Article I: On the Essence and Object of Prayer

S. Th. II-II, q. 83, a. 1, 3-6, 10, 11.

661. Prayer is called by St. John Damascene (De fide orth., l. 3, c. 24): "the ascent of the mind to God." Hence:

a) In the broadest sense, it is every ascent or movement of the intellect and will into God, whether it happens by religion or by other virtues, such as the theological virtues, penance, humility; and thus meditation and contemplation are called mental prayer;

b) In a less broad sense, it is that ascent of the mind which happens by religion and by which we praise God and bless Him, give thanks to Him for gifts conferred, or seek His help;

c) This last alone is prayer in the strict sense.

662. Prayer strictly so called is defined by the same St. John Damascene: a pious petition of fitting things from God. It is said:

1. Petition, that is, an explanation or manifestation of our desire made to another for obtaining something by way of favor. Namely, it is a manifestation:

a) Of desire, and thus it is distinguished from command and from the exigency of right;

b) For obtaining something, so that it is speech not simply narrative, but motive, which induces another to grant something;

c) By way of favor, and thus it is distinguished from counsel and exhortation.

2. Of fitting things, that is, of those things which are honorable and which it is unbecoming neither for men to ask from God nor for God to bestow upon men.

3. From God, so that it may be indicated that prayer properly so called is made to God alone, by whom alone it can be fulfilled.

4. Pious, so that it may be indicated that it is an act of religion: for although petition involves some humiliation, and therefore is most apt for expressing the excellence of another and our subjection, nevertheless it does not necessarily include the account of worship; therefore, that in fact it may worship God and be able to be called strict prayer, it must proceed from a pious intention of worshiping God, or from an act of devotion. Yet this intention suffices if implicit, as it is ordinarily had in the prayers of the faithful.

663. Prayer is not an act of the will but of practical reason. It is proved:

To pray bespeaks some ordering; but to order is an act of reason, not of the will; therefore. For:

a) Through practical reason, man disposes and orders something to be done by another, either by morally compelling an inferior and imposing necessity upon him: through command; or by inducing a superior or equal, and by manifestation of desire disposing him toward some effect: through petition or prayer. Therefore, just as command is an act of practical reason, so also is prayer.

b) Prayer is speech to God, as being a manifestation of desire; but speech is an ordering of concepts and an expression of them made to another, either by external or mental words; therefore it is essentially an act of reason (a. 1). But since it is an act of practical reason, it necessarily presupposes an act of the will.

664. Prayer is properly an act of religion. Through prayer man exhibits reverence and honor to God, insofar as he subjects himself to Him and professes that he needs Him as the author of all goods¹ (a. 3). Indeed, after devotion, it is the more principal act, because it is better to offer intellect to God than body or exterior things (ad 1 and 3).

¹ "Therefore when," says Prummer, Th. M. II, n. 332, "someone prays for recovering health, he ought first and more principally to intend divine worship and his subjection under God; secondarily, however, he can desire his own health."

665. Who can pray. Since prayer is an act of reason by which someone entreats a superior, those can pray who have reason and at the same time a superior whom they can entreat; namely: Christ as man (who often prayed on earth, and in heaven is always living to intercede for us), the angels, the saints, and all wayfarers, even the non-predestined or sinners, as is clear from the condemnation of Wycliffe² and Quesnel;³ but not the three divine persons nor irrational creatures (a. 10 and 11).

² Prop. 26.

³ Props. 50 and 59.

Yet de facto demons or the damned do not pray, inasmuch as they do not will to worship God. But whether the souls in purgatory pray for themselves, and especially for others, is disputed: St. Thomas denies that they pray for us, because they are inferior to us as regards the penalties which they suffer, and therefore are not in a state of praying, but rather of being prayed for.⁴ (a. 11, ad 3).

⁴ Their state makes it so that they do not pray from their own office; but it does not impede their being able to pray. But, says Prummer, n. 334, it is difficult to understand that those souls can pray for themselves, or how they know the necessities of men on this earth.

666. Whom we can pray to. Prayer is directed to someone in two ways: in one way, as if to be fulfilled through him, that is, that from him we may obtain what we ask; in another way, as if to be obtained through him, that is, that by his prayers and merits our prayers may obtain their effect (a. 4). In the former way, as the author of every good, we pray to God, that is, either to the divinity abstracting from the persons, or to the three persons together, or to one of the three, and also to the Son as incarnate; and therefore the Church prays to them that they have mercy on us. This prayer is an act of religion. In the other way, we pray as to mediators and intercessors before God: the angels, saints (even baptized infants), and especially the Blessed Virgin Mary; and therefore the Church asks that they pray for us.⁵ This prayer is an act of dulia; but if someone prays to the saints so that through the ministers also he may honor God, it will be an act of dulia commanded by religion.

⁵ Council of Trent, sess. 25.

Christ as man, although He is intercessor for us and primary mediator, in view of whose merits all graces are granted, nevertheless because He is also God, is not accustomed to be prayed to as mediator only, but always as author of goods.

The Church does not pray to the souls in purgatory; but whether they can be prayed to privately is disputed. St. Thomas denies this, because there is no reason for thinking that they know our prayers (ad 3). Hence, for the sake of prudence, it is better to abstain from such devotion to be preached to the faithful.

The just on earth we do not pray to, honoring them as intercessors and mediators: for they are not yet our superiors, because they do not yet possess the eternal life which we seek; nevertheless sometimes we ask that they pray with us (Rom. XV, 30; Jas. V, 16).

667. For whom we can pray. We can pray:

1. For rational creatures alone, for irrational creatures are not for their own sake, but for man;

2. For those alone who can be helped: for ourselves, for the souls in purgatory, and for all wayfarers, not only in general but also in particular,⁶ even unbelievers and enemies, which pertains to the love of charity; but not for demons or the damned, nor for angels and saints who lack nothing (a. 7 and 8).

⁶ Wycliffe, prop. 19 condemned.

Some, however, think that we can ask for an increase of accidental glory for the saints.

668. What we can ask by praying. Since prayer is a petition of fitting things, hence:

1. We can ask for all goods, not only in general but also in particular;⁷ and indeed:

⁷ But since it is not fitting for God to give evils to His children, it is not lawful to ask for evil as such, and indeed:

a) The principal object of prayer is spiritual and eternal goods, whether supernatural or natural, which per se and directly regard the moral perfection of man; and these we can ask absolutely, because man cannot use them badly according to themselves, whence they are sought according to the will of God. Yet they must be sought according to the order established by God, and indeed extraordinary gifts are not licitly sought except with subjection to divine providence (a. 5).

b) The secondary object of prayer is temporal goods insofar as through them bodily life is sustained and insofar as they organically serve the acts of the virtues; and these we can ask under the condition (at least implicit) insofar as they are expedient for salvation: for man can use these goods well or badly (a. 6).

a) Never moral evil: for it would be grave irreverence to ask the help of God even for a venially evil thing, because it is directly repugnant to the holiness of God;

b) But physical or temporal evil may licitly be sought insofar as it is good, that is, on account of an honorable end proportionate to it, for example, tribulations for the exercise of virtue, and the illness of a sinner for his amendment.

2. Thus against Socrates, Wycliffe, the Illuminati, and the Quietists.