Question — Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Question Three: On the Distinction of Virtues

587.
  1. By reason of the subject or power in which they principally inhere, into intellectual virtues, which are in the intellect, and moral (or appetitive) virtues, which are in the appetite.
587.
  1. By reason of the nature to which they state an order, into natural virtues, which are suitable to human nature as such and to the natural end; and supernatural virtues, which are suitable to the divine nature participated in us, and to the supernatural end, the beatific vision; of these there will be treatment in the third part.
587.
  1. By reason of the cause, into acquired virtues, which are acquired by our natural acts, in the way explained in part I, q. 3, n. 567; and infused virtues per se, which God alone can give us.
587.
  1. By reason of the object and matter about which they are concerned, intellectual virtues are divided into speculative and practical virtues, and moral virtues according to their various objects; likewise supernatural virtues are distinguished into theological virtues, which are concerned with God Himself, and moral virtues, which order our life: these latter, just like natural virtues strictly so called, which render man morally good, are distinguished into cardinal virtues, which are concerned with principal matter, and annexed virtues, which are concerned with secondary matter.
587.

It should be noted that virtues can be distinguished from several headings; in fact, however many there are, they are distinguished by reason of the object, which gives the lowest species.

587.

In the present matter we shall speak in particular of intellectual, moral, and cardinal virtues.

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