Article II: On the Coercive Force or Sanction of Natural Law

St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles III, 140-141.

254. Notions. - Sanction, a) on the part of the cause or origin, is internal (and concomitant), which proceeds naturally and by the very fact, from the action itself or from the nature of the thing, and follows observance or violation of the law, for example, tranquility and remorse of conscience, good and bad reputation, bodily indisposition from drunkenness; and external (or inflicted), which comes from an extrinsic cause, or is connected by the disposition of law with observance or violation of law, for example, if a drunkard is punished by a judge with a fine;

b) on the part of the effect, it is perfect or sufficient, which by its nature is able to move all subjects (either absolutely, or relatively for certain circumstances) in every case to observance of the law, and has due proportion with merit and demerit; or imperfect and insufficient.

255. Thesis. An imperfect and internal sanction of natural law exists in the present life; the perfect sanction is in the other life, from the attainment or loss of the ultimate end.

a) The first part is proved. Internal sanction is present, for virtue is the perfect good of this life; and fault is rather often followed by 1) remorse of conscience, because "when the impulse of malice or passion by which they do evil has ceased, according to reason they know that they have acted badly and they grieve"; 2) pain in the soul; 3) sickness in the body. Hence Wis. XI, 17: By the things through which one sins, by these also he is tormented. But it is imperfect, both because it does not sufficiently induce to observance of the law, for sometimes we are bound to expose life itself, and there are many seductions in this life, for overcoming which a sanction more excellent than the goods of this life is required; and because, as experience testifies, it does not repay each one according to justice.

1. St. Thomas, on IX Ethics, l. 4.

b) The second part is proved: 1) from the essential order of things: where there is a due order to an end, it is necessary that order lead to that end, and departure from order exclude the end. But from the disposition and law of God, human acts are essentially ordered to the ultimate end. Therefore it is necessary that those preserving order attain the ultimate end (which is to be rewarded); but that those departing from order be excluded from the end (which is to be punished). This is confirmed:

a) Just as natural things are subjected to the ordination of divine providence, so also human nature; therefore, just as in natural things the order preserved of necessity produces conservation and good in them, so in human things it is necessary that the order of law divinely imposed, when preserved, lead from the disposition of the governor to the good of retribution, but the order of law passed over, to the evil of penalty.

b) For matter does not attain form unless it has been suitably disposed. But the end is the perfection of the will, just as form is the perfection of matter. Therefore the will does not attain the end unless it has been suitably disposed. But it is disposed by the intention and desire and pursuit of the end. Therefore he whose intention is turned away from the end does not attain it.

c) This also holds of the supernatural end. For he who recedes from the natural end also recedes from the supernatural end, because the natural order is the foundation of elevation to the supernatural end; namely, he recedes from God as the principle of all perfection.

2. from the wisdom of the supreme legislator: God, as the most wise and provident legislator, intends that natural law be observed by all. But, as experience testifies, one efficacious and necessary means of inducing free men, moved by depraved desires and pleasures, to this is perfect sanction, which is so proportioned to every virtue and difficulty of the law that, all things considered, it is never truly useful for man to depart from the law. Therefore God established a perfect sanction. But in the present life such perfect sanction is lacking. Therefore perfect sanction pertains to the future life, or to the state of the term and end, so that the human will, which naturally tends to happiness, may be efficaciously moved to observance of the law by hope of attaining this and fear of losing it.

3. from the holiness and justice of the supreme Lord: men are distinguished from one another by their acts, to which imputability and merit belong. But divine holiness demands that this distinction resulting from the imputability of human acts be preserved in the future life; and justice demands that reward be assigned to merit, penalty to demerit. Therefore. For if good and evil were related equally to the essential attainment of the end, there would be no essential distinction of morality, because all morality depends upon relation to the ultimate end; and thus: a) practically the intrinsic difference between good and evil would be destroyed, and God would seem indifferent to good and evil, which contradicts His holiness; b) the law of God would be violated with impunity, and the rebellious creature could escape His will and as it were triumph over Him, which is repugnant to the justice of divine dominion.

256. Sanction does not harm morality.

For to do good on account of reward and to avoid evil on account of penalty can happen in two ways: a) so that reward or penalty is the sole motive of the act, without any respect to its goodness or malice, and such a mode is bad because it perverts order, since the means is put before the end; b) so that man uses hope of reward or fear of penalty for pursuing good more efficaciously and avoiding evil more efficaciously, and such a mode is conformable to the order intended by the legislator, who adds sanction as a means for urging the obligation of law. This is confirmed by the universal practice of parents and teachers in educating children (n. 133, 3).

Hence Kantian ethics, which asserts the sole motive of obligation, is not more perfect than Christian ethics, which they say is founded on fear and hope. For on the one hand Christian ethics does not teach that morality depends upon fear and hope, but that these are helps; on the other hand Kant refuses to admit that rational human nature and the essential order of things are the foundation of morality. And yet it does not pertain to ethics to correct nature, but to accept it as it is in fact and so to direct human actions that they be conformable to rational nature.

1. Cf. Lehu, op. cit., n. 27; and D'Hulst, Conferences de N. D., 1891.