Article II: On Attrition or Imperfect Contrition

497. Attrition, necessary and sufficient for the remission of sins in the sacrament of Penance, is sorrow for sins committed, which is conceived not from the perfect motive of charity, but from another supernatural motive of an inferior order, namely either from the consideration of the baseness of sin, or from fear of Gehenna and of punishments, insofar as they are inflicted by God that man may abstain from sinning, with the purpose of not sinning for the future.

According to the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 4, it can be conceived from a twofold motive: "either from the consideration of the baseness of sin, or from fear of Gehenna," i.e., of the punishment of loss and of sense, "and of punishments," temporal punishments of Purgatory and of this life; to this also pertains the desire of beatitude lost, can. 5. To these two all other motives are easily reduced. For besides the opposition of sin to the infinite good of God in itself, which perfect contrition regards, there is no opposition of sin except to our good, either to honest good, to which the baseness of sin is opposed, or to pleasurable good, which God takes away in punishment of sin.

The first motive is more noble, since it considers sin as opposed to the rectitude of the moral order, insofar as this has been established by God or insofar as it is known from the supernatural motive of faith, e.g., as it is injury, ingratitude, disobedience, injustice toward God, staining the soul, etc. The latter motive, although less noble, is nevertheless good and useful. To understand this, a twofold fear of God can be distinguished: filial fear, by which one fears to offend God from love and reverence, namely, fears the evil of fault on account of God, because it is an offense against God the best Father; this pertains to perfect contrition; and servile fear, by which God is feared only on account of the punishments which He threatens, by the force of which one not only abstains from the evil itself, but also lays aside affection for sin, yet on account of punishment; namely, he fears the evil of punishment to be inflicted by God and the fault on account of the punishment, so that fear is the motive of attrition, but not the condition without which attrition would not be had. Hence it does not positively exclude filial fear, but abstracts from it; and therefore servile fear is not evil, but imperfect (I, n. 822-823).

From the aforesaid there is distinguished, and is altogether different, fear servilely servile, when one avoids an evil work while nevertheless retaining affection for sin, so disposed that punishment is the condition without which sin would not be avoided: if there were no punishment, I would will to sin. Namely, he fears punishment alone, and indeed as the highest evil, more than fault. But then there is no true fear of God, by which, namely, man is converted to Him and avoids sins; rather there is sin, which positively excludes true fear of God. Hence rather than fear of God, it should be called merely worldly and depraved fear.

Now: 1) Luther and the Protestants contend that fear simply servile is not truly useful and honest, but makes a hypocrite and a greater sinner; likewise the Jansenists, Quesnel and the Synod of Pistoia, said that it is not dishonest, but inordinate and evil, because it is from love of self.

2. Several Catholics held that attrition alone does not suffice for obtaining the remission of sins in the reception of the sacrament, but that perfect contrition is required; and that this, however, does not remit sin without the sacrament unless it has a certain grade of intensity, or is intensively above all things.

Against these a twofold thesis is established.

498. Thesis I. Attrition conceived from the baseness of sin, the loss of beatitude, and the incurring of eternal damnation, can be true and useful sorrow, remotely preparing for grace. - Thus stated, it has been defined by the Council of Trent against Luther, sess. 14, can. 5.

But in c. 4 the Council teaches thus:

"But that imperfect contrition which is called attrition, since it is commonly conceived either from the consideration of the baseness of sin or from the fear of Gehenna and of punishments, if it excludes the will of sinning with hope of pardon, the Council declares not only does not make a man a hypocrite and a greater sinner, but also is a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, not yet indwelling, but only moving, by which the penitent, aided, prepares a way for himself to justice. And although without the sacrament of Penance it cannot of itself bring the sinner to justification, nevertheless it disposes him to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of Penance."¹

¹ Cf. prop. 14 and 15 condemned by Alexander VIII; 60, 61, 62, 67 of Quesnel; 25 of the Synod of Pistoia.

It is proved: 1) From Scripture: that fear is good and useful which in the Scriptures is commended and commanded as conducing to justification. But such is the case concerning servile fear of punishments (Ps. CX, 10; Ecclus. I, 27, 28; Prov. I, 7; Mt. X, 28; Luke XII, 4-5).

2. From the Tradition of the Fathers: a) they frequently use the cited words of Christ to show that fear of Gehenna is truly salutary; b) they propose fear of judgment and Gehenna as a motive of detesting and fleeing sin; e.g., Tertullian, On Penance XI, 1; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata VII, 12; Chrysostom, hom. 15 to the people of Antioch, n. 2; Augustine, serm. 161, c. 3; on ep. I of John, tract. 9, c. 4; Enarr. on Ps. CXXVII, 8; Gregory, exp. on I Kings V, 11.

3. By theological reason: A. Attrition is not evil. Attrition from fear of Gehenna imports three things: the will of fleeing punishment, which has itself after the manner of an end; detestation of sin, which is the means to the end; and the ordering of this means to obtaining the end. But these three things are good and useful, indeed necessary that by such a motive men for the most part may be held in duty. Therefore.

The minor is proved: a) it is honest to flee the punishments of hell, since they are some evil and therefore worthy of hatred, and to pursue beatitude is good;

b) that detestation of sin is good, there is no one who denies;

c) moreover, to order the flight from sin to the avoidance of punishment as to an end is not evil, since it is an apt means, and God Himself, as every legislator, uses the threatening of punishments to deter us from sin. - Besides, the sinner who flees sin on account of punishment to be avoided does not exclude a higher motive, as if he were saying that punishment is the highest and principal evil, and thus were placing the ultimate end in his own good, but abstracts from the higher motive. For if he excluded it, there would be fear servilely servile. Hence the motive of attrition is not the noblest, but it is not base.

B. Indeed, attrition remotely disposes to contrition. Attrition of its own accord tends toward perfect contrition and charity, and contains it in purpose.

For he who, from efficacious fear of Gehenna, hates sin, detests it as the cause of Gehenna, and consequently is disposed to doing whatever is necessary so that, by avoiding sin, he may also avoid hell. But for this it is required that he firmly propose to observe all the precepts, of which the first and chief is love of God above all things. Therefore from fear of Gehenna he is induced to love God Himself. Namely, he is disposed to posit an act of charity when it is necessary, but he does not posit it here and now.

499. Thesis II. For obtaining the remission of sins in the sacrament of Penance, perfect contrition is not required, but attrition suffices. - The thesis has not been defined nor is it theologically certain, but it is morally certain and safe, as being the doctrine now common, against several ancient theologians.2

It is proved: 1) From the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 4, if it is understood in the obvious sense. The Council describes the parts of the sacrament of Penance, and in the first place contrition. Hence it speaks of contrition insofar as it is a part of the sacrament; it distinguishes this as twofold, perfect and imperfect, and says that it sometimes is perfect. Hence the contrition which is a part of the sacrament is not always perfect, but imperfect contrition also suffices for the sacrament; moreover, the definition of contrition handed down by the Council agrees with it.

It is confirmed: in the Council it is declared that contrition is twofold: perfect, which reconciles the sinner to God before the sacrament is actually received; imperfect, or attrition, which "disposes him to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of Penance," i.e., disposes proximately and sufficiently, or suffices. Indeed, the stricter authors understood that word "disposes" of a remote disposition, but not of a proximate disposition to justification. Yet this is precluded a) by the parallelism between contrition, which is a proximate disposition, and attrition; likewise b) because attrition, even without the sacrament, remotely disposes to grace, as is clear from the example of the Ninevites adduced by the Council; hence it would uselessly and ineptly be added: in the sacrament; finally c) since Trent did not mention a more proximate disposition in the sacrament, the definition would be defective and the doctrine incomplete. - Besides, if the Council used the word "disposes," and not "suffices," this was done lest the antiquated opinion of Peter Lombard be expressly condemned; but the mind of the Council is sufficiently clear from the disputations held among the Tridentine Fathers.²

² Cf. Theiner, Acta, vol. I, p. 531-600.

2. From various theological reason: if perfect contrition were prerequisite to absolution,

a) sinners would never be made alive by the sacrament of Penance and by the ministry of the priest, since they would already have been justified by contrition; this contradicts the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 1 and 3, can. 3 (cf. can. 9), saying that through the sacrament of Penance sins are truly remitted; and it is badly reconciled with the condemnation of prop. 59 of Baius: "The penitent sinner is not made alive by the ministry of the absolving priest, but by God alone, who, suggesting and inspiring penance, makes him alive and raises him up; but by the ministry of the priest guilt alone is taken away";

b) the sacrament would not cause that for which it was primarily instituted, namely, to take away mortal sin; and then there would be no difference between the sacraments of the living and of the dead, nor would Penance be the second plank after shipwreck;

c) the way of salvation would be narrower and more difficult in the New Law than in the Old Law, since now confession is also required; indeed, the same disposition would be required for justification ex opere operato and for justification ex opere operantis, although for the latter a disposition demanding grace is necessary, while for the former there suffices a disposition which removes the obstacles to grace, namely the will of sinning or adhesion to sin.

3. From the universal practice of confessors and the faithful, who do not require perfect contrition in order to administer or receive the sacrament; likewise from the practice of the Church carefully absolving the dying, even when they had gravely sinned; indeed, absolution is not denied to the dying man provided that he is probably attrite. This is not explained in the opposite thesis: either the dying man has contrition, and then he does not need absolution; or he is only attrite, and then absolution is useless.

2. The thesis is held by St. Thomas and the Thomists generally, Scotus, Durandus, Aureolus, Suarez and the Jesuits, St. Alphonsus and all recent authors. On the contrary, St. Anselm, Hugh of St. Victor, the Master of the Sentences, Roland, Albert the Great, Richard of St. Victor, St. Bonaventure, Pallavicini, Juenin, Berti, Ledrou, Gazzaniga, Christian Lupus, Morinus.

500. Question concerning the dispositions required for attrition. - Attrition necessary for the remission of sins supposes certain dispositions of soul; it must be joined with faith, otherwise it would not be supernatural, and with hope of pardon, otherwise there would be no purpose of a better life. But it is disputed whether, in addition, a beginning of love is required, or whether attrition conceived from fear of Gehenna alone, without love of God, suffices for justification in the sacrament of Penance.

The occasion of the disputation was furnished by the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 6, describing in a general way the conditions required for justification: "They are disposed to that justification when, aroused by divine grace, conceiving faith from hearing, they are freely moved toward God, believing... and... from fear of divine justice, by which they are usefully shaken,... they are raised up into hope, trusting... that God will be propitious to them, and they begin to love Him as the fountain of all justice,... and on account of these things they are moved against sins by some hatred and detestation, that is, by the penance which must be done before Baptism; finally, they propose..." Hence

1. some said that together with attrition there is required love of God loved for His own sake, namely an initial act of charity or at least of benevolence, whether

a) an act of charity but remiss, not intense, saying that perfect contrition is required for the sacrament of Penance, because only very intense contrition remits sin without the sacrament, as we noted above;³ or

³ Cf. on IV Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 2-3; and d. 20, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 1.

b) an initial love of God loved for His own sake, by which He is not loved above all goods, although it efficaciously withdraws from every sin (Pallavicini, Bossuet); or

c) at least a certain love of benevolence toward God, as St. Charles Borromeo, Billuart, Sardagna, Simonet, Diekamp, etc.

2. others hold that the love of charity is not required, but no love except the love of concupiscence and hope, which act must be elicited explicitly and specially, as Tournely and the Wurzburg theologians;

3. finally, according to others, no explicit and formal act of love is required, but sincere attrition from fear of Gehenna, which excludes the will of sinning, suffices. Thus Francis de Vitoria, Melchior Cano, Valentia, Dominic Soto, Vasquez, Suarez, Lugo, Gonet, Gotti, St. Alphonsus, Ballerini, and nearly all moderns.

Now it seems that some love of God is required, at least of concupiscence, or a beginning of love, yet not a special one; but this is in fact contained in every sincere attrition which excludes the will of sinning, or connaturally follows attrition. For there is present a will or desire of conversion, in which there is implicitly contained love of justice to be repaired and of God, who is the fountain of justice. And thus several opposed opinions can to some extent be reconciled.

Such love, however, seems to suffice, for there is no reason for affirming that some special love is required. For that love suffices which proximately disposes to justification in the sacrament, while it removes the obstacles to grace. But the love of concupiscence toward God, our highest good, included in attrition, disposes to justification: from it attrition detests sin and includes hope of pardon and excludes the will of sinning, or adhesion to sin, which is an obstacle to grace. Therefore a more noble love is not proved to be required, besides the love of concupiscence included in attrition. But if a more perfect love were required, it would seem that the Church could not permit the opposite opinion.

But the words of the Council of Trent a) can be understood of the love of concupiscence and hope toward God as good to us: for by this they begin to love God as the fountain of justice, namely from love of justice to be acquired for themselves; by this also they are moved against sins, because it is sufficiently apt to produce hatred of sin. And nevertheless there is present a beginning of love, insofar as it is included in attrition: 1) in the sorrow by which the sinner intends to render God propitious and to return to divine friendship, which is an approach to charity; 2) in the purpose by which he wills to observe the whole divine law, and therefore the primary law of charity; 3) in the hope of pardon by which he wills to arrive at eternal life and the most perfect friendship of God, and thus has the love of charity for the ultimate end.

b) Perhaps, however, they are better understood of love properly so called, of God loved for His own sake, because the decree of the Council seems to reproduce the article of St. Thomas III, q. 85, a. 5.⁴ But all the acts described by Trent are not absolutely and equally necessary for justification with the sacrament; thus, e.g., fear is never necessary, although ordinarily present; some are always necessary whether outside or within the sacrament, as faith and hope; another only outside the sacrament, namely the act of charity. Hence the word "therefore" does not indicate the consequence of love alone, but of all the preceding acts, which nevertheless are not all always necessary; so that hatred and detestation and penance depend on faith, fear, and hope if justification is made with the sacrament, and also on the beginning of perfect love if it is made without the sacrament.

⁴ Cf. p. 440.

For the rest, according to the Council, that love of God for His own sake is not necessarily required is clear both from the disputations held in the Council, and from the theologians who were present at the Council, several of whom do not require such love of God for His own sake in the sacrament of Penance.⁵ Therefore this opinion is sufficiently safe in practice, because the opposite is founded on no solid reason.

⁵ Cf. Palmieri and Pesch, op. cit., and Perinelle, L'attrition d'apres le Concile de Trente et d'apres S. Thomas d'Aquin.

501. They object: 1) Sorrow for sin on account of the motive of Gehenna imports the will of sinning at least conditionally, if there were no Gehenna.

Resp. Distinguish: it imports the will of sinning of itself, I deny; accidentally, I subdistinguish: sometimes, I concede; always, I deny. - If someone grieves from fear of Gehenna, saying in his heart that, if there were no Gehenna, he would will to sin, he sins not only conditionally, but absolutely. But this is not from fear of Gehenna precisely and considered in itself, but from a depraved affection of the will, which places the ultimate end in the avoidance of Gehenna. But if he simply grieves for sin on account of fear of Gehenna, then Gehenna is the motive of sorrow, which is good and by its nature is ordered to God, and therefore mediately tends toward that which is the true ultimate end.

2. If someone from fear of Gehenna alone detests sin, he virtually or equivalently has this act: I would will to sin unless I feared hell.

Resp. Since he knows that sin leads to hell, he fears and abhors this for its own sake, and sin and affection for it on account of this. Hence he rather says: since hell is given, which I fear and will to flee, I in no way will to sin.

Therefore he neither excludes nor includes other motives, but prepares the way to them. Hence it is not rightly said that, according to the present disposition, he would not grieve from another motive, if there were no hell.

3. It is perverse to order a greater good to a lesser, and to hate a greater evil in order to avoid a lesser. But he who has servile fear hates the greater evil, namely sin, in order to avoid the lesser, namely hell. Therefore.

Resp. a) Distinguish: it is perverse to order a greater good to a lesser as to the ultimate end, I concede; otherwise, I deny. For those praying for a temporal good order the worship of God to a temporal end.

b) I deny the minor: Gehenna is not a lesser evil; for it imports not only the evil of punishment, but also the evil of fault, aversion from God.

4. The attrite person fears punishment more than fault.

Resp. Distinguish: he fears more intensively, I concede; more appretiatively, I subdistinguish: if he were to institute a comparison and positively exclude other motives, I concede; if he does not exclude them, I deny.

5. To grieve only on account of punishment is evil.

Resp. Distinguish: with the positive exclusion of another motive, I concede: that indeed is evil; with simple abstraction from another motive, I deny: that is good.

6. If servility is evil, therefore also servile fear.

Resp. Distinguish: servility intrinsic to an act renders the act evil, I concede, as in fear servilely servile, by which punishment is held as the highest evil; servility extrinsic to the act renders the act evil, I deny, as in fear simply servile, by which punishment is held as an evil; and this is right. Then, namely, servility is not intrinsic to the work, but to the one working, insofar as man is still in the state of servitude or mortal sin, turned toward temporal good; namely, it is a vice of the one fearing and grieving, not of fear and sorrow. Hence the fear or sorrow is not evil.

7. Attrition from fear of punishment does not cause displeasure of sin according to itself, but only as it induces punishment; therefore it does not take away affection for sin according to itself.

Resp. Distinguish: it does not directly and immediately take away affection for sin according to itself, I concede; it does not take it away indirectly and mediately, I deny. For at least indirectly and mediately the attrite person does not will sin according to itself, since he does not will that which leads to punishment; directly he does not will it on account of hell.

8. Yet many are so disposed that they would sin if fear of hell did not restrain them; therefore in them there lies hidden an affection for sin.

I deny the consequence. From acts conditionally future no one is good or evil. For many, if they were not led by love of God or of virtue, would in fact sin, and yet for this reason they do not say here and now: I would will to sin, unless I loved God or virtue. By parity, for those who are led by servile fear.

502. Observation. - He who says: I would sin, if there were no hell, either understands it of an actual conditioned will: if I could with impunity, I would sin; and then no sincere attrition is present; or of a conjectural judgment of the intellect: I am so weak that I foresee that I would sin if there were no hell; and this can be combined with true and sincere attrition.

503. Corollaries. - 1) The penitent, by receiving the sacrament, from attrite becomes contrite, not indeed 1) in the formal and proper sense, that attrition formally becomes perfect contrition, since they are two acts distinct in motive and species; moreover, the same act numerically cannot be changed as to substance, nor be from a different motive or a different principle, e.g., from actual grace alone or from an infused virtue; but 2) in the material and improper sense, on the part of the subject, insofar as the penitent who from an act of imperfect contrition is denominated attrite can now by the power of the sacrament be denominated contrite, as having grace by which the informity or imperfection of contrition, i.e., the defect or absence of charity, is taken away: both a) by reason of the habit of charity and penance, which is infused, by which he becomes contrite habitually, able to elicit perfect contrition; and b) by reason of the supernatural act by which he voluntarily accepts grace and charity, insofar as attrition joined to the sacrament is equivalent to contrition as to the effect produced, namely the remission of sin.

2. Hence penance, which is necessary by necessity of means, is either perfect contrition, at least virtual, with the desire of the sacrament, or formal imperfect contrition in the sacrament.

3. Nevertheless penitents are to be exhorted and stirred up to love of God and perfect contrition, for the sake of greater perfection and security. Nor is having such contrition so difficult, as St. Thomas testifies.⁶

⁶ Quodl. IV, a. 10; on John, lect. 6, n. 6, v. 44; C. Gent. IV, 72; on IV Sent., d. 22, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 3.