Article I: On Extrasacramental Satisfaction

St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 13, a. 2; q. 14.

543. Principle I. Extrasacramental satisfaction must be made in the state of grace from charity. - For works are not satisfactory except from the acceptance of God; but God does not accept except works pleasing to him, and consequently works done in grace and in his friendship.

And although a debtor can satisfy and pay a debt to a creditor, whether he is a friend or not, nevertheless a sinner cannot do so before God: men in the payment of a debt consider only the external equality of thing to thing; God looks upon the heart, the dispositions, the dignity, and the intention of the one acting. Hence man is bound to accept a quantity equal to the debt; God is not bound, but only accepts from friends.

Hence for satisfaction before God several conditions are required:

A. on the part of the man satisfying:

1. that it be done in the state of grace, from charity, as was said;

2. that it be done in the state of life, because after this life the time of meriting and satisfying ceases;

B. on the part of God accepting, there is required

3. acceptance;

C. on the part of the work:

4. that it be free, because it is a human act;

5. that it be good, because through evil we rather merit punishment than pay it;

6. that it be supernatural, because punishment delays one from the supernatural end;

7. that it be penal, as will be said in the following question, which belongs to the essence of satisfaction rather than to its condition. For this, moreover, it does not suffice that the work of itself be painful and for this reason apt for satisfying; in order that it be in fact satisfactory, it is necessary that in the one acting there be the intention of satisfying, for no goodness is contracted unless it is intended for its own sake.

Hence extrasacramental satisfaction can be defined: the voluntary expiation, through penal works, by a justified penitent, of temporal punishment which remains after fault has been remitted.

544. Applications. - Therefore 1. properly satisfactory are not:

a) good works, but purely natural ones.

b) Nor, a fortiori, works done in the act or affection of sin.

c) Nor supernatural works done in the state of sin, even for sins actually remitted; - except broadly and indirectly, insofar as they can dispose to greater charity, to more ample remission (q. 14, a. 2), and to the habituation of good works; "because nevertheless this merit is not properly called merit, therefore it is more to be granted that works of this kind are not meritorious of any good than that they are" (q. 14, a. 4).

d) Indeed, neither do those works begin to be of value for satisfaction when charity comes upon them, because charity arriving does not make works already done to have been done from charity and to be pleasing to God (q. 14, a. 3), or make things not living become living.

e) Yet good works whose effect remains can acquire satisfactory value if the effect is afterward offered from charity (e.g., weakness from fasting, diminution of substance from almsgiving): as to that which remains, through penance they are accepted by God. But those works of which there is no effect, e.g., prayer, must be repeated (ad 3).

On the contrary, 2. works otherwise already due and prescribed can be satisfactory,¹ but not prescribed under the same title of satisfaction.

¹ Thus Cajetan, Nugno, Suarez, Sylvius, Gonet, Billuart, etc., against several older authors, such as Capreolus, Paludanus, Sylvester, Soto, Major.

For prescribed works can have all the qualities required for satisfaction, namely, that they be free, good, supernatural, and penal; whence also the fasts of the Church, martyrdom, and scourges divinely inflicted are to be observed by precept or borne patiently, and nevertheless are satisfactory.

And although they are already due and are required by God, nevertheless they are not required as satisfactory, but only as good or also meritorious: for they were not due to be done under such a special aspect of expiation and for such an end; but when they are voluntarily assumed as laborious and penal, and are ordered to recompense for the punishment due to sin, then beyond that which is due something is added to them by which they become satisfactory. And thus we can pay a twofold debt by one and the same price, but one which has a twofold value: a moral or also meritorious value from the object and circumstances or from grace and charity, by which we fulfill the debt of precept or vow; and another satisfactory value from punishment and labor, by which we satisfy for the temporal punishment due to sin.

And although in debts of strict justice and in human affairs we ordinarily cannot satisfy a twofold debt by one and the same price, this is because in them the perfect equality of strict justice is required, and indeed the external equality of thing to thing; but it is impossible that an exterior thing be equal to two equivalent things. But in debts toward God the equality of strict justice is not required, and therefore less attention is given to the external equality of thing to thing, but more to the internal dignity and intention of the one acting than to what is exhibited exteriorly, so that sometimes satisfaction is made to him by the act of the will alone, e.g., of most perfect charity. But from the fact that someone satisfies one precept, nothing is taken away from his dignity or intention for satisfying another precept or the debt of punishment, since he can order one act to diverse ends.

Yet this does not hold if the work is already due as satisfactory, or if it is enjoined as such, because by one and the same work not so much honor is restored as by several, nor can the same work at the same time equal several punishments equal to it.

545. Principle II. A man cannot satisfy for one mortal sin and not for another, as to fault or offense, because the offense cannot be taken away except through the reintegration of the friendship of God; - but he can as to temporal punishment, because to each sin a certain measure of temporal punishment is due, and a man can apply his satisfaction for one sin and not for another, just as he can apply it to another and not to himself (q. 14, a. 1).

546. Whether one can satisfy for another? - It must be answered with a distinction. For satisfaction can be ordered to a twofold end: a) to the payment of debt, b) to medicine for avoiding future sin; likewise c) it can be considered either as extrasacramental or as sacramental. Now:

A. One can satisfy for another as to the payment of the debt of punishment for sins committed (provided he is in charity), as is clear from the dogma concerning the communion of saints. For:

1. We are all one in Christ, and many members of one body in Christ the head, from whom all receive influx. But in the human body some member works not only for its own utility but also for that of another, as the eye which sees for the whole body. Therefore also in the mystical body of the Church.

2. Charity has more power before God than before men. But among men one can from love of another pay his debt. Therefore much more before God, who is most liberal, and who in fact showed himself to accept satisfactions from one for another in his Son, who satisfied for all.

3. Hence it is said in Gal. VI, 2: Bear one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfill the law of Christ; and II Cor. VIII, 14: In the present time let your abundance supply their want, that their abundance also may be a supply for your want, that there may be equality.

Indeed St. Thomas observes (q. 13, a. 2): he who thus satisfies for another acts from greater charity in satisfying than he who satisfies for himself; therefore a lesser punishment is required in the one satisfying for another, because punishment has the force of satisfying from charity. Hence although satisfaction for another is accepted by God only de congruo, nevertheless, once the acceptance is posited, it can also be of value de condigno, because he can offer a work which renders to equality on the part of the price or matter.

B. But if satisfaction is considered as medicine for guarding against a following sin, it cannot profit another (except accidentally), just as medicine received by one does not heal the disease of another. For from the fasting of one the flesh of another is not subdued, nor from the good acts of one does another become accustomed to act well, as though he had acquired a habit of acting.

Yet it can profit accidentally, insofar as someone can merit de congruo for another an increase of grace, which is the most efficacious remedy for avoiding sin; but this is by way of merit rather than by way of satisfaction (q. 13, a. 2).

C. But sacramental satisfaction enjoined upon one cannot, insofar as it is sacramental, be fulfilled by another or through another, because, according to the Councils of Florence and Trent, the matter of the sacrament is the acts of the penitent, which by the power of the keys are elevated to the being of a sacrament. But satisfaction fulfilled through another, although it belongs to the penitent because it is done in his name and at his request, nevertheless simply is not his act. Therefore it cannot be elevated by the power of the keys to the being of a sacrament, nor consequently become sacramental satisfaction. Hence no one can complete the sacrament of another.

It is said: insofar as it is sacramental; for the confessor can impose on one penitent a satisfaction to be executed by another at his request (e.g., a pilgrimage, almsgiving): then the work of the other according to itself, or as it is from another, will not be sacramental, but only as it is done from the request of the penitent, or formally as commanded by him. And thus the request itself is the formal element of satisfaction; the work of the other is material.

547. Principle III. Just as the just in the state of way, from charity, can here on earth satisfy for other just persons who are in the state of way, so also they can satisfy for the dead. - For, as St. Thomas says, q. 71, a. 2:

"Charity, which is the bond uniting the members of the Church, extends not only to the living but also to the dead, who depart in charity. For charity, which is the life of the soul, just as the soul is the life of the body, does not end (I Cor. XIII, 8): Charity never falls away. Likewise the dead live in the memories of the living. And therefore the intention of the living can be directed to them. And thus the suffrages of the living profit the dead, as also the living, both because of the union of charity and because of the intention directed to them."

And thus the souls of purgatory can most certainly be helped: "The punishment of purgatory is in supplement of the satisfaction which had not been fully consummated in the body. And therefore because... the works of one can be of value to another for satisfaction, whether he be living or dead, there is no doubt that suffrages made by the living profit those existing in purgatory" (a. 6). And "although souls after death are not simply in the state of way, nevertheless in some respect they are still in the way, insofar, namely, as their progress is still delayed from the last retribution. And therefore... as to this, that they are detained from the last retribution, they can be helped by others, because according to this they are still in the way" (a. 2, ad 3).

548. Remarks. - 1) Although one cannot merit beatitude for another, which is rendered according to capacity, i.e., the merit and present disposition of the one seeing, for one is not disposed by the act of another; nevertheless he can satisfy, because temporal punishment is not measured according to the present disposition of the debtor: for sometimes he who is now better has liability to greater punishment because of preceding sins. And therefore nothing prevents, as to the remission of punishment, one from profiting another and the act of one from becoming that of another, charity mediating, through which we are all one in Christ, according to Gal. III, 28 (q. 13, a. 2, ad 1).

2. Although one can pay a debt for another, he cannot be contrite or confess for another: for contrition (and confession) is directly ordered against fault, which pertains to the disposition of goodness or malice of the man himself who sins, and therefore by the contrition of one another is not freed from fault; namely, one is not disposed by the act of another. Besides, by the confession of one, another does not subject his sins to the keys of the Church; but one cannot receive a sacrament for another, because in a sacrament grace is given to the receiver, not to another (ad 2).

3. He who satisfies for another merits for himself, because he does a good work from charity, but he does not satisfy for himself, because the same quantity of punishment does not suffice for the sin of each. Nevertheless by satisfying for another he merits for himself something greater than the remission of punishment, namely eternal life (ad 3).

4. Sacramental satisfaction, insofar as it is sacramental, is ex opere operato and therefore cannot be alienated; but insofar as it is a work proceeding from free will and having value ex opere operantis, concerning which the one who acts can dispose, it can be ordered to satisfaction for another, and thus the confessor can impose penance or satisfaction for the relief of the souls of purgatory.

5. Although we can and ought to obtain by petition the remission of punishments, nevertheless we cannot do this in an ordered way except through satisfaction or adequate recompense; namely, we obtain by petition the means necessary for this, whether of sacramental satisfaction ex opere operato, or of satisfaction ex opere operantis, one's own or another's, or of the satisfaction of an indulgence from the superabundant satisfactions of Christ or the Saints applied to us by concession of the Church. Hence it is impossible to satisfy in another way for punishment in the present life, just as it is impossible to satisfy for fault except through the aid of contrition. And therefore if we obtain something from God by petition, we do it through a satisfactory operation. Just as when we obtain grace or remission for ourselves or for others by petition, we do it by obtaining penance and not otherwise, so we can obtain satisfaction or remission of punishment by petition, but by then at the same time obtaining satisfactory works. Cf. Nugno, In III, Suppl., q. 13, a. 1; Suarez, in III, d. 37, sect. 10.

6. Hence, just as we cannot by petition alone obtain for ourselves a gratuitous remission of temporal punishment, so much less can we obtain it for other wayfarers, or a fortiori for the souls of purgatory. "No one," says Suarez, in III, d. 48, sect. 2, "can obtain for himself in that way the gratuitous remission of temporal punishment; therefore neither will he be able to obtain it for another, 1) because, other things being equal, prayer is more efficacious for obtaining for oneself than for another; 2) because, since he has something from which he may pay, he undeservedly asks for a gratuitous remission and dispensation from the law of justice, where no sufficient reason of mercy is available." Hence, if we ask remission of punishment for others, we do this according to the order established by divine providence; and therefore we do not ask that it be done through prayers alone without due disposition; but a) we ask for dispositions, namely satisfactory works, or also we offer prayers as a satisfactory work for them: for prayers also are satisfactory, whence they are also customarily numbered with other satisfactory works; b) we also ask that God benignly accept the satisfactory works or apply them to the dead: for although he has established it thus, he has also established that it should be sought by us.