Article I: On the Act Itself of Faith

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, a. 1; q. 2, a. 2; De Verit., q. 14, a. 1; III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 2.

693. Thesis. The elicitive principle of faith is the intellect. - The last act required for faith, which is essentially and properly the act of faith by which we assent to revealed truth, is an act of the intellect; whence the intellect is the proximately elicitive principle of faith. - This is certain from the Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 3, establishing faith by which we believe true things, and from the profession of faith of Pius X; against many Protestants, who hold faith to be confidence, which is rather in the heart or will than in the intellect, and against Rationalists, Semirationalists, and Modernists, who place it especially in a tendency or inclination, or reduce it to a religious sense.

It is established from the Scriptures in which:

1. faith is called an argument, that is, a conviction of things not appearing (Heb. XI, 1);

2. by it we admit something as true, and indeed on account of testimony (Heb. XI, 3, 6, 8; Mk. XVI, 16; John VI, 70; XX, 31; Rom. X, 9; I John V, 1-10);

3. whence it is called the captivity of the intellect unto the obedience of Christ (II Cor. X, 5).

Hence a profession of faith was always required from catechumens, in which the Symbol was explained (cf. Cyril of Jerusalem, Cat. V, 7; Chrysostom, in Hebr.; Augustine, De Praed. SS., n. 5).

694. The analysis of the act of faith simply is this: we admit some truth, for example, the Incarnation, that is, we judge it to be true, because God has authority in revealing it (which is supposed already to have been known beforehand); but in this act we do not believe nor in any way affirm the very authority of God revealing. For just as in human faith the authority of Peter testifying is in no way believed or affirmed, but is only the motive or that on account of which I believe what he says, so in divine faith the authority of God revealing is only the motive on account of which we believe, but in no way that which is believed or affirmed; otherwise it would be to confuse the material and formal object. In other words: the knowledge of the authority of God is previously supposed as a condition, but it is not the cause or motive of assent; this is not knowledge concerning the authority of God, but only the authority known from elsewhere.1

Hence 1. Suarez does not rightly teach,2 that the motive, that is, the authority of God revealing, is believed in the act itself of faith, saying that the analysis of this act is: I believe the Incarnation, because I believe the authority of God revealing it, and I believe the authority of God revealing it, because I believe the authority of God revealing itself, since it is impossible that God reveal something and not by that very fact speak His authority in revealing, or reveal Himself with authority. - For then it can again be asked: and why do you believe God saying that He reveals with authority, or revealing His authority? Either you will answer: because I believe a new revelation of the authority of God, and then you believe that because you believe another, and then there will be a process to infinity; or you will answer: I believe the authority of God revealing because I believe it, which is a blind affirmation without a reason given.

Nor say: the authority of God revealing is also revealed, therefore it also must be believed. - The answer is:

a) for this reason it is not believed in every act of faith: for the intellect can abstract from the fact that God, by revealing, also revealed His authority, and can consider uniquely that He revealed another truth, for example, the Incarnation; indeed ordinarily we act thus;

b) when we believe the authority of God revealing, it is at once that which is believed and the motive on account of which it is believed, but it is not believed insofar as it is the formal object or motive; in other words: the authority of God is believed on account of itself as motive, but not on account of itself as believed, otherwise we would arrive at this absurd analysis: I believe the authority of God revealing because I believe it!

Likewise 2. we do not admit what Lugo teaches,1 that in the act of faith the authority of God and the very fact of revelation are affirmed by reasoning, saying that the act of faith is a ratiocination or is equivalent to it: God in revealing is infallible; but God revealed the Incarnation; therefore the Incarnation was made. - For:

a) the conclusion of this syllogism is not: therefore the Incarnation was made, but: therefore God, in revealing the Incarnation, is infallible. This conclusion is not an act of faith, because it is not adherence given to the Incarnation; from it indeed follows the obligation of believing the Incarnation, but not necessarily that it is already believed;2

b) since that conclusion is admitted on account of the nexus with the premises, it is not an act of faith in the authority and testimony of another, but an act of science; especially

c) because it is not admitted by trusting in the dignity or authority of God revealing; whence such reasoning could also be made by an unbeliever, who at the same time by a perverse will would not wish to believe.

Nor say: it is irrational, indeed impossible, that we believe unless we know that God is infallible in revealing and that He Himself has spoken. - For the answer is that the assertion is true, but from this it does not follow that those truths are affirmed in the act itself of faith: for it suffices and is required that they be known prior to that act, as will be said in article 3. Just as in human faith it is prerequired that I know the authority and testimony of Peter in order that I may believe him, but while I believe him I do not affirm his authority and testimony.

695. Corollaries. - From the aforesaid doctrine it follows, and besides experience establishes:

1. that the act of faith is simple, because it indivisibly attains the revealed truth as believed and the authority of the one revealing as the reason for believing; consequently

2. that it is not complex and multiple, so that it is equivalent to two other acts (as Suarez says) or to three (as Lugo says); consequently

3. nor is it formally or virtually discursive. Moreover an assent which rests upon discourse has as motive the goodness of the consequence, for we assent to the conclusion because it coheres logically and follows well from the antecedent; but the assent of faith in no way rests upon the goodness of the consequence, but the adequate motive of faith is only the first truth of God revealing something.

1. This mode seems to us altogether conformable to the principles of St. Thomas. The Salamancans, John of St. Thomas, Gotti, Mazzella, Billot, Mannens, Van Noort, etc., hand it down; thus also perhaps Billuart judges.

2. Likewise Valentia, Coninck, Schaetzler, Brouwer, Waffelaert; also certain Thomists.

1. Likewise Franzelin, Bouquillon, the Mechlin Theology.

2. Perhaps someone will say that the argument can be proposed otherwise: What God reveals is true; but God revealed the Incarnation; therefore the Incarnation is true. But this conclusion is assent to the Incarnation. - Resp. 1. indirectly: either the assent is given on account of deduction, and then it is an assent of science, not of faith; or it is given on account of the authority of God alone, and then it is not discursive; - 2. directly: the sense of the Major, in which the whole formal object or motive of faith is placed, is: what God reveals is true as to us, that is, it is shown to be true, insofar as revealed and because God is truthful; for something is not objectively in itself true because it is revealed; - but the minor is nothing but the application of the motive of faith to a determinate truth, namely, the Incarnation. The conclusion cannot be broader than the Major, and must be: the Incarnation is true as to us, namely, insofar as revealed and because God is truthful; but this is nothing other than to say: it is thus shown to be true on account of the authority of God revealing, so that this moves us to admitting it for that reason, and it merits being admitted on account of this motive by that other and special voluntary assent which is faith. But this is nothing but credibility; whence the conclusion itself is not an assent of faith.