Article I: On Taxes and Tolls to Be Paid

624. Taxes or tolls, in a broad and general sense, are called whatever citizens are bound to pay for relieving the common burdens of the republic; strictly, however, these two are distinguished. Taxes, namely, in the proper sense are monies which citizens must pay by civil law precisely for this end, that satisfaction may be made for the public expenses of the republic; a toll is rather money to be paid on account of the conveyance of merchandise, whether into another city or kingdom (droits de douane et de transit), or to another person (droits de succession et de mutation), or into another form or use (droits d'accise).

In modern law, however, another distinction is usually in use, namely, into direct and indirect taxes. Direct taxes are those which immediately and primarily affect persons on account of the goods which they possess, immovable or movable, or the arts or businesses which they exercise. But indirect taxes are reckoned to be those which immediately and primarily affect things and mediately persons, such as those which are collected on occasion of succession, conveyance, manufacture, etc.

625. The conditions required for the justice of a tax are numbered as three:

1. That it be imposed by legitimate and competent authority, national, provincial, municipal, as commutative justice prescribes;

2. For a just cause, namely, the utility or necessity of the republic, so that immediately or mediately it yields to the common good, proportionately to the necessity occurring, as legal justice demands; otherwise public authority does not have the right to dispose of the goods of subjects; hence under this heading there are per se excluded taxes imposed for useless expenses, or a fortiori for harmful ones;

3. With due proportion to the faculties of each one having been preserved, as distributive justice dictates: so that the burden does not exceed the faculties and is compensated by the advantage which comes to the people from the tax, and consequently so that those who are richer and perceive more of the benefits of civil administration bear greater burdens. For the State does not have the right to dispose of the goods of subjects except in this way.

1. In Belgium, for the various earlier direct taxes there was substituted a general tax upon income (law of October 29, 1919, arts. 1, 7, and 90).

Hence they sin not only against legal or distributive justice, but also against commutative justice:

a) Those who knowingly impose taxes (legislators, ministers, the king sanctioning them) without probable necessity or utility, because they unjustly deprive citizens;

b) Those who squander public monies without utility, with danger of burdening the peoples in the future;

c) Those who divide burdens among subjects without proportion to their faculties, and exceed these.

626. Thesis I. Taxes de iure and per se oblige in conscience, at least after the quota part has been legitimately determined according to justice.

It is explained. It is said: a) de iure and per se, insofar as the legislator has the power of obliging subjects in conscience, and is judged to intend this unless the contrary is clear from the circumstances. For legislators can also establish a merely penal law and oblige under the penalty alone; hence, if from the circumstances it is evident that such was the mind of the legislator, or that the law is understood by the greater part of the people as merely penal, and the legislator does not contradict, by accident the law does not bind in conscience except to the penalty;

b) At least after the quota part has been legitimately determined: for in present-day law the law does not oblige subjects, unless after legitimate authority has defined the quota to be paid and imposed it upon the citizen; for then the general obligation of paying taxes passes into a strict obligation, which can be sought by civil action. The determination of the quota to be paid is usually made by taxation by officials; but that it may be made more easily, sometimes a declaration to be made by citizens is prescribed by public power; in which case, even if there is an obligation of conscience of declaring, nevertheless, before the quota has definitively been imposed, there is not yet an obligation of paying, especially from commutative justice;

c) According to justice: for insofar as taxes are not unjust, so far they per se oblige.

It is proved: 1. From the Scriptures: a) implicitly, from the example and words of Christ, who commanded Peter to pay the tax (Mt. XVII, 23-26), and, being asked by the Pharisees and Herodians whether it was lawful to give tribute to Caesar, answered: "Render therefore the things that are Caesar's to Caesar, and the things that are God's to God" (Mt. XXII, 21); b) explicitly, from the doctrine of the Apostle Paul, Rom. XIII, 5-7: to rulers "be subject of necessity, not only because of wrath, but also because of conscience. For therefore also you pay tribute: for they are the ministers of God, serving unto this very thing. Render therefore to all their dues: to whom tribute, tribute: to whom toll, toll." Hence taxes and tolls must be paid in conscience, because they are ministers of God.

2. From the common doctrine of theologians of all times.

By reason: Citizens are bound in conscience to furnish those things which are necessary for administering and protecting society. But society generally cannot be administered and preserved without expenses necessary for preserving good order, protecting the fatherland against enemies, and promoting the common good; and these expenses cannot be paid unless taxes are imposed. Therefore citizens are bound to pay them in conscience; but if they could not be held in conscience, the end intended and necessary to the common good would not easily be obtained.

627. Thesis II. Even de facto, in present-day times and in many regions, taxes, at least direct taxes, oblige in conscience. We say: in many regions, because we would not dare to pronounce a firm judgment for England and English-speaking America.

Some have attempted to deny the thesis or call it into doubt, saying:

a) Present-day legislators care nothing about obligation in conscience;

b) The common persuasion of the people is inclined to considering tax laws as merely penal, whence also many of timid conscience defraud taxes;

c) Given an obligation of conscience, timid men would be in a much worse condition than the impious who do not care about such an obligation.

But, says Prummer, "everyone easily understands that these reasons are not convincing." For the response is:

To the first, that a true obligation may be present, it suffices that the legislator truly intend to impose the law and wish to command: for by that very fact an obligation of conscience naturally follows, and he implicitly intends it; otherwise almost no civil law could now oblige in conscience (I, n. 284).

To the second, the persuasion of the people rather regards the prior declaration to be made by citizens for certain taxes, but not the payment itself of taxes already defined, since citizens rarely are able to evade payment in such a case; moreover, in present-day law the estimation and custom of the people obtains no power of authentically interpreting or abrogating laws.

1. Thus Angelus Carletus (d. 1495), against whom Sylvester Prierias, O.P. (d. 1523) vehemently fought. In more recent time Biederlack, Crolly, Genicot-Salsmans, Frassinetti, Bucceroni favor this opinion; Vermeersch inclines to it; St. Alphonsus does not dare to call it probable.

2. Yet this is not universally true, nor in all regions.

To the third: it proves too much, because, if it had force, it could almost always be applied, and there would now be no obligation of human law in conscience.

The aforesaid opinion, therefore, is neither solidly nor sufficiently probable, if the reasons adduced are considered, and a fortiori if the opposing reasons are considered.

It is proved: 1. From the intention of the legislator and the end of the law: the legislator is judged to oblige in conscience when the law immediately contributes to the common good and is very necessary for the public good, such as a law imposing taxes is: for then he is presumed to oblige in the more efficacious manner, insofar as he can.

2. From the penalties and sanctions of the law: the obligation of paying direct taxes already defined is usually urged not only under penalty of a fine, but also by coercive penalties, for example, prison, indeed also by civil action, so also that sometimes it is a privileged debt fortified by legal mortgage: then the fiscal laws themselves grant the State a strict personal right, even before other debts, of pursuing payment from the goods of citizens by coercive force (for example, by compulsory sale), and indeed without judicial sentence, because from the law itself immediately the title is executory in the same degree as a judicial sentence.

Thus also in Belgium: formerly the law of August 22, 1822, now the law succeeding it, of October 29, 1919, arts. 70-73. The same is valid concerning duties imposed on occasion of succession (law of December 27, 1817, art. 3). But if sometimes recourse is given to a tribunal, either it is against the mode of proceeding alone, or for fines to be imposed besides upon defrauders, but not for founding the right of the State and the obligation of citizens, which the judge only recognizes.¹

¹ Nor does the objection of Fr. Vermeersch have force: sometimes someone has a civil action before a judge, and yet does not have a strict right, for example, to some reparation to be made to him (on account of damage inflicted in goods of soul or body or external goods), before the sentence of a judge has intervened. We concede this concerning those cases in which the sentence itself of the judge is the immediate title of the said right. But the public treasury (the fisc) has the right immediately from the law itself and independently of the intervention of a judge. Thus Kiselstein, in Revue Eccl. de Liege, March 1922. The whole article deserves to be read.

3. From the very words of the law. Even the law of taxes often employs imperative words, which ordinarily are accustomed to found the presumption of obligation.

Thus also the new Belgian tax law (arts. 11, 20, 21, 28, 32, 38, 70); moreover, in the discussions preceding the acceptance of the law, the strict natural office by which citizens are bound to pay taxes was mentioned several times.²

² Ann. Parl., October 10, 1919, p. 1985.

4. Finally there is added that a merely penal law, in so great a universality of all taxes, would necessarily open the way to innumerable frauds, lies, and perjuries, from which inequality and injustice would prevail with great detriment to the whole of society and of morals.

Hence tax laws, provided they are just and are applied in practice according to the rules of justice, oblige in conscience, from justice and obedience, unless the contrary appears from special circumstances. But the contrary does not appear except probably a) for laws merely prohibiting certain merchandise to be imported (droits de douane), unless it concerns merchandise prohibited because dangerous to public security: for grave fines and the multitude of watchful officials seem to indicate that nothing is left to the consciences of subjects. Likewise b) for taxes imposed on occasion of the manufacture or cultivation of certain things (droits d'accises ou de culture). Likewise c) for certain laws in postal matters, for example, that monies not be inserted in ordinary letters, or letters be inserted among other things to be conveyed; and similar things which seem merely to be referred to external order and can be assimilated to laws about preserving public order, which are merely penal (lois de police).

628. There is a dispute concerning the nature of the obligation, and concerning its proximate foundation, and concerning the virtue by whose force it binds. On this there are three opinions:

The first is of those who hold the laws to be merely penal, which oblige only to the penalty, and then only from obedience and legal justice. This we have already refuted;

The second holds that the obligation arises from commutative justice, so that for those defrauding there is an obligation of restoring. Thus St. Antoninus, the Roman Catechism, Billuart, and many others, so that St. Alphonsus calls the opinion most common and more probable. The principal reason is the implicit contract which intervenes between the prince and the people. The prince promises to procure the common good; citizens promise to pay the taxes necessary for sustenance and for taking care of the common affair.³

³ There is a manifold way of defending this opinion: 1. the right of occupying taxes by force of a pact or implicit contract, because social life is impossible without goods; 2. the contract is one of insurance, and the tax is the premium of insurance: thus Thiers and Mirabeau; 3. the contract is an exchange of offices, and the tax is the price by which utilities are bought, a recompense for an emolument received: thus Hugo Grotius, Bastiat, Ad. Smith; 4. the tax is a real burden in goods established for cooperation: thus Genouillac, Monier, De Broglie, Yves Guyot. But the State is not a society of monies but of persons; otherwise, how in that case could indirect taxes be justified? Cf. Janssen, Le fondement philosophique du devoir fiscal, in Eph. Theol. Lov., July 1925; and De Zedenleer en het belastingswezen.

The third opinion says that the obligation per se arises from legal justice and obedience. For the obligation of paying taxes is not real, but personal, by which citizens are bound to contribute to the common good of the republic. This, however, they explain in two ways: some say that there is an obligation from legal justice of declaring goods to be taxed,⁴ but after taxation there is also present an obligation of commutative justice;⁵ others, on the contrary, even after taxation, acknowledge only an obligation of legal justice,⁶ as before, or also hold the obligation of declaring, provided the law does not openly exact it in conscience or under oath, probably as merely penal,⁷ unless it concerns goods which in some case would be necessary for the very sustenance or conservation of civil society.

⁴ Thus Bouquillon, Marres, Lehmkuhl, Noldin, Keuller.

⁵ Waffelaert, Lehmkuhl, Th. Mechliniensis, Kiselstein; Aertnijs-Damen.

⁶ Vermeersch, Noldin, Cornelisse, Keuller, Ballerini-Palmieri, Marc.

⁷ Waffelaert, Th. Mechliniensis, Vermeersch, Kiselstein.

In practice this depends on the law. In Belgium it seems more conformable to the law to assert an obligation from commutative justice for taxes already legally defined, to which the State also has a civil action; but for the declaration, it does not seem improbable that the obligation is merely penal, considering both the grave penalties and the fact that the Belgian minister himself who composed the law and declared that citizens are held in conscience to pay taxes sincerely, nevertheless added that his mind was not to urge so strictly the necessity of declaration.⁸

⁸ Ann. Parl., October 9, 10, and 13, 1919; pp. 1960, 1985, and 2020.

629. The modes of imposing or taxing and exacting taxes are various:

1. Either taxation is made from presumption, with the right of protest and complaint; in which case declaration is not obligatory, and consequently it is lawful to withdraw goods. Thus immovable goods can be taxed according to value or presumption, with the right of complaining, as happens in Italy; but for revenues and successions of movable things, taxation can be made according to presumption or declaration, yet in Italy successions of movables are not subject to tax except for goods openly possessed.

2. Or declaration is principal, and taxation with the right of complaint is secondary. In this case the obligation of declaring can probably be judged to have been prescribed by a merely penal law, as in France and in Belgium; and then a false declaration does not constitute injustice, but is a lie, unless it is made with a real restriction which is sufficiently indicated by circumstances, as if the tax is very great and partly unjust, or unjust vexation is exercised, or it is universally customary for it to be defrauded in part by subjects.

3. Or a declaration is to be made in conscience: "on honor," as in Germany, or "under oath," as in the Netherlands for successions. In this case the law of declaring obliges in conscience, at least from legal justice; and the transgression of the law is a grave sin in notable matter. Yet if the tax is certainly and truly unjust,⁹ at least in part, or by general custom is usually defrauded partially, a restrictive declaration which conceals this part perhaps even then could be held as not mendacious (unless, however, one uses false bonds), because this is sufficiently indicated by the circumstances, and because civil power cannot justly exact that someone pay proportionately more than is usually done in the same circumstances. Hence probably it could be concealed up to a fourth part, or perhaps up to a third part, according to circumstances.

⁹ We say certainly and truly unjust, because many easily imagine it to be unjust, just as they easily affirm that there is a general custom of defrauding.

630. Conclusions. A. According to all, officials exacting taxes are held to restitution when they knowingly and willingly favor those defrauding taxes: for they are held from office, or quasi-contract, to prohibit this; and if they are sworn, they also sin against religion.

But they must restore their salary according to the proportionate part of their negligence (for example, of one day, one week, etc.), and besides the tax, at least direct, not received; but not the fines, because these are not owed before they have been inflicted. But for those tolls which oblige only to the penalty, they are not held to restore unless from the defrauding the State has undergone great detriment, so that its revenues are notably diminished, especially if it is in greatest need of them.

B. Those also injure commutative justice who not only intend to capture benevolence by words or even by small gifts, but corrupt the exactors of taxes by an express or tacit pact, or prohibit them by force or threats from exacting the taxes which are justly owed: for such persons cooperate in the injustice of the exactors, and by unjust means violate the right of the public treasury (the fisc) to receive just taxes.

By reason of cooperation, they must repair the damage caused by the officials, in solidum with them but in the second place, namely, if those fail; by reason of the thing accepted, if they themselves retain a direct tax already imposed which was defrauded, they must restore in the first place, and the officials if they fail; but if both have divided it, each is held for the part which he retains, in solidum and in the first place. Thus Ill. Waffelaert.

C. A fortiori those who attempt by force to snatch away taxes or fines justly received and to compensate themselves secretly, because the goods have already been justly acquired by the State and have been made its own.

D. Those who apply their work to defrauding tolls from habit and as if by art sin gravely at least under a double title, because they expose themselves to graver danger (lies, perjuries, penalties), and because they generally are prepared even for bloody defense against public guardians of tolls.

E. Everywhere citizens are to be exhorted to pay taxes according to the custom received in the region. But one who, before taxation has been made, defrauds the public treasury (the fisc) only in those parts of taxes in which even timid persons are accustomed to do so, is not to be accused of sin on this account. I say: on this account, because it is not lawful to use evil means, for example, lies, false written instruments, nor a fortiori perjuries.

F. Everywhere it can probably be held that a strict right arises for the public treasury (the fisc) only after the royal commissioner has defined the quota and imposed it upon the citizen as to be paid. Thus say also those who defend the stricter opinion in this matter.

G. But what if a citizen has concealed goods or deceived officials by lies, frauds, or what is worse, perjuries? It is disputed. Lehmkuhl, at least as regards direct taxes, teaches that he who does not declare the value of goods which upright men are accustomed to declare sins against commutative justice: for he is an unjust cause why others must pay more. Marres, Waffelaert, and Tanquerey deny this. Nor does the reason adduced have force, for a) he is not a cause but an occasion, because citizens must not positively favor the right of the State to occupy part of goods, but only must not impede the State in the exercise of its right: thus they use their own right and are not obligated from justice to impede the damage of others; b) certainly they are not an efficacious cause. For the physical cause is the official, the moral cause is the necessity of the State; he who omits the declaration, using his own right and not being bound to impede the damages of others, by accident burdens them.

H. Given the variety of opinions, let the confessor, with respect to defrauding taxes, note these general principles:

a) The burden of paying or restoring is not to be imposed unless the obligation is certain, with all things diligently inspected;

b) Where penitents are in good faith, it is often expedient that they be left in it;

c) If penitents ask, they are to be exhorted to pay taxes as upright men are accustomed to pay and as legitimate custom interprets the laws.

631. Observations. 1. In a positive doubt concerning the justice of a tax, it seems that it must be paid, because the presumption stands for the legislator, who possesses the right of commanding; although some have said that many taxes are unjust and therefore that the presumption is against the legislator, at least in part, and consequently that upon him lies the burden of proving the justice of the tax. But this is against the general principles set forth in the treatise on conscience; nor is it verified in present-day times, when taxes are established by deputies of the people. Thus perhaps there has never been a law more conformable to distributive justice than our recent Belgian one, immediately founding the direct tax upon real income. Hence theoretically there can be no doubt about its justice; nor practically, if in taxing individuals it is applied according to the norms of justice.

2. If a tax is certainly unjust in part, it will be lawful and just to defraud this part. Hence some plausibly hold that, in so great a multitude of taxes, there are often some unjust ones, because many useless expenses are made; and consequently taxes can be partially defrauded. Yet this does not always have force, because in these matters the common good is the supreme law; hence if it is morally impossible for it to be done otherwise, or if the common good requires this, the tax will now be just by accident.

3. From distributive justice taxes must be immediately proportioned to the strength of citizens, not to goods or revenues. Hence they must not necessarily be proportional to revenues, nor must they be simply progressive; but it is better if the proportion is tempered by some progression, with attention to the various destinations of proceeds and the other obligations of citizens.

4. Other monies to be paid to the State on account of certain works which it undertakes to furnish in favor of individuals are not to be confused with taxes properly so called, for example, for carrying persons, things, and letters by railway or postal way. Since in this case a contract intervenes between the State and the private persons who request its work, there is no doubt that the charges must be paid from commutative justice. Hence those sin against strict justice who, by deceiving the officials, defraud the State (by using a false ticket, or false money, or by not paying if they must ask for a ticket), and a fortiori those who corrupt them. Namely, the intention of the contracting State is that it does not wish to transfer things or persons on such conditions.

5. The question concerning the obligation of taxes is not of such great weight in practice as it seems at first glance. For after taxes have been definitively imposed upon individual citizens, it now becomes almost impossible not to pay them, unless perhaps by corrupting officials, which certainly is against commutative justice. But before they are imposed upon individuals, to defraud them is not established as being against commutative justice and therefore does not oblige to restitution.

But in declarations a sin can be committed, especially if the law urges it in conscience; yet even then there can be an exception, as we have said, and the sin, if there is one, is at most against legal justice.