goods (cf. Cornely, Comm. on this place), and the necessity of walking before God in faith, so that man may be able to attain eternal life. And reason supports this: for since acts are specified by the object, only that operation will be supernatural whose motive is taken from faith.

There is given another opinion, which nevertheless does not please us. It denies that a supernatural motive is required, and says it suffices (so that the act can be called meritorious) that it be ethically good and arise from a supernatural principle. See Noldin (I, n. 97). The principal reason which the patrons of this opinion use is this: Where the root is supernatural, the fruits also must be supernatural. This can be considered especially among unbelievers, who, by the motion of actual grace, are disposed toward faith.

But the fundamental principle thus set forth must be denied, in which, if we attend well, a begging of the question lies hidden. Especially it must be denied from this, that, if it is admitted, the axiom celebrated by all utterly collapses: namely, that human acts receive their specification primarily from the object. Whence those acts which, under the inspiration of grace, dispose unbelievers toward faith cannot be called simply supernatural.

Note. This discussion is not merely theoretical; for in the treatise on Penance (n. 1667) the question is put whether contrition, also on the part of its motive, ought to be supernatural.

309. I. For the goodness of an act it is required that it be deficient from no source of morality, neither from the object, nor from the end, nor from the circumstances; but for the malice of an act it suffices that it be deficient on one part alone. The reason is because "good is from an integral cause, evil from any defect."

II. For contracting goodness, a directly voluntary element is required; but for contracting malice, an indirectly voluntary element suffices, as St. Thomas says (1.2, q. 19, a. 7, ad 3). The reason for the first is because the goodness of the will consists in this, that it wills the good. Now the agent does not positively will an effect only indirectly voluntary, but merely permits it. Therefore. The reason for the second is because evil not only cannot be sought, but ought to be avoided; but it is not avoided by him who freely posits an action to which evil is annexed.

To the point St. Thomas speaks thus (l. c.): "For this, that the will be good, it is required that it be good under the aspect of good, that is, that it will the good and on account of the good"; at least virtually or implicitly, as was explained above (n. 307).

III. Goodness and malice are the supreme genera of morality, each of which is divided into various species. The species of goodness are the various virtues; the species of malice are the diverse vices and sins, as will be said more fully in its place (cf. treatise on Virtues and treatise on Sins).