Article II: On Positively Doubtful Conscience

88. Most certain principles placed beyond all controversy. - Positive doubt, which, namely, is founded upon grave reasons morally equal, i.e., equal or almost equal on both sides, is serious and therefore impedes direct practical certitude, and consequently is not to be neglected but attended to. But conscience ought to be certain (n. 78). Therefore it is never licit, but always illicit, to act with a positive practical doubt concerning the honesty of the action to be placed here and now, or with a positively doubtful conscience. This, namely, is not a rule of acting prudently.

But from positive speculatively practical doubt there follows per se and ordinarily practically practical doubt or doubtful conscience: for he who doubts concerning the honesty of an action in general, per se and ordinarily doubts concerning the honesty of the same action in particular. Hence there follows the obligation of laying aside the said doubt, and

1. of acquiring certitude concerning the honesty of the action, and indeed direct certitude if this is possible: for he who is held to observing laws is held to knowing and inquiring into them; otherwise he would be in ignorance that is vincible and culpable;

2. but if he cannot have direct certitude, he is held, before he acts, to acquire indirect certitude and to form conscience by force of an indirect or reflex principle;¹

¹ According to one of the systems of probability: Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, Probabilism, as we shall see later.

3. but if he also cannot have indirect certitude, he is held to act more safely, namely, to abstain from the action which is doubtfully honest; and if he must altogether act, he must do what is safer and what removes more from the danger of sinning even materially. Here the principle is valid: In practical doubts the safer way must be chosen.

89. Thesis I. In all practically practical doubts the principle must always be applied: In doubts one must act more safely.

Namely, it is to be applied a) if the one doubting does not wish to inquire into the truth; or b) if the means of arriving at certitude is lacking, for example if there is no time for examining or approaching a learned man, or if the indirect principle is not known, etc.

It is proved: In these cases and doubts the formation of a certain conscience concerning the honesty of the action is impossible, and therefore man is held to do the safer thing, i.e., to abstain from the action about whose honesty he doubts, and if he must altogether act, he is held to choose what removes more the danger of sinning; - for otherwise he would voluntarily cast himself into the proximate danger of sinning, and would will to place the action whether it is honest or is not, which is sinful (n. 78).

Therefore, in the case of practically practical doubt or doubtful conscience, the principle is valid: In doubts - in which we cannot arrive at certain conscience - the safer way must be chosen.

90. Thesis II. Even in certain speculatively practical doubts of fact, sometimes one must act more safely, as often as there is a certain and absolute obligation of obtaining a determinate end or effect, and there is doubt not only about the honesty, but also about the value and conditions of the act, or about the necessity of a means so required for the end that without it perhaps the end would not otherwise be obtained. Whence: In doubts about the validity of an act to be placed, one must act more safely, or by that whereby, with perfect security, the end to be obtained is attained.

Thus as often as a good effect (for example, salvation, health, a sacrament) is absolutely to be obtained, or an evil one (damnation, death, unjust harm) is absolutely to be avoided, and there is doubt not only about the honesty, but also about the necessity or efficacy of the fact or means required for this, or about the value of the act which one is altogether bound to procure, or about one's own or another's harm which one is altogether bound to impede. In other words, as often as a determinate effect is to be obtained or avoided, which the use of a means doubtfully or probably inept would bring into danger, so that the effect could fail to be obtained or avoided.

It is proved: 1) He who is absolutely and certainly held to obtain a good end is also held to the means by which the end is certainly (or more certainly) obtained, and he who must absolutely beware of evil must also beware of an action by which the danger of evil is brought in. But by the safer part alone the end can be certainly (or more certainly) obtained: for, from the hypothesis, a means doubtfully or only probably apt brings into peril the end which someone is held absolutely to attain. Therefore it is illicit to use a means doubtfully or only probably apt; rather, fitter means, and the same safer ones, are to be chosen.

2. The foundation is that, if the honesty of an action depends upon reason and conscience, not so its value and efficacy or the aversion of harm; for our judgment, doubt, persuasion, or system, is not able to change the nature of things and consequently to render a null act valid, or to bring it about that what is required for the validity of an act is not required, or to cause the due effect to arise from some action, or to prevent harm from following from it. Thus doubt or an opinion, however probable, cannot effect that what is not a sacrament should be a sacrament, or that what is rather poison should be medicine; it cannot remove the danger of not obtaining the intended end or of incurring harm which someone fears. Therefore to expose oneself to such danger, by following a doubtful or probable sentence, is not licit.

"We say," says St. Alphonsus, Th. M., book I, n. 42, "that it is never licit to use a probable opinion with probability of fact, with danger of harm to another or to oneself, because probability of this kind by no means takes away the danger of harm: for if that opinion is false, the harm of the neighbor or of the one acting will not be avoided; for if, for example, Baptism conferred with saliva is really null, so that the infant remains without Baptism, probability in the opposite direction cannot effect that it be valid."

3. For in these cases there is no practical doubt or probability present for the licitness of the less safe part, and therefore the formation of a certain conscience concerning the honesty of an action doubtfully valid or harmful is impossible, because the reflex judgment of conscience (or system) is incapable of taking away positive doubt concerning the value and efficacy of the means and of removing the danger. And therefore there is a certain obligation of placing the action which will certainly obtain the effect, and of abstaining from the action which perhaps inflicts harm; - and if that certitude cannot be had concerning the obtaining of the effect, there is a certain obligation of employing at least fitter and safer means for pursuing the end or averting harm. Otherwise the one acting would voluntarily expose himself to the danger of not attaining the said end and of inflicting harm, while nevertheless, as much as he can, he ought to obtain the end or avert the evil.

This obligation is certain, not indeed directly by force of the particular law which is doubtful, but indirectly

a) by force of a certain higher law (of charity, religion, justice) which imposes this end as to be absolutely obtained;

b) or by force of a special obligation arisen either from a vow, for example if someone has obligated himself to doing the safer thing, or from positive law, for example a priest doubting whether he was the efficacious cause of a homicide cannot exercise sacred order.

Thus, after the propositions of the laxer probabilists were condemned by Alexander VII and Innocent XI, all now teach.

91. The higher law which imposes the safer part is:

A. First, the law of charity, which sometimes obliges absolutely to procuring certainly one's own or another's good, or to avoiding certainly spiritual or temporal harm; and then it is certain that we cannot choose the less safe part (even if it is more probable), but we are bound to choose the more secure and safer part, for example in the matter of faith and in things necessary for salvation, according to the axiom: No security is excessive where eternity is imperiled.

Hence we are held a) to inquire concerning the true religion and faith until we arrive at certitude, and we are not excused by a less probable opinion (prop. 4 condemned by Innocent XI),2 nor is faith in only probable knowledge (prop. 21);3 - b) explicitly to believe and to teach others the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and Incarnation, although perhaps they are not necessary to be believed by necessity of means (prop. 64);4 - c) again to receive or confer (under condition) Baptism or another necessary sacrament, although perhaps it has already been administered; - d) to impose the safer opinion and not to teach the less safe, if, with attention to the common or special fragility of the one acting, it is certainly joined with the proximate danger of sinning formally, as can easily happen in the matter of lust and vengeance.

B. Similarly, the law of religion obliges absolutely to reverence toward sacred things, especially the sacraments, and therefore the minister or recipient cannot expose the sacrament to danger of nullity; whence it is certain that he cannot choose the less safe part when there is question of the value of a sacrament (even if it is more probable), but he is held to make or receive a certainly valid sacrament (Innocent XI, prop. 2),5 or to abstain from it, for example if the matter or form is doubtful, or a condition for valid reception is doubtful; similarly, if the ordination of a priest is doubtful, he cannot celebrate.

An exception is made a) if there is a case of grave necessity and a certainly valid sacrament cannot be had: then let it be administered under condition, because then the law of charity prevails, which urges more than religion; - b) if the doubt does not render the sacrament doubtfully valid, because the Church supplies the defect, namely: if a priest absolves with probable jurisdiction, if persons enter marriage with a probable impediment of ecclesiastical law, if a priest has probable delegation for assisting at marriage. But the Church cannot supply those things which are of natural or divine law.

C. Likewise the law of justice. And indeed:

1. Commutative justice obliges absolutely and strictly

a) to wholly guarding against certainly unjust harm1 to the neighbor.

Whence someone is certainly held to abstain from an action which can be harmful for a third party and violative of a certain right, although perhaps it does not inflict harm, for example from the divulging of a secret or crime even if it is probably already public.

b) to procuring the good from office or contract.

Thus a physician is held to employ safer remedies of health, a pastor to indicate the more salutary way, an advocate to bring better arguments, a notary better counsels, a priest from a stipend to apply a certainly valid Mass.

2. Distributive justice absolutely obliges the judge

a) in civil causes, as to the fact applying the law, to await the proof of the plaintiff, according to the axiom: proof lies upon the plaintiff, and consequently to leave the possessed thing to the possessor in good faith, unless it is established that he possesses unjustly.

For the common good requires that dominions be stable and secure, and that lawsuits not be multiplied; and therefore possession is judged a certain title, and the condition of the possessor is better until the contrary is proved.

b) as to law, where there are diverse interpretations of law, for example for a thing not yet possessed, he is held to render sentence in favor of him for whom the stronger reason stands, because he ought to distribute right according to the weights of the cause (Innocent XI, prop. 2 condemned2).

And if the reason on each side is equal, let him counsel an amicable settlement or propose division of the thing in controversy (prop. 26 condemned by Alexander VII1), unless however positive law commands him to render sentence, in which case he will strive to form his own opinion.

c) but in criminal causes he is held not to condemn anyone unless he is certainly guilty.

For man possesses life, liberty, just reputation, etc., from which he is not to be deprived unless he is certainly guilty: for by the absolution of a guilty man the republic is injured less than by the condemnation of an innocent man. Hence the axiom: In doubt one must favor the accused.

3. Legal justice, by reason of the common good and of order to be preserved and scandal to be avoided, certainly obliges a subject to obey a superior (even a judge) commanding a thing which perhaps is illicit, or useless for the common good, or exceeding the limits of his power.

For presumption stands for the superior, and right order forbids subjects to deny obedience unless it certainly appears that he has abused his power, both because, says Suarez, de Leg., book I, c. 9, n. 11, he has a higher right and possesses it, and also because he can have universal reasons hidden from subjects, and also because otherwise subjects would assume too great a license of not obeying laws, since they can scarcely be so just that they cannot be brought into doubt by some persons through apparent reasons.2

1. Cf. St. Alphonsus, Th. M., book I, nn. 42-52 and 31.

2. "An unbeliever who does not believe, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from unbelief."

3. "The assent of supernatural faith useful for salvation stands with only probable knowledge of revelation, indeed with fear by which someone fears that God has not spoken."

4. "A man is capable of absolution... even if... he does not know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ." Cf. Holy Office, 3 May 1703.

5. "It is not illicit in conferring sacraments to follow a probable opinion concerning the value of the sacrament, the safer one being left aside."

1. Unjust, that is, unless a proportionately grave reason excuses, namely, unless our utility or that of a third party prevails over the harm to be guarded against.

2. "I probably think that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable."

1. "When litigants have equally probable opinions on their side, the judge can receive money for rendering sentence in favor of one rather than the other."

2. Some, especially among the older authors, place a restriction: unless the precept is too difficult, or brings grave harm. But this is to be understood thus, if from epikeia the law can then be presumed to cease. This can scarcely happen in present-day civil law.

92. Thesis III. In speculatively practical doubts which are not about the validity of the act and the necessity of the means, but about the objective honesty alone of the action and the necessity of the precept, man can, in a positive doubt about the existence of a law remaining after diligent examination, form for himself an indirectly certain conscience concerning the honesty of the action, by force of the reflex principle: An uncertain law cannot impose an obligation, and thus also do what seems less safe.

Thus, after St. Alphonsus, whose doctrine the Church declared safe,1 which at least seems to be understood concerning the fundamental thesis of his system, nearly all present-day theologians teach, against the Tutiorists and Probabiliorists, who held that what is safer must be done, either always, or unless it is more probable that the law does not exist. For seeing that in doubt there was not a sufficient reason for preferring one part, they said that he acts imprudently and exposes himself to the danger of sinning who arbitrarily chooses the less safe part.

1. The principle is proved: A doubtful or uncertain law does not oblige. Law is a rule and bond imposed upon the will. But a rule cannot in fact direct, or a bond bind the will, unless it is applied and imposed upon it. But it is applied and imposed by means of reason: for law is an ordination of reason; and indeed it is applied through science, i.e., certain knowledge of the law. Therefore law, in order to bind in fact, must become known through certain knowledge. The minor is proved: for doubt and mere opinion do not determine the intellect to one thing and consequently do not bind it to one part, nor consequently the will; only science or certain knowledge does this. Thus conformably to the principles of St. Thomas, Q. D. de Ver. 17, a. 3.2

In other words: An uncertain law cannot directly by its own force impose a certain obligation: for obligation is the effect of law; but the effect cannot surpass the power of the cause. But an obligation objectively and speculatively uncertain is subjectively and practically none, for:

a) Obligation is a moral necessity by which we are absolutely held to act in some way in order to the ultimate end; but an uncertain necessity is not a necessity for us, because we are not determined by it nor absolutely held; therefore.

b) As to this, the psychological state of one doubting is the same as if the law did not exist: for a man, in the case of doubt, does not feel himself bound, is not conscious of some tie or obligating bond.

c) The condition for a law to oblige subjectively is that it be intimated and made known to us from promulgation; when the law is uncertain, the law itself does not become known but only its doubt or uncertainty; therefore it does not oblige. Cf. I-II, q. 90, a. 4.

The adversaries object: the principle is to be understood of a law doubtfully promulgated; but positive law is almost always promulgated, and natural law is certainly promulgated in each man through reason; therefore generally the law is certain, and then it precedes exemption from the law and possesses against liberty until the exemption is proved.

Resp. Laws are promulgated and therefore oblige habitually and, as it were, in first act; but in order that they actually and in fact bind, actual cognition is required, which is as it were promulgation in second act; but if then there is doubt concerning the law, it is doubtful as to this case, nor is the law promulgated in second act, but only its doubt is promulgated. Each must be certain, namely, both the promulgation of the law and the knowledge of it: for promulgation must be certain only because the law must be able to be known certainly.1 - Moreover, it is not proved that law possesses against moral liberty, but rather liberty possesses against law; for although in reality they are understood correlatively, nevertheless liberty logically precedes law, since law is a restriction of liberty according to that saying of Eccli. XV, 14, 15: "God from the beginning constituted man and left him in the hand of his own counsel; He added His commandments and precepts."1

"That is said to be licit which is prohibited by no law," says St. Thomas, in IV Sent., d. 15, q. 2, a. 4, ad 2. On the contrary, the Tutiorists and Probabiliorists: Nothing is licit except that which is morally established to have been conceded by God.

2. The thesis is proved: A practically certain conscience is the legitimate rule of acting. But man, in a positive doubt about the existence of a law, can form for himself a practically certain conscience concerning the honesty of the action, even if this is less safe. Therefore he can legitimately place the less safe action. The minor is proved: Positive doubt is serious and therefore renders the existence of the law practically doubtful, so that we cannot affirm more than deny that the law exists. But it is certain that a law, concerning whose existence, all things having been diligently considered, there exists grave doubt, does not oblige in second act.

This having been posited, a certain conscience can be formed thus:

"That which, all things having been diligently considered, is not prohibited, is licit.

"But this action here and now to be placed certainly is not prohibited to me: for it is certain that a law, all things having been diligently considered, uncertain, does not oblige; but in the case, all things having been diligently considered, the law is uncertain; therefore it is certain that in the case it does not oblige me.

"Whence this action here and now to be placed certainly is licit."

Such a ratiocination cannot be made except by him who has diligently considered the matter, because otherwise he could not sincerely say: in the case the law is uncertain.

The adversaries object that an obligation is present by force of a higher law or indirect principle prohibiting us from exposing ourselves to the danger of sinning: He who exposes himself to the danger of sinning sins; but he who does that which perhaps seems dishonorable exposes himself to the danger of sinning; therefore he sins.

Resp. to the major: He who exposes himself to the danger of sinning subjectively and formally, sins, granted; he who exposes himself to the danger of sinning objectively and materially, I subdistinguish: if the danger arises from negligence in inquiry, granted; if it exists even after diligent inquiry, denied; for this latter is not proved; indeed, if it were true, we would always have to have perfect certitude, which is impossible, and since many practical doubts occur, this would especially expose one to the danger of sinning formally.²

² Objective promulgation, namely, must pass into subjective promulgation so that the same law may oblige in second act. By the mere will of prescribing, God does not oblige formally: that is impossible; it is necessary that He communicate knowledge of this will. Yet cognition is not promulgation itself, but the application of it to man which comes from promulgation. Thus St. Thomas, I-II, q. 90, a. 4: "Law is imposed upon others by way of rule and measure. But rule and measure are imposed by this, that they are applied to those things which are ruled and measured. Whence, in order that law obtain the force of obliging, which is proper to law, it is necessary that it be applied to men, who must be ruled according to it. But such application is made by this, that it is brought to their knowledge from the promulgation itself." Hence knowledge of objective promulgation, or the application of law, is as if another promulgation, namely subjective; and by several it is simply called promulgation, even by St. Alphonsus, who writes concerning it, Th. M., book I, nn. 63-66: "We say that no one is held to observing any law unless that law is manifested to someone as certain. For, once it has been posited, as we have seen, that law necessarily must be promulgated in order that it oblige, if a doubtful law is promulgated, only the doubt, opinion, or question whether there is a law prohibiting the action will be promulgated, but the law itself will not be promulgated... If someone continues to ask why a doubtful law does not oblige, we shall answer by this succinct argument: A law not sufficiently promulgated does not oblige; a doubtful law is not sufficiently promulgated (because, while the law is doubtful, the doubt or question is sufficiently promulgated, but the law is not promulgated); therefore a doubtful law does not oblige. He who wished to deny this argument would have to prove either that even a non-promulgated law obliges, or that a doubtful law is truly promulgated... but he will never prove either of these propositions in eternity."

To the minor: He who does that which perhaps seems dishonorable, if he were acting in doubt, would expose himself to the danger of sinning, granted; if he resolves the doubt by saying: although the action perhaps is dishonorable in itself, nevertheless it is certainly licit for me to place it, he exposes himself to the danger of sinning, I subdistinguish: of sinning objectively and materially, granted; of sinning subjectively and formally, denied.

I distinguish the consequence: therefore he sins, if he operates in doubt or if he has neglected to inquire about the existence of the law, granted; otherwise, denied.

1. "He wrote very many books filled with sacred learning and piety, whether, amid the tangled opinions of Theologians, both laxer and more rigid, for fortifying a safe way by which the directors of the souls of Christ's faithful could walk with unoffending foot..." Apostolic Letters, 7 July 1871, on the conferral of the title Doctor of the Universal Church. - That this is true also in the present times is established from the brief of Pius X, 12 June 1905, to Fr. Gaude, editor of the works of St. Alphonsus, "whom all can safely follow in moral doctrines"; and from the brief of 2 May 1906 to Fr. Aertnijs, disciple of St. Alphonsus, "whom every student of this doctrine may always run through with unoffending foot." It is indeed to be regretted that many priests almost ignore St. Alphonsus, and leave aside his most wise works to consult some recent manual whatever; indeed also in several Academies and Seminaries, students almost never hear the name of the Holy Doctor, except to refute one or another of his sentences.

2. Behold the words of St. Thomas: "The command of someone governing has itself for binding in voluntary things in that mode of binding which can befall the will (namely, of moral obligation), as bodily action has itself for binding bodily things by necessity of coercion. But the bodily action of an agent never induces necessity in another thing except by contact of the coercion itself with the thing in which it acts. Whence neither from the command of some king or lord is someone bound, unless the command reaches the one to whom it is commanded: but it reaches him through science. Whence no one is bound by any precept except through science of the precept." Science in the present place in St. Thomas is not taken in the strict philosophical sense for evident cognition deduced from evident principles; but in the broad sense, for knowledge (as is clear from the context) or any certain cognition; for no one is said to know something, to have science, to have knowledge, who is not at least morally certain.

We do not say, in the cited words, that St. Thomas touched upon our question, or even demonstrated the adage: an uncertain law does not oblige; for he does not treat of the case in which there is knowledge of doubt concerning the existence of a precept, but of the case in which there is no knowledge of the precept. Nevertheless the general principle from which St. Thomas argues is also valid in the case of a doubtful precept, because knowledge of doubt does not reach the mind in such a way that it binds it. Namely, the principle: no one is bound except by means of science of the precept, not only shows the necessity of knowledge of the law but also the insufficiency of knowledge of doubt, because cognition of doubt does not bind the human mind. Whence elsewhere he grants the saying of Aristotle, Metaph. X, c. 3: "a measure must be most certain" (I-II, q. 19, a. 3, 3; q. 96, a. 1, 3).

1. Cf. St. Alphonsus, Th. M., book I, n. 77.

93. Thesis IV. Even in a doubt about the cessation or fulfillment of a law remaining after diligent examination, it seems that man can acquire a certain conscience concerning the honesty of the action, by force of the principle: A doubtful law does not oblige.

Thus, against St. Alphonsus and the more recent Equiprobabilists, with certain others,2 nearly all Probabilists teach, departing from St. Ligorio in this secondary thesis.3

It is proved: Unlike negative doubt, positive doubt is serious; and therefore if grave reasons are present for thinking that the law no longer exists or that it has been fulfilled, then it becomes actually uncertain and practically doubtful at least as to this case, and consequently it is certain that it no longer obliges me in the present case. Whence a certain conscience can be formed in the same way as in the preceding thesis.

Yet they object: The condition of the possessor is better. But the law is certain, the cessation or fulfillment doubtful. Therefore the law possesses the right that it be fulfilled, and is to be fulfilled. In other words, a certain law cannot be satisfied by doubtful fulfillment.

Resp.: 1) The principle The condition of the possessor is better, according to many, is not valid concerning positive doubt except in the matter of justice, where there is true possession in the proper sense (n. 91), but in other matters it is valid only concerning negative doubt (n. 84); at least the contrary is not proved.

2. Granted that the principle is valid in every matter, I reply: The law is no longer certain, and consequently possession itself becomes doubtful. For from the fact that before the doubt arose there was a certain obligation, it does not follow that the obligation remains. Thus, for example, it is ridiculous to say that we must presume that we have not fulfilled because previously we were certainly held to fulfill. Every obligation, namely, must be proved, because it is a restriction of liberty; for this it is not sufficient to prove the prior existence of the law, but its actual obligation.³

³ Cf. Prummer, Th. M., I, n. 346, 1; and Vermeersch, Th. M., I, n. 360.

3. Hence we do not say: an uncertain law is satisfied by doubtful fulfillment; but: the law is no longer certain, and consequently it need not be satisfied.

94. Corollaries. - 1. Although to follow Probabiliorism in doubt is safer, nevertheless it is simply safe, in a case of doubt, to act in the manner of the Equiprobabilists and Probabilists, because it certainly removes the danger of sinning formally.

2. For we are not always bound to act altogether more safely, which absolutely removes every danger of sinning, but it suffices that we act safely, so that we guard against that which is not safe, i.e., that which does not sufficiently remove the danger of sin or harm. Namely, nothing prevents that which is less safe (with respect to material sin) from now being simply and sufficiently safe (with respect to formal sin), because it removes every danger of formal sin.

3. Indeed Probabiliorism seems to suppose the principle: an uncertain law does not oblige. For it establishes that it is licit to follow the more probable opinion, the less probable one for the law being left aside. Now this rule cannot be certainly proved except because the less probable law, as being uncertain, does not oblige. But this almost equally proves the principle of the Equiprobabilists and Probabilists, which nevertheless the Probabiliorists reject.⁴

⁴ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Th. M., book I, n. 82.

4. In the case in which an end is not imposed, but in which someone absolutely wills to attain it, he also must, in order to act prudently, employ certain or safer means by which the end is certainly obtained, for example if someone wills to gain an indulgence or to know the truth. For this reason it is rather idle and imprudent, in the time of a jubilee, to indicate to the faithful several probable modes by which perhaps they can gain it; because by employing such modes they incur the danger of not gaining it.

5. Some falsely attack the difference between necessity of means and necessity of precept, saying that every law is a necessary means to the end. For one thing is a means only necessary because prescribed; another thing is a means necessary of itself and prescribed because it is a means.

6. What certain more recent authors say does not please:⁵ that one must act more safely in doubts which regard the truth (or value) of the thing according to itself, which is taken according to the notion of commensuration or debt toward another, concerning which is the cardinal virtue of Justice; but that one need not act more safely, and even the probable less safe may be done, in doubts which express order only to the one acting, and are about those things which are taken according to commensuration to the one acting, or about the dispositions alone of the one acting, concerning which are Fortitude and Temperance with the annexed virtues. In other words, in operations of the will toward another one must act more safely; but, on the contrary, in the passions or affections of the one acting, thus applying to the present question St. Thomas's doctrine on the division of the moral virtues.2 - But a) one must not act more safely in all things which express order to another, but only in the matter of justice properly so called, and in acts of religion which are concerned with the validity of a sacrament; but not in other acts of religion or in other virtues annexed to justice; b) even in justice properly so called, one must not act more safely in doubts of law, when the right of another is uncertain, but only in doubts of fact, when the right of another is certain; c) outside the matter of justice, for example from charity, sometimes one must also act more safely, even in those things which regard only the one acting, for example in doubts which concern things necessary by necessity of means for salvation, and in those which would expose one to a doubtful or probable danger of sinning formally.

⁵ Recent Equiprobabilists say that the principle The condition of the possessor is better is primary and most general; but that the principle A doubtful law does not oblige is secondary, derived from the primary principle and consequently to be limited by it. - Yet this does not seem to be admitted. For the principle a doubtful law does not oblige admits no exceptions; even in the case in which, on account of an end to be obtained absolutely, one must act more safely, the obligation arises not from the doubtful particular law, but from the higher law which then urges certainly. On the contrary, the principle The condition of the possessor is better seems rather to be restricted to the matter of justice or to doubts of fact. St. Alphonsus spoke in diverse ways on this point. In Confess. diretto, c. 1, n. 11, he assigns the first place to the principle of possession, and seems to signify the same in Hom. apost., tr. 1, c. 2, n. 14; but in the final redaction of Th. M., book I, n. 26, he has these words: "Of these (reflex) principles, the most principal is that one, that a doubtful law cannot induce a certain obligation... But from this first principle, that second principle is formed: The condition of the possessor is better." Since, however, this text is later and is found in a strictly theological work, it must be held as stronger and is presumed better to express the definitive mind of the Holy Doctor.

Therefore one must not depart from the received distinction between necessity of means and necessity of precept, validity of an act for the end and mere honesty (n. 90).

2. Certain pure Probabilists also hold this, among whom d'Annibale, Summula Theol. Mor., I, n. 244.

3. The thesis is secondary, because it does not treat of the principle, but only of the application of the principle to certain cases, and because, as the Mechlin theologians say, Th. Mor. gen., ed. 3, n. 190, q. 6: "Here indeed the distance is real, yet not so great. For 1) practically, equiprobabilists rarely invoke the principle of possession in favor of law: namely, in doubt or probability of fact alone, not of law; for they admit that law is satisfied through probable fulfillment by probability of law; and thus one who reads the hours according to that mode which probably only suffices is not held to read them again: the reason is that the law, insofar as it requires more, is doubtful, but a doubtful law does not oblige (cf. St. Alph., book I, nn. 97, 185; book IV, nn. 112, 700; H.A., tr. 15, n. 34). Moreover, probability of fact will be present more rarely: for if there is doubt about the very fact of fulfillment, often either there will be only a slight reason for doubting and therefore one to be spurned, or there will be such probability of fact that it reaches moral certitude. Therefore there remain those cases in which, in doubt about the cessation of a law, there is true probability of fact. Now 2) several principles are given by whose help, according to all, liberty is aided even then. Thus the equiprobabilists, with St. Alphonsus as guide, book VI, n. 477, resolve that one doubting whether he omitted a mortal sin is not held to confess it, if he was diligent in confessing his sins; but if he is accustomed to be negligent, scarcely, even according to the pure probabilists, because of the contrary presumption, will the doubt of confession made rise to true probability. Thus also another principle often solves the doubt: 'In a conflict of laws the higher law prevails'; whence, in doubt whether the recitation of the office, hearing Mass, or observance of the fast, to which the law certainly obliges, will be harmful to health, you are held to nothing; because the natural law or the right of preserving health prevails (St. Alph., book V, n. 154). Other principles also can come into use, for example, 'A way is not to be opened to scruples'; 'Positive laws do not oblige with grave inconvenience'; for these are frequently to be feared, if we oblige someone to fulfill a precept which he has already probably satisfied (St. Alph., book V, n. 177); and so on." Cf. also de Caigny, De Gemino Probabilismo licito, pp. 109-115.

1. Thus Beaudoin, Sertillanges and Dumas.

2. I-II, q. 70, a. 2; II-II, q. 57, a. 1; q. 58, a. 10.