Chapter I: On True and Erroneous Conscience

15. Definition. True conscience is that which dictates the truth of the thing. It rightly concludes from true principles that something is lawful or unlawful, which in reality is such. Erroneous conscience is that which dictates the false as true, whether it assumes for itself a false principle, or deduces false conclusions from a true principle (I, 3).

True conscience, strictly speaking, is not the same as right conscience, although it is sometimes used promiscuously; for true is said according to what is, but right according to what is apprehended. Namely, TRUE is that which in reality is such in itself; RIGHT is that which is done according to the rules of prudence, in other words, that which truly and really is conformed to right appetite, as St. Thomas says (Eth., VI, 1. 2). Hence right conscience can be predicated, although per accidens, even of him who labors under invincibly erroneous conscience, as will be said below. Cf. Beaudouin, q. 1, § 1.

16. Division. Erroneous conscience is either invincibly or vincibly erroneous.

1. Invincibly erroneous conscience is that whose error morally cannot be overcome or laid aside; because, a) either the thought or doubt of error in no way, not even confusedly, comes into the mind of the one acting, while he places the action or its cause; or because, b) although doubt of error has come into the mind, nevertheless, with moral diligence applied for attaining the truth, the error cannot be driven away.

2. Vincibly erroneous conscience is called that whose error man does not lay aside through neglect. Therefore he operates with vincibly erroneous conscience who a) either already notices the error in some way, or b) at least

doubts about the error, and at the same time notices the obligation of overcoming it, and nevertheless does not inquire into the truth.

But diligence in inquiring into the truth is not required to be the greatest; ordinary and common diligence suffices, such as prudent men of the same condition are accustomed to apply in like circumstances.

Note. Those things which later in the various treatises, on Laws, on Sins, on Censures, etc., will come to be said concerning ignorance will explain the present matter more perfectly. See n. 22.

17. Principles. I. We are always bound to obey a true conscience, whether prescribing or prohibiting. This is clear from the words of the Apostle (Rom. 14:23): But all that is not from faith (that is, from the dictate of conscience) is sin. And from Innocent III (c. Litteras, de restit. spol.): "Whatever is done against conscience builds toward gehenna." The reason is that true conscience is the right application of the law, and a manifestation of the divine will, to which it is always unlawful to resist.

St. Bonaventure very beautifully expresses this office of conscience, saying: "Conscience is like the herald of God and His messenger; and what it says, it does not command from itself, but commands as though from God, as a herald when he publishes the edict of the king" (L. 2 Sentent., dist. 39, a. 1, q. 3).

18. II. We can obey a true conscience permitting or counseling, but we are not bound. For 1. it belongs to a permitting conscience truly and absolutely to dictate that some action is neither prescribed nor prohibited, therefore; 2. but it belongs to a counseling conscience to declare that something is better and of counsel. But this is the nature of counsel, that it indeed brings in the merit of reward in the one carrying it out, but no guilt of fault and penalty in the one omitting it. Hence that saying: "He who passes over counsel does not sin, provided contempt is absent" (St. Thomas, de Verit., q. 17, a. 3 and 4).

19. Nevertheless it must be noted that what the law in general only counsels or permits can in the particular case be prescribed or prohibited by conscience, namely when there are peculiar circumstances which, in a special case and for a determined person, clearly manifest the obliging will of God; as will be clear from the things to be said concerning vocation to the clerical or religious state (cf. n. 1916, q. 3 and n. 2141).

20. The principal means by which the treasure of a true and right conscience is acquired are these: 1. knowledge of the law of the Lord, in which each one can progress by continual study, by reading good books, by consulting the doctors of the Church, and especially by questioning and humbly listening to the Church herself, who is the supreme mistress of consciences. 2. Mortification of vices. This mortification is absolutely necessary, because the practical judgment of reason, on account of the evil inclination of the will, often turns away from the truth. 3. Prayer, or assiduous conversation with the Divine Teacher, who speaks within without the noise of words, and raises up to Himself a docile mind in a point of time so that it grasps more reasons of eternal truth than if it had studied in the schools for ten years (Imit. Chr., l. 3, c. 43).

21. III. It is right to follow an invincibly erroneous conscience permitting; one must follow it when it prescribes or prohibits. The reason for both is that "a human act is judged virtuous or vicious according to the apprehended good, toward which the will is borne of itself, and not according to the material object of the act" (St. Thomas, quodl. 3, a. 27; St. Alphonsus, I, 5).

The first is also clear: 1. From the words of the Lord (John 15:22): If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin. 2. From the saying of St. Augustine (de Lib. arb., l. 3, c. 19, n. 53): "That which you unwillingly do not know is not imputed to you as fault." 3. From the second proposition condemned by Alexander VIII: "Although there be invincible ignorance of the natural law, this does not excuse the one acting from formal sin." So Baius and Jansenius (cf. Viva, on this proposition).

The second is proved: 1. From the doctrine of the Apostle (Rom. 14:22), saying that one who eats meats which he judges it unlawful to eat, as having been sacrificed to idols, truly sins, because he acts against faith, that is, conscience.

2. From reason: the will is borne toward the object not according as it is in itself, but according as it is proposed by reason. Hence St. Thomas says (1.2, q. 19, a. 5): "When erring reason proposes something as a precept of God, then it is the same thing to contemn the dictate of reason and the precept of God."¹ Hence he who acts against an invincibly erroneous conscience (if it obliges) commits sin of the same species as if he acted against a true conscience.

It is useful to note that one acting with invincibly erroneous conscience not only does not sin, but also more probably acquires merit for himself. "The reason is that, in order to call some act good, at least inadequately, it suffices that it be directed by the dictate of reason and prudence. Therefore, since the one acting acts prudently, without doubt he ought to merit on account of the good end by which he is led in acting, namely the end of the glory of God or of charity toward neighbor, etc.; just as, on the contrary, he would demerit who does a good work, but apprehended as evil, on account of the evil end by which he carries out that work" (I, 6). So the doctors very commonly with St. Bernard, "who teaches that a subject obeying a prelate from a right intention acts meritoriously, although materially he errs against the law" (de Praec. et disp., c. 14, n. 21). Cf. I, 7 and 173, 174.

22. IV. No one can follow a vincibly erroneous conscience permitting, nor contemn one prescribing or prohibiting; but each one is bound to lay it aside. For 1. By operating according to a permitting conscience of this kind, a man sins, because he does what in reality is evil in itself; nor does ignorance excuse him from fault, since, as vincible, it makes his act voluntary in its cause (cf. n. 288). Thus a judge who already notices that he does not sufficiently know a case debated in court cannot cast his vote for either side; but he is bound to acquire for himself a more perfect knowledge of the matter, so that he may thus be able to render a just sentence; otherwise he would rashly commit himself to the danger of erring, and accordingly would stain himself with sin. 2. By operating against an obliging conscience of this kind, he likewise sins, because he chooses what he judges to be evil. Thus, he who erroneously judges that he must lie or steal in order to help his neighbor, and at the same time notices the obligation of further inquiring into the truth, cannot follow such a conscience, nor act against it (I, 4).

Yet in order that one sin by acting against erroneous conscience, his action must be free. Hence the ignorant man does not sin, even if he believes himself to sin, when, being unable, he omits to hear Mass on a feast day; when he suffers involuntary distractions in prayer, or nocturnal pollutions in sleep.

Note. That the confessor may more easily judge whether the conscience of a penitent was vincibly or invincibly erroneous, let him ask him: a) whether he truly doubted concerning the lawfulness of the act, b) whether he attended to the obligation of searching into the matter further? If he answers affirmatively, we have one laboring under a vincibly erroneous conscience. Nevertheless the responses of a scrupulous person must be weighed according to the things soon to be said. Cf. n. 319, 337.

23. To vincibly erroneous conscience can be reduced: 1. lax conscience, which loosens obligations too much; 2. scrupulous conscience, which increases them too much; 3. perplexed conscience, which apprehends sin in both terms of a contradiction.

We shall treat of each only briefly here, because practical rules will be set forth at length below in the treatise on Penance.

24. Notion. A lax conscience is that which, from light and contemptible reasons, judges that what in reality is evil is not evil, or thinks that a grave evil is light, although either can easily be detected (H. Ap., tr. ult. 31). How great a danger threatens from this sort of conscience the Savior Himself declares, crying out: Broad is the way that leads to perdition (Matt. 7:13).

Lax conscience can be distinguished in three ways:

1. Simply lax conscience, which tends to extending liberty beyond what is fair, for example if it rests upon a slightly probable or improbable opinion.

2. Cauterized conscience, when, from a long-standing habit of sinning, it counts grave or even most grave sins as nothing, calling evil good and good evil (Isa. 5:20), and drinking iniquity as though water (Job 15:16).

3. Pharisaical conscience, when it makes great things small and conversely small things great; of which sort were the Pharisees straining out a gnat but swallowing a camel (Matt. 23:24).

25. The principles to be adapted to a lax conscience are these:

I. He gravely sins who, knowingly obeying a lax conscience, transgresses some law in a grave matter.² The reason is that he could easily overcome ignorance of this kind, as being voluntary, and therefore cannot, under the pretext of ignorance, be excused from lethal sin.

II. Indeed, he can gravely sin in a light matter, if his temerity drives him to acting after any dictate whatever has been passed over and contemned.

III. He who labors under a lax conscience ought, far more strictly than others, to apply effort to laying it aside, if a doubt about the honesty of an action arises.

26. The causes of lax conscience are: 1. a soft life, which enervates; 2. neglect of prayer, which wholly casts us down; 3. excessive solicitude for temporal things, which makes us earthly; 4. the custom of sinning, which removes the horror of sin; 5. familiarity with vicious men, to whom we become accustomed; 6. luxury, which prevents the Christian from inclining and tending toward spiritual things.

The effects are: 1. blind tranquillity of soul after sin; 2. insensibility to pious warnings; 3. mockery of pious exercises; 4. an impenitent heart treasuring up wrath for itself on the day of wrath (Rom. 2:5).

The remedies of such a conscience are: 1. spiritual retreat for several days; 2. frequent and humble prayer with meditation on the last things; 3. daily examination of conscience; 4. frequent reading of pious books; 5. diligent confession; 6. flight from the wicked and conversation with the good (Haine, Elem. Theol. mor., n. 44).

27. Notion. A scrupulous conscience, or one agitated by scruples, is that which, from a slight motive, doubts concerning the honesty of some action, and therefore often fears that there is sin where there is none (H. Ap., I, 8).

Scruple is said from scrupus, which is a rough little stone entering the shoe of one walking, whence the foot is injured and the step impeded. Therefore a scruple is a vain apprehension, or an empty specter of sin, by which the eyes of the mind are struck, as infants are terrified by apparitions. But it belongs to the malignant spirit to inject a greater anxiety of sinning than is proper, so that the soul, rushing into the abyss of despair, may no longer truly fear any sin.

Three things concur for a scruple: 1. a futile reason, whose solution does not appear; 2. a vain fear of sinning arising thence; 3. disturbance of soul (Billuart, de act. hum., Diss. 5, a. 5).

You will infer: 1. Scrupulous conscience, as such, is not conscience, but only a shadow and likeness of conscience; for it is not the dictate of reason, but of imagination. Yet if someone were to judge firmly that sin is present where it is not, he would have a conscience formed by scruples and therefore erroneous, but properly so called. 2. It differs entirely from a tender and timorous conscience, which indeed solicitously, but wisely, according to the rules of Christian prudence, avoids every sin, even the slightest.

28. Since the present matter is to be treated elsewhere (n. 1835 seqq.) in order to practice, it suffices here to note two things:

I. To act against scruples is always licit, and often obligatory. 1. It is licit, because a scruple is not a dictate of reason, but an empty fear, as lacking a prudent and reasonable foundation. Therefore that fear does not prevent the one acting from forming for himself a practically certain conscience from extrinsic principles, especially from the authority of the confessor. Hence, to act against a scruple is not to act against conscience.

2. It is obligatory, because excessive anxiety greatly harms spiritual progress, and brings grave detriment to body and soul at once (I, 19).

II. The principal and almost sole remedy against scruples is to acquiesce in the judgment of a superior or confessor. - Thus very commonly the Doctors, and the reason is clear. For since the scrupulous, while they are agitated by scruples, cannot form for themselves a true dictate of conscience, nothing else remains except that they hand themselves over to be ruled by the counsel of others, and use extrinsic reasons rather than intrinsic ones (I, 12).

29. Notion. A perplexed conscience is that by which someone, placed between two precepts, believes that he sins whichever part he chooses. He labors under this conscience who, for example, assisting a sick person, thinks that he will sin equally, whether, on a feast day, he omits Mass, or whether he departs from the infirm person.

Rules to be observed by the perplexed (I, 10; H. Ap., I, 7):

I. If the perplexed person can defer the action without grave harm, he is held to defer it until he has consulted the wise (for example a confessor); because each one must avoid that by which he thinks God is offended.

II. If (as usually happens) he cannot defer the action, he is held to choose that which seems to him the lesser evil, avoiding rather the transgression of natural law than of human or positive divine law; for the law of an inferior order must yield to the law of a superior order.

III. If he cannot discern the lesser evil, whichever part he chooses, he does not sin; because there is lacking in him the liberty necessary for formal sin, and because he himself is in invincible ignorance (cf. n. 216).