Article I: On Perfect Contrition Itself

494. Thesis. Contrition, perfected by charity, remits sins, even mortal sins, without the real reception of the sacrament of Penance, yet not without the desire of it.

The proposition, set forth in these general terms, is certain from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 4, against Luther and the Protestants, who deny that contrition disposes for justification; but the Council "teaches..., although it sometimes happens that contrition (this contrition) is perfected by charity, and reconciles man to God before this sacrament is actually received, nevertheless this reconciliation is not to be ascribed to contrition itself without the desire of the sacrament which is included in it." That this effect is always obtained when contrition is perfected by charity, and not only most rarely, in a case of extreme necessity, is certain against Baius and Jansenius,1 from the condemnation of propositions 31, 32, 70, and 71 of Baius.2

It is said: a) contrition perfected by charity, namely sorrow of soul and detestation concerning sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning for the future, from the motive of perfect charity toward God supremely loved for His own sake; whence its formal object is the supreme perfection of God on account of which God is lovable above all things and the offense against God is to be detested and repaired;

b) without the real reception of the sacrament of Penance, because perfect contrition from its own nature most fittingly demands the remission of sin and from the promise of God infallibly confers it;

c) yet not without the desire of it, because, since the sacrament of Penance and therefore sacramental confession is necessary in the New Law, the sinner cannot truly be contrite unless he wills to subject his offenses to the power of the keys, namely, to fulfill the necessary means and precepts of Christ.3 Yet it is not always required that the desire be explicit; but if someone is ignorant of the necessity of the sacrament or does not recall it, an implicit desire suffices in the general will of fulfilling all things that are necessary for salvation.

From this it follows:

1. that the desire of itself does not have the power of blotting out sin, nor does contrition have this power by reason of the desire, but the whole power is from perfect contrition;

2. consequently that the desire is not required as if the future sacrament, as foreseen by God, were the moral cause of the remission of sins, nor as if the remission were made conditionally, namely, if the sacrament should be received; but that contrition itself with this desire justifies, insofar as from the desire there is sufficiently posited the condition required in this economy of the New Law for the remission of sin;

3. that a man thus justified is bound by divine precept to accuse to a priest at the opportune time the mortal sins already remitted through contrition; otherwise the desire of receiving the sacrament would not be sincere. - Nor is the absolution of the priest useless in this case, since it works grace ex opere operato, which does not remit sins already remitted but justifies more, and adds the special help of sacramental grace.

1. Estius also taught this, in IV Sent., d. 17, § 2-3.

2. "Through contrition, even joined with perfect charity and with the desire of receiving the sacrament, crime is not remitted, outside the case of necessity or martyrdom, without the actual reception of the sacrament," prop. 71.

3. Thus already before the Council of Trent it was certain on account of prop. 1 of Peter of Osma: "Mortal sins, as regards guilt and the punishment of the other age, are blotted out by contrition of heart alone without order to the keys"; which on August 9, 1478, was condemned as erroneous and contrary to the Catholic faith, but was revoked by the author.

495. The efficacy of perfect contrition is proved:

1. From the Scriptures, which teach that those who are converted to God with their whole heart and love Him perfectly are at once justified. But perfect contrition is so called from the fact that it is perfected by charity. Therefore, if charity justifies, perfect contrition also does.

The major is clear a) from various testimonies of the Old Law (Prov. VIII, 17; Ezek. XVIII, 21-24; XXXIII, 12; Deut. IV, 29; Joel II, 12-13), by which it appears that sinners could obtain the remission of sins without a sacrament; this must at least be understood of those who are converted by a most noble act, such as penance from perfect charity, or, as is said explicitly, who love God and are converted to Him from the whole heart.1

b) A fortiori, this is valid of the New Testament, in which, besides, it appears that if a man loves God with perfect charity, by that very fact he is loved by God, so that he lives (Luke X, 27-28), and God comes to the man and makes His dwelling with him (John XIV, 23), and the man remains in God and God in the man (I John IV, 16), to whom He manifests Himself (I John IV, 7-9, 13), and that he who is thus born of God can no longer have sin (I John III, 9).

2. From Tradition, which a) supposes the thesis, both in the doctrine concerning Baptism of desire or of the Spirit, and in the fact that confession is not to be instituted before the reception of sacraments of the living; indeed, not even before the celebration of the Eucharist, if there is lack of a confessor and there is necessity of celebrating; - b) declares it by explicit testimonies.

Thus Tertullian, On Baptism 18, c. 4; On Penance, c. 4; Cyprian, On the Lapsed, c. 36; On Mortality, 17; ep. X, 5; XII, 1; LXXIII, 23; Pacian, ep. 3 to Sympronian, n. 8; Chrysostom on II Tim., hom. 7, n. 8; book 2 On Compunction; or. on St. Romanus I, 1; Ambrose, or. on the death of Val., 51-53; Augustine, book IV On Baptism, 21, 78; on I ep. John, I, n. 6; V, n. 10; serm. XXXIV, 3, 5; Enchiridion, c. 65; Gregory, II on Kings, c. III, 12, 26; hom. on the Gospels II, 33; Leo the Great, ep. 91 and 108; Peter Chrysologus, serm. 94; Bernard, Bapt., n. 7 and 8; etc.¹

¹ Cf. Galtier, De Poenitentia, n. 67-69.

3. By reason of fittingness: Although the most perfect conversion to God and contrition does not adequately compensate for the offense inflicted on God, nor equal the infinity of the injury, on account of the infinite inequality between God and man, but the injury remains until God liberally remits it, nevertheless from equity it is altogether fitting to the infinite goodness that He remit to one having perfect contrition, both because it is the most perfect disposition which can be had by sinners, and because it imports pure love of God and thus most excellently disposes for divine friendship.

For it is not fitting to the divine goodness still to repel a creature who, with the help of divine aid, rectifies himself concerning the ultimate end, and casts away perversity from himself as far as he can. Namely, God does not deny grace to one doing what is in him.

Nor should this be reckoned changed from the institution of the sacrament of Penance. For since positive law does not change the nature of things, perfect contrition, from its own nature a sufficient disposition for grace, retains the same force with the sacrament instituted.

1. The words of Christ are not an obstacle: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she has loved much" (Luke VII, 47): for in Greek it is read: apheontai, i.e., they have been forgiven.

496. Observations. - 1) The proofs brought forward in the thesis proceed concerning contrition formed by any grade whatever of charity, which always includes actual and habitual conversion to God. For appretiative love above all things cannot consist with an affection or will of sinning. Whence they are valid concerning any grade whatever, not only concerning very intense contrition. Therefore no grade of intensity is required, but the least grade is sufficient, whatever many theologians formerly taught (before and after Trent), holding that contrition is not perfected by charity unless it is very intense; nevertheless their opinion has not been condemned.² Cf. St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 5, a. 1; a. 3; II-II, q. 45, a. 4.

² These belong to three classes: 1) Some said that detestation from the motive of charity, if it is appretiatively supreme, is perfect contrition; and that efficacious detestation from the motive of charity is appretiatively supreme; but intensity is required in order that it be efficacious. Thus many ancient scholastics are said to teach, as, for example, St. Anselm, Hugh of St. Victor, the Master of the Sentences, Roland, William of Auxerre, Albert the Great, Richard of St. Victor, St. Bonaventure; likewise Scotus, Faber, Hicquaeus, Major, Marsilius, Ockham, Gabriel, Abulensis, Thomas of Argentina. - 2) Others said that detestation from the motive of charity, if it is appretiatively supreme, is perfect contrition; but efficacious detestation is not always appretiatively supreme. Therefore a further grade is required beyond efficacy. Thus Pallavicini and Gisbertus. - 3) Others finally required for perfect contrition that it be at once appretiatively and intensively supreme; we have already indicated these above, p. 422. - These various opinions are not directly against the Council of Trent, which did not intend formally to condemn them. Nevertheless the mind of the Fathers was not doubtful, and in all things they favored the doctrine now generally received.

2. Let it not be thought that sin is never remitted by an act of contrition, since it is already remitted by the act of charity from whose command perfect contrition proceeds. For these two things occur simultaneously in one instant, as St. Thomas testifies, q. 85, a. 6 and I-II, q. 113, a. 8; so that according to the order of material and dispositive cause on the part of the subject, contrition precedes by nature; on the contrary, according to the order of efficient cause on the part of the agent, charity precedes.

3. Certain theologians have said that other motives besides perfect charity suffice for perfect contrition and for the remission of sins outside the sacrament: either any motive whatever that regards God, e.g., one taken from the virtue of religion, penance, obedience, gratitude, by which we detest sin not as it is against God supremely lovable, but as injurious to God and opposed to His rights and will (the Scotists, e.g., Brancatus, Minges); or the motive of love of concupiscence and hope, by which we love God as our highest good (as a few moderns: Bolgeni, Hurter, Palmieri, Egger).

This opinion a) is altogether gratuitous, founded on no argument of Scripture or Tradition; - b) is unknown to the Council of Trent, which indicates one motive of perfect contrition, and this where it distinguishes it from attrition ex professo; indeed it seems to reduce all other motives to attrition, since the baseness of sin consists in this, that it is against the right, worship, obedience of God, and the motive of hope (God to be possessed) is reduced to the motive of fear (beatitude lost); - c) nor does it fit with reason: for an act of religion or of love of concupiscence is not a sufficient (or ultimate) disposition for the habit of charity or love of friendship toward God loved above all things. For thus God is not loved more than a created good; than the good of the virtue of religion, which is something created, or than our good, which is something beneath God; - nor does man already esteem himself less than God and God more than himself.³ Whence man does not convert himself with his whole heart, nor does he do all that he can for the remission of sin; and therefore God is not bound to remit to him, either from equity or from fittingness.

³ Indeed, for the virtue of religion or another moral virtue, God, even if He is the end for whom, nevertheless is not the end which, or the object of our act.

4. There is dispute among theologians concerning perfect contrition, as concerning charity, whether for the formal object, namely infinite goodness, one divine attribute suffices, or whether formally infinite goodness is required as the aggregation or sum of all perfections. Many moderns say that one attribute suffices, because in one attribute all the others and the supreme goodness of God are implicitly included, and consequently contrition is already on account of God Himself as supremely lovable. Others more truly say: if a man abstracts from or does not attend to the other attributes, these are not the object of his love, nor is God, infinitely perfect and supremely lovable, formally conceived, than whom nothing better is given and above whom nothing remains to be desired (II-II, q. 23, a. 5, ad 2; Q. D. de Char., a. 6).

5. Certain authors distinguish between the love of charity or friendship toward God, which suffices, and the love of simple benevolence, which does not suffice, for perfect contrition. Thus among others Billuart. But although this is true of natural love of benevolence toward God the author of nature, it is not valid of supernatural love of benevolence toward God the author and end of the supernatural order: for this, if it is above all things, is already of true friendship because it is founded in the communication of the goods of the same divine life, while God is already loved as communicating Himself amicably in the beatific vision.⁴ But if it is not above all things, neither will it be sufficient attrition for obtaining the remission of sin.

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 27, a. 2, cannot be invoked, because he distinguishes benevolence from the act of charity. For he does not distinguish the act of charity from supernatural love of benevolence, but from mere benevolence without love, which "is a simple act of the will, by which we will good to someone, even without presupposing a union of affection toward him"; while "love... imports a certain union according to the affection of the lover toward the beloved, insofar, namely, as the lover esteems the beloved in a certain way as one with himself,... and thus is moved toward him." "Thus therefore," the holy Doctor concludes, "in dilection according as it is an act of charity, benevolence indeed is included; but dilection or love adds union of affection."

But if by the adversaries there were understood not love of benevolence, but benevolence alone or a mere act of willing good, they would indeed speak truly; but the observation would not be to the point, since thus they would not indicate a special motive, because in every sincere contrition, even imperfect and fearful, there is necessarily and always included the will of repairing sin, which is to will good to God.