Question Two: On the Impediments of the Voluntary or On the Involuntary

65. The involuntary is that which does not proceed from knowledge of the end, or, if knowledge of the end is present, nevertheless not from an intrinsic principle, or: that which does not proceed from an intrinsic principle or at least not with knowledge of the end. If only knowledge of the end is lacking, in one who is capable of knowledge and of the voluntary, the involuntary is negative, or non-voluntary, and is that which the agent does not know and therefore neither pursues nor turns away from: thus a dishonorable movement before the advertence of reason is properly non-voluntary. But if inclination from an intrinsic principle is lacking, the involuntary can be positive, or contrary in the proper sense, and is that which the agent turns away from by a positive act and which is against his inclination: thus a base thought had unwillingly is properly involuntary.

66. The involuntary is distinguished as involuntary simply, which the agent in no way causes nor desires but rather turns away from and tries to impede absolutely and efficaciously; and the involuntary in a certain respect, which the agent would not will but which would displease him when certain circumstances are considered, yet, all things weighed, he wills and it pleases him. In other words: that which he turns away from by a conditioned will, yet embraces by an absolute and efficacious will, so that the involuntary in a certain respect is voluntary simply. This voluntary is not pure, but mixed with the involuntary. Thus the throwing of merchandise into the sea is voluntary by reason of the storm, but in a certain respect is involuntary, for if the danger were lacking, the throwing would not be done.

1. Others also divide the voluntary thus: they call voluntary simply that which someone wills absolutely; voluntary in a certain respect, that which he wills or would will conditionally, although now he absolutely wills the contrary. But that which he conditionally wills is only the object of velleity or the willed thing, not voluntary, because it does not proceed from the will. Whence there is no voluntary in a certain respect; but every voluntary is voluntary simply. Therefore when St. Thomas, II-II, q. 142, a. 3, writes that those things which are done from fear are not simply voluntary but mixed, he takes simply for that which is the same as purely, altogether, from every part, and as it is opposed to mixed, as is clear from the terms. But here he takes simply for that which is actual in reality, says Billuart, diss. 1, art. 7. Whence St. Thomas understands voluntary simply in diverse ways: either in the sense explained by us above (I-II, q. 6, a. 6), or as pure voluntary (II-II, q. 142, a. 3).

67. Impediments of the Voluntary. - The following impede the voluntary and thus the human act: 1) all those things by which man is not master of himself, such as defect of reason, alienation of mind, sleep, drunkenness, the state of perfect somnambulism or hypnotism, diabolical obsession, etc.; certain of these, however, can be voluntary in cause; 2) in a man master of himself there are four proximate principal causes (to which the others are reduced) which impede the voluntary, that is, remove or diminish it: violence and fear, which impede the inclination of the will; concupiscence and ignorance, which impede intellectual knowledge, that is, remove or diminish it. Hence they are called enemies of the voluntary.