Article II: On the Affection Itself of Credulity

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, a. 2 and 9; q. 1, a. 1; De Verit., q. 14, a. 2, ad 10 and 13; a. 3, ad 10; a. 7, ad 3; III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1 and 2.

696. Thesis. For the act of faith the command of the will is also required. - Namely, the second act required for faith is the motion of the will; this is certain because it is explicitly taught by the Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 3, calling faith the obedience of the will, indeed it follows immediately from those things which it defined concerning the liberty of faith (can. 5).

Its analysis is this: the will moves to assent to revealed things and commands it on account of a motive proper to itself; but the proper motive of the will is good; hence it moves the intellect to believing, for example, because it is good to believe, because to believe is useful, because to tend by faith to the ultimate end is good, because it is good not to act irrationally. "That will," says St. Thomas, De Verit., q. 14, a. 2, ad 10, "which determines the intellect to believing, is not an act of charity, nor an act of hope, but a certain appetite (or simple volition) of the good promised," for example, John VI, 69. This act of the will moving the intellect to believing is called by theologians after the Second Council of Orange the pious affection of credulity, that is, a pious inclination to believing.

697. Corollary: What it is to believe God, to believe God, and to believe in God. - From the aforesaid we understand what St. Thomas teaches after St. Augustine, in Ioh., tr. 29 (a. 2), that by the act of faith we believe God (credere Deum), believe God (credere Deo), and believe in God (credere in Deum). For to believe is an act of the intellect commanded by the will. On the part of the intellect, God is the primary material object, and this we signify by saying: I believe God (credo Deum); He is also the formal object, and this we signify by saying: I believe God, namely, speaking with authority (credo Deo). But on the part of the will, this commands the act of faith by tending into God as into the end, and this we signify by saying: I believe in God (credo in Deum). We do not do this last perfectly except through charity, and therefore without this faith is called imperfect or unformed.

On the contrary, by divine faith we do not believe the Church, because the Church is not the formal object of this faith, although we can believe her by ecclesiastical faith (at least according to several); - nor do we believe in the Church because she is not our ultimate end; properly we believe the Church, as the Symbol speaks, because she is the material object which we believe.

698. The liberty of faith. - On the part of the motion of the will the act of faith has a property, namely, liberty, as the Second Council of Orange, can. 5, and Trent, sess. 6, c. 6, already taught, and the Vatican Council defined, sess. 3, c. 3, can. 5, against the Rationalists and Hermes, who confused faith with science.

It is a free act 1. not indeed radically, remotely, and per accidens, because we can fail to consider the motives of credibility, - or because the motives of credibility do not render us altogether certain concerning revelation, as Lugo falsely teaches (as will be said in the following article, n. 703), which besides would explain liberty in the preambles, but not in the act itself of faith; - but

2. formally, proximately, and per se, because, although the fact of revelation and the obligation of believing can be altogether certain and evident, nevertheless the truths to be believed are not evident by themselves for us; whence the intellect does not necessarily assent to them, but for this the motion of the free will is required, especially

3. because we admit those truths by trusting in divine authority. From which it follows:

a) that the act of faith is free not only as to exercise, or as to use (like science), because we can fail to consider the motive or turn attention away from the object to be believed, but also as to specification or as to assent, because while we consider the object, there remains the possibility of doubting, of not assenting, indeed of denying; whence St. Thomas, a. 10: "the act of faith... is subject to the will not only as to use, but also as to assent";

b) that the act of faith can be meritorious, with charity nevertheless acceding (a. 9 and 10).

The liberty of faith is handed down in Sacred Scripture:

a) once the preaching of the Gospel is set forth, some believe, some do not believe, which is a sign of liberty (Acts XVII, 32-34; Rom. X, 16; Is. LXV); they do not believe because they do not seek the light but love the darkness (John III, 18-21);

b) believers are praised, those not believing are reproved (Rom. IV, 3; Mk. XVI, 14; Apoc. II, 19; Luke XXIV, 25; Acts VII, 39);

c) faith falls under precept and reward is ascribed to it, but unbelief is held as a grave sin worthy of eternal punishment (I John III, 23; John III, 15; Rom. IV, 3; Mk. XVI, 16);

d) whence faith is called voluntary obedience (Rom. I, 5; X, 16; Acts VI, 7; II Cor. X, 5-6) by which it is believed from the heart, indeed from the whole heart (Rom. X, 9-10; Acts VIII, 37). Hence Augustine, in Ioh., tr. 26, n. 2: "No one can believe unless willing"; and Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. IV, 37, 5: "Not only in works, but also in faith, the Lord preserved man free and in the power of his own judgment; and on account of this he who believes Him has eternal life, but he who does not believe the Son does not have eternal life, but the wrath of God will remain upon him."

Therefore the Church has never used force for converting infidels.