Article I: On Perplexed Conscience

St. Th. I-II, q. 19, a. 6, ad 3; Q. D. de Ver. 17, a. 4, ad 8.

113. A simply perplexed conscience (radeloos geweten) is that by which someone, placed in the midst of two precepts, fears or suspects or probably thinks, invincibly, that he necessarily sins here and now, whether he places the act or omits it, whether he chooses this or that, and yet he must now choose one of them; for example, one serving a dying man who thinks he will sin whether he deserts him or omits Mass; one sworn to the killing of an enemy who thinks he will sin whether he does not keep the oath or kills. - It is said:

a) fears, suspects, or probably thinks, and thus it is distinguished from an erroneous conscience which judges with certitude; for it does not seem that anyone can judge certainly that he necessarily sins;

b) invincibly, and thus it is distinguished from a vincibly erroneous conscience, which is perplexed in a qualified sense: for with this someone sins whether by acting against it or according to it, yet he can also lay it aside; but because he voluntarily neglects this, therefore he sins;

c) that he necessarily sins: this is the object by which it is distinguished from every other doubtful and opinative conscience;

d) and yet he must choose one: for if someone could defer the action, it would not be a truly perplexed conscience, because he could consult the wise and lay aside the conscience; but if he did not do this, he would sin in the same way as was said concerning a vincibly erroneous conscience.

114. Thesis. He who has a simply perplexed conscience must choose what appears to him the lesser evil. - Each one must avoid voluntary or formal sin as far as is possible for him.

In the case, therefore, 1) he must rather transgress positive law than natural law, and human law than divine law; rather commit a venial sin than a mortal one (also generally if this is doubtful, because then it is presumed certainly venial), a doubtful sin than a certain sin, etc.; and he must form for himself a practically true and certain judgment that it will not be imputed to him. Otherwise in either case he would be guilty of the excess of the malice of the greater evil over the malice of the lesser evil.

2. But if he cannot discern which is the lesser evil, whichever part he chooses, he does not sin, even if he does not form a practically true and certain conscience, because in such a case the liberty necessary for sinning is lacking. Thus the confessor who equally fears lest, by absolving one doubtfully disposed, he concede the sacrament to the unworthy, and, by denying, remove the penitent altogether from the use of the sacrament.

115. Formation of a certain conscience in the case of a perplexed judgment. - He who labors under a perplexed conscience can easily form for himself an indirectly certain conscience, from the principle obvious to all: No one is held to the impossible; for example, in this way:

"No one is held to the impossible; - or: God does not oblige to the impossible.

"But in this case to do and to omit appear to me equally evil, and it is impossible at the same time to do and to omit.

"Therefore in this case I am not held to avoiding evil; - or: in the case God does not oblige me to avoid evil."

Or thus: "Between two evils, which it is impossible for me to avoid together, the lesser must be chosen.

"But in this case to do and to omit (to do this and to do that) appear to me evil, but that seems the lesser evil.

"Therefore in this case that must be chosen by me."

In this way he now has a practically true and right conscience.