Chapter II: On the Morality of Acts

St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 19, a. 4; q. 21, a. 1; q. 71, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, V, n. XXXIV; ed. G., II, p. 698; Frins, II, sect. 1 and 2; Cathrein, Moralph., P. 1, l. 11; Tanquerey, Theol. mor., II, p. 19; Willems, Phil. mor., III, p. 32-104.

294. DEFINITION. The morality of human acts is their habitude or relation to the rule of morals, with which they agree, or from which they disagree. Just as artificiality consists in the respect which an artifact has to the rules of art, so morality consists in the respect which a human act has to the rule of morals, that is, according to the Angelic Doctor, to "the dictate of right reason, whether uncreated, which is the eternal law, or created, which is the natural light of man, or participation of the eternal law" (1.2, q. 91, a. 2). Cf. n. 9 and 114 ff., and what St. Thomas teaches, Q. disp. de Virtutibus, q. 1, a. 13.

Hence it is established: "that the nature of moral good is situated in the conformity of action with the laws of order, which God requires from men for His own honor and universal happiness" (V, l. c.).

a) Therefore they err who constitute morality either in liberty or in the voluntary. Certainly, liberty and the voluntary are required as the foundation of morality, but its essence is by no means to be placed in them. For the morality of a human act says imputability to praise or blame: but an act is worthy of praise or blame not precisely because it is free, but because it is freely made conformable or deformed to the rule of morals, that is, to divine law, intimated through conscience. Others settle the question thus: He exists in general worthy of praise, and therefore places a moral act, who acts autonomously; but he alone will be worthy of special praise who acts deliberately in relation to such and such an order. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 93.

b) They likewise err who place the nature of moral good in the useful and delectable alone; wherefore in the Syllabus, under n. 58, Pius IX reprobated this error: "...all discipline of morals and honorable things ought to be placed in heaping up and increasing riches in any way whatever and in fulfilling pleasures."

c) Finally they err who seek the distinction between good and evil in public opinion, in the order of justice, as if that alone were good which is done from the motive of obligation which reason alone dictates.

DIVISION. Morality is divided 1. into GOOD and EVIL. For a human act either agrees with its rule, or wanders from it. If it agrees, it is called right, good, honorable: right, because conformable to its rule; good, because this conformity is owed to it; honorable, because it adorns human nature. But if it wanders from its rule, it is called depraved, evil, dishonorable: depraved, because through its wandering it is truly distorted; evil, because it is deprived of the perfection owed to it; dishonorable, because it befouls the rational creature (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 21, a. 1).

It is divided 2. into material or objective, and formal or subjective. The foundation of the division is the twofold rule to which human acts are to be conformed: namely the law, to which they are to be conformed materially and objectively; and the conscience of the one operating, to which they are to be conformed formally and subjectively. Therefore MATERIAL morality is the agreement or disagreement of an act with the external rule or law; but FORMAL morality, agreement or disagreement with the internal rule or conscience of the agent. From this it is clear that one morality can exist without the other, namely when a man acts from an invincibly erroneous conscience. Thus, for example, an act which is consonant with the law, but which the agent thinks opposed to the law, is materially good, formally evil; on the contrary, an act opposed to the law, which the agent invincibly thinks conformable to the law, is materially evil, but formally good. Cf. Bouquillon, Theol. fund., n. 348 ff.

It is divided 3. into intrinsic and extrinsic. Morality is called intrinsic if it arises from the nature itself of the thing; thus the love of God is intrinsically good, hatred of God intrinsically evil; but it is called extrinsic if it rises from positive law alone: thus to eat meats on Friday is extrinsically evil (cf. n. 112).

295. For greater understanding of the matter, it must be explained what is intrinsically and extrinsically good or evil (Reuter, Theol. mor., P. I, tr. I, n. 32).

1. Intrinsically good is that which, by its nature, agrees with right order, so that it either necessarily ought to be prescribed, for example, adoration of God, or at least can deservedly be counseled, for example, the evangelical counsels. A twofold kind is distinguished: one is good absolutely, for example, an act of faith, hope, and charity; another is good relatively, for example, a vow of chastity.

Intrinsically evil is that which, by its nature, is so repugnant to right order that it necessarily ought to be prohibited. A threefold kind is distinguished: a) Evil absolutely, which is such independently from every circumstance, necessarily and immutably, because in itself it involves repugnance with right order, for example, hatred of God, blasphemy. b) Evil conditionally, which is such not precisely in itself, but by reason of an adjunct, which depends on the dominative power of God or of man: wherefore it can become good, namely by the concession of God or of man acceding. Thus, for example, the killing of a man is intrinsically evil, but conditionally, insofar as concession from one having the right does not accede. c) Evil relatively, which is such only by reason of the danger which it ordinarily has joined to it, as the sight of a base object, the reading of a depraved book, etc. These, when a just cause is given and the proximate danger of sinning removed, can become lawful, as we shall see in its place.

Note. Some authors call conditionally evil actions evil-sounding, insofar as they regularly recall the notion of evil into memory and become good only under certain conditions (St. Thom., Quodl. IX, a. 15 in corp.).

2. Extrinsically good or evil is that which becomes good or evil not from its own nature, but by force of some precept. Such are, for example, servile works which have been prohibited by the Church on certain days, and therefore on those days become evil. Likewise, walking, indifferent in itself, if it is undertaken for the sake of piety or charity, becomes good.

With these things premised, we shall treat: 1. concerning the principles of morality; 2. concerning its extension.