Question II: On the Goodness and Malice of the Exterior Act

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 20, a. 1-4 and 6; q. 19, a. 8.

168. Principle I. The external act can have a twofold goodness and malice, namely:

1. one subjective and formal, which it has immediately from the end of the agent; and this is prior in the internal act of the will, and from it is derived into the exterior act, and depends wholly upon the will.

2. Another objective and material, which it has immediately from the due object and due circumstances; and this is more from reason than from the will, since on the contrary the goodness of the will depends upon it according as the will is borne toward it as toward an object. Hence in the ordination of reason and intention, objective goodness is prior to the goodness of the will; but in the execution of the work the goodness of the will is prior (a. 1 and 2). Hence sometimes the interior and exterior act are in the same species of goodness or malice; sometimes in a diverse species, and then each, just as the completed act itself composed of both, contracts a double species (a. 3), as was said in n. 155.

Therefore, in order that the external act be simply good, formal goodness from the intention of the end and from the will is not sufficient, but there also can be no defect in the external act on the part of the object and circumstances: for good is from an integral cause, evil from any defect whatever (a. 2).

169. Principle II. The external act per se, that is, insofar as it is the mere execution of an efficacious internal act, does not superadd to it formal and simply so-called goodness or malice (a. 4).

It is proved: a) from Scripture, which reckons the sincere will as the deed, Gen. XXII, 16; Mt. V, 28.

b) By reason: liberty is the foundation of morality; hence goodness and malice formally are only where there is liberty. But the interior act of the will alone is of itself intrinsically and formally free; the exterior act is not free except from an extrinsic cause and by an analogical denomination: for it is not voluntary except by the voluntariness of the internal act whose effect it is. Therefore formal goodness and malice are not per se in the exterior act, but this is good or evil in this way only by the goodness or malice of the interior act.

1. Understand analogy not of mere attribution (secundum dici), which is had by metaphor alone, but of proportionality through real participation (secundum esse), as is clear from the examples (a. 3, ad 3).

It was said:

1. Per se, for per accidens or by reason of another it adds accidental goodness or malice, both by reason of the interior act, insofar as the exterior act is often the occasion why the interior act is multiplied, exercised more intensely, continued longer; and by reason of effects, insofar as a special grace, value, or privilege is connected with it, such as grace given by a sacrament, an aureole by martyrdom, an indulgence by a pious work, or evils and inconveniences follow from it, for example, the burden of restitution, censure, irregularity. Hence:

a) When the will is prepared to operate if it could, and does not operate solely because it cannot or because it does not have the occasion of operating, the will without the external act is as good or evil as with it, because the absence of the external act is simply involuntary; whence it simply and essentially merits the same praise or punishment.

b) One who gives alms, fasts, or afflicts the body does not merit more than one who has the efficacious will of doing this; nevertheless he satisfies more, because satisfactory value depends also upon the exterior work insofar as it is penal, that is, upon the penalty insofar as it is actually inflicted.

2. Insofar as it is the execution of the interior act, and not insofar as it is its object: for thus it communicates its objective goodness (if it has any) to the will which intends it, and so formal goodness is already had. But supposing that it is the object of the will, the external execution itself does not add.

3. Formal goodness or malice; for the exterior act, insofar as it perfects and consummates the goodness or malice of the will, adds material goodness or malice and goodness or malice in a certain respect: for although it does not increase formal goodness or malice, nevertheless it extends that same goodness or malice to the exterior act and so perfects it; hence it merits accidental reward or punishment.

4. Efficacious, that is, which of itself suffices for placing the external act and would operate it, if it could. For if it were inefficacious for this, it would not be a proportionate means for obtaining the external act and its effect: thus the will to convert the whole world, to feed all the poor, to free all the souls of purgatory, although it is very good because it participates in something of the goodness of the external act which is its object, nevertheless does not have the same goodness as the work itself, because a single act of the will is not able to effect it (q. 19, a. 8).

170. It is objected:

The interior and exterior act are two moral acts; therefore there is more morality. Resp. St. Thomas, De Malo, q. 2, a. 2, ad 8: "Quantity added to quantity signifies something greater, where both are called quantity according to the same account. But where one is the reason why the other is a quantity, this is not necessary. Thus if wood is long, a line will be long, nor is it necessary that the wood with the line be longer than the line, because the line is the reason of length in the wood: similarly also it was said that the external act has the notion of fault from the act of the will."

171. Observation.

The external act is rightly said and truly is good and evil, because it is conformed or difform to reason and at the same time voluntary; it also has formal goodness or malice, not indeed its own, but derived from the interior act. For with that it constitutes one moral act, to which it concurs as the material element (n. 155). Whence also in confession not only evil wills or intentions are to be declared, but also external acts: for sins must be confessed not only according to distinct species, but entire, such as in fact they were perpetrated, namely, perfect and consummated. In other words, the whole evil must be said (which is truly evil), even if only participatively and analogically it is evil (cf. treatise on Sins).