Article II: On Moral Virtues

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 58-60; De Virt. q. 1, a. 4, 5, 12.

591. Moral virtue is said from custom, that is, an inclination to acting, which properly belongs to the appetite; whence moral virtue is a habit by which the appetite is well disposed so that it may be conformed to reason. In fact, it is a habitual conformity to right reason. But since to choose is an act proper to the human appetite, hence moral virtue is a habit elective according to right reason, and it is defined by Aristotle, Eth. VI, c. 6: an elective habit consisting in a mean relative to us, determined by reason as the wise man will determine.¹ It is said:

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, in Eth. VI, c. 6, lect. 7.

1. an elective habit, because choice is the proper act of moral virtue, and because a moral habit is the principle of choice;

2. consisting in a mean relative to us: this is the object or term of this action. The moral good which is the object of virtue is a mean between excess and defect, which must be estimated not in itself, but with respect to the one choosing, so that he may choose what is fitting to himself according to right reason, neither more nor less;

3. determined by reason: this is the cause of goodness. For it is reason which determines the mean between excess and defect, so that it may be good. And because it happens that reason is not always right but also sometimes erroneous, there is added: as the wise man, that is, the prudent man, will determine; namely, reason through prudence will rightly estimate what is good or evil in acts of the appetite (q. 58, a. 1 and 59, a. 1).

592. Principle I. Moral virtues are necessary. - For both the rational and the sensitive appetite do not obey reason wholly at command, but can contradict it, because they are properly operative, that is, they have their own motions and actions. Whence for operating well it is required that not only the intellect be well disposed through prudence, but also the appetite be well disposed, for obeying reason, through the habits of moral virtues; otherwise it would be moved as if violently and with sadness (q. 58, a. 2).

593. Principle II. Moral virtue is not one in species but multiple, both by reason of the subject or diverse power in which it inheres, and by reason of the object (the formal principle), which can have itself in diverse ways toward reason, in which it can participate more or less, and thus states a diverse relation to reason directing (q. 59, a. 2 and 4; q. 60, a. 1).

For reason directs both the operations of the will by which man is disposed, even externally, toward another, and the passions of the sensitive appetite, whether of the concupiscible or of the irascible, so that they may be conformed to reason and thus man may be well disposed internally, in order to himself. Whence in a threefold way: both a) by reason of the matter about which they are principally² concerned (external operations, interior affections impelling or withdrawing), and b) by reason of the subject in which they inhere (will, concupiscible appetite, irascible appetite), and c) by reason of the formal object (good according to commensuration to another, or good according to commensuration only to the one operating, either as delectable or as arduous), there are distinguished in species virtues concerning operations of the will, - virtues concerning passions of the concupiscible, - and virtues concerning passions of the irascible (q. 60, a. 2).

² Principally, for virtues concerning operations can consequently be concerned with passions, insofar as these impede due operations, and conversely virtues concerning passions can also be concerned with operations, if the passions have exterior effects and state a relation to another. Whence St. Thomas, q. 60, a. 2: "But it happens that in operations which are toward another the good of virtue is omitted on account of an inordinate passion of the soul, and then insofar as the commensuration of the exterior operation is corrupted, there is a corruption of justice; but insofar as the commensuration of the interior passions is corrupted, there is a corruption of some other virtue, as when on account of anger someone strikes another, in the undue striking itself justice is corrupted, but in the immoderation of anger meekness is corrupted. And the same is clear in other cases."

594. Principle III. The virtues concerning operations are diverse. - All the virtues which are concerned with operations agree in the general account of debt toward another. But the account of debt is not of one account in all: in one way something is owed strictly from pact; in another way, not strictly, from a promise or a benefit received; in another way something is owed to an equal, in another to a superior, in another to a lesser. Whence, according to the diverse accounts of debt, the virtues concerning operations are diverse, for example, justice, religion, piety, gratitude, truth, etc. (q. 60, a. 3).

595. Principle IV. There are also diverse virtues concerning passions of the concupiscible or the irascible, not indeed from the fact that the passions are diverse, but when they state a diverse relation to reason.

Hence a) the same virtue is concerned with contrary passions, between which it holds the mean, for example, fortitude between fear and daring (q. 60, a. 4);

b) furthermore diverse passions can be ordered to one another and to one thing in a certain order, and in the same way can be repugnant (or suitable) to reason, as happens for the passions of the concupiscible: love, desire, and delight of the same good (and consequently also for hatred, flight, and sadness concerning the opposed evil); whence all those passions pertain not to diverse virtues but to the same virtue, for example, to temperance (a. 4);

c) on the contrary, when passions are ordered to a diverse good of reason, and thus state a diverse relation to reason, as happens for the passions of the irascible, which "are not of one order but are ordered to diverse things. For daring and fear are ordered to some great danger; hope and despair to some arduous good; but anger to overcoming some contrary which has inflicted harm. And therefore concerning these passions there are diverse virtues, namely... fortitude concerning fears and darings, magnanimity concerning hope and despair, meekness concerning angers" (q. 60, a. 4);

d) a fortiori when they pertain to diverse powers, because then they are concerned with diverse objects; whence some virtues are concerned with passions of the concupiscible (good as such), others with passions of the irascible (good as arduous), for example, temperance and fortitude, philotimy and magnanimity, liberality and magnificence, temperance and meekness, etc.³ (a. 5).

³ Because reason rules the lower parts of man and also extends to exterior things, not at command but "in a certain order (and according to conditions determined by nature), therefore also according as one object of passion is apprehended by sense or imagination - or also by reason, and according as it pertains to the soul, the body, or exterior things, it has a diverse relation to reason, and consequently is apt to diversify virtues. Therefore the good of man, which is the subject of love, concupiscence, and delight, can be taken either as pertaining to the sense of the body (for example, food), or to the interior apprehension of the soul (for example, money, honor); and this either as it is ordered to the good of man in himself, either as to the body (money) or as to the soul (honor); or as it is ordered to the good of man in order to others (actions and speech, whether serious, by which he renders himself delightful or manifests himself to another, or playful). And every such diversity, on account of the diverse order to reason, diversifies virtue..." And because certain goods "can be considered either absolutely or with arduousness..., it is clear that according to Aristotle there are ten moral virtues concerning passions, namely, fortitude, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, philotimy, meekness, friendship, truth, and eutrapely." q. 60, a. 5.

596. Corollaries. - From what has been said it follows:

1. "That the first principle of all human operations is reason,... whence just as appetite (rational or sensitive) is a principle of human act according as it participates in reason in some way, so moral habit has the account of human virtue insofar as it is conformed to reason" (q. 58, a. 2).

2. Hence, just as intellectual virtue is rational by essence, so moral virtue is rational by participation, insofar as the appetite, whether the superior appetite of the will or the lower appetite of the sensitive life, participates in reason (q. 60, a. 1; q. 56, a. 4 and ad 1; a. 6, ad 2; q. 58, a. 2; q. 59, a. 4, ad 2; q. 61, a. 2).

3. Moral virtues can exist without the intellectual virtues of wisdom, science, and art; not, however, without prudence, which is necessary for rightly taking the means to the end and which itself supposes understanding of practical principles (q. 58, a. 4).

4. Intellectual virtues can exist without moral virtues; however, prudence does not exist without these. For in order that a work be of the virtue of prudence, it must be done for a right end, or for the good; moral virtue provides the right end (a. 5).