Article — Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis
Article II: On the Conditions Required for the Material Object
St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, a. 3, 4, 5; I-II, q. 67, a. 3 and 5; De Verit., q. 14, a. 9.
677. Two conditions are required for the object of faith. - In order that something can be believed, it is required that it be at once true and obscure, or non-evident. Hence theologians say that there are two conditions of the material object of faith, namely, that it be true and obscure, and two properties of faith on the part of the object: infallibility and obscurity.
678. The infallibility of faith. - First, it is required that the material object of faith be true (Num. XXIII, 19; Heb. VI, 18): for what is false cannot underlie faith, neither on the part of God revealing, nor on the part of the man believing,
a) Not on the part of God revealing, because He cannot say what is false: for if God, by Himself or through another, could say what is false, this would happen either because He was deceived, or because He wished to deceive others; but each is impossible, for the former is repugnant to His omniscience, the latter to His infinite goodness and perfection.
b) Nor on the part of the man believing: for nothing is attained and believed by the habit of faith except on account of the authority and testimony of God, namely, through the mediation of the formal object; but the authority and testimony of God do not extend themselves to false things; therefore what is false cannot be believed.
Faith is an intellectual virtue which is not occupied with what is false, which is the evil of the intellect: for no one uses virtue badly. Hence if someone assents to something false which, through ignorance even invincible, he thinks to be revealed by God, such a one does not assent from the supernatural habit of theological faith on account of the authority of God, because God has revealed it, but only by a natural act on account of error, because he falsely thinks that God has revealed it. Nor does God by grace concur with such an act, by which the intellect adheres to what is false. Hence faith is infallible.
679. The obscurity of faith. - Second, it is required that the material object of faith be obscure or non-evident: for faith is the argument of things not appearing. And indeed:
a) All theologians unanimously admit that the material object of faith is formally non-evident, by reason of the motive, that is, insofar as it is attained through the formal object, the authority of God revealing: for this does not render the thing evident to the intellect, as the Vatican Council says, sess. 3, c. 3, nor does it make the revealed truth appear in itself.
b) All likewise hold that something cannot at once be believed and be seen by the beatific vision, according to I Cor. XIII, 9-10.
c) Likewise they concede that those things concerning which faith principally is, are altogether obscure and non-evident: for they are the beatific vision and other mysteries hidden in God, for the knowledge of which revelation is absolutely necessary (Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 4, can. 1).
d) It is disputed whether other objects which can be known naturally, but which nevertheless are revealed, can be believed by those who concerning these objects also have evident rational knowledge, for example, whether one who has evidence in every way of the existence of God, or of creation, or of providence, etc., can still admit these things on account of the authority of God, who also revealed them.
680. How evidence impedes faith. - In this question:
- It is certain that one who has evidence of some thing can believe this implicitly, insofar as he must believe in a general mode all things which God has revealed and can exclude none of them; and this is the sense of the Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 3.
- Indeed, he can believe it explicitly, but at another moment than that at which he has evident knowledge: for one who, for example, now demonstrates the existence of God can afterwards admit it on account of revelation, namely, when the intellect does not consider the evidence or does not remember the demonstration.
- Hence there can be at once in the same man, concerning the same truth, the habit of faith and an act of science, an act of faith and the habit of science, indeed even the habit of faith and the habit of science, by which he is disposed at the same time to believing and knowing, not simultaneously but at diverse times.
- For it seems that it must be said with St. Thomas,1 that at the same moment in which someone makes an evident demonstration of some truth, or most fully remembers an earlier demonstration, so that he has full evidence of the truth, he cannot at that moment accept the same truth on account of testimony, even divine testimony. - It is proved:
1 St. Thomas follows the tradition of Chrysostom, Gregory, Augustine, and in the same way Scotus.
a) From internal experience it is established that what we see with our eyes, we never admit, nor can we admit, on account of the testimony of another even most worthy of faith; likewise it is established that no one believes or can believe the first principles, for example, the principle of contradiction, which are seen by the mind; hence in heaven faith is made void, when the vision of God comes; the same seems to be said of the moment in which someone, after a demonstration has been made, sees by the mind the evident conclusion of the existence of God or of another natural truth: for immediate and mediate evidence are of the same genus. Namely, it is a law of our intellect that it cannot believe the things which we see.
b) By reason: the intellect cannot at the same moment rest perfectly in the truth and at the same time not rest. But he who has knowledge altogether evident, rests perfectly in the truth and indeed necessarily; he who believes does not rest in it, for the possibility and liberty of doubting or of not assenting remain to him. Therefore at the same moment someone cannot hold the same truth by faith and by evidence.2
2 Therefore the impossibility perhaps is not metaphysical, but psychological. - Some deny the force of this second argument, saying that the intellect rests in the truth as evident, but at the same time does not rest in it from the motive of faith. Yet to one considering well it appears to be nothing other than the same argument as the first, drawn from psychological experience, but whose reason at the same time is rendered. Rest, moreover, does not express a relation to the object, but absolutely a relation to the subject, which is at rest or is not.
c) From the answer to the principal argument of the adversaries: the same truth can be admitted at once on account of a twofold motive, namely, evidence and authority. For this is easily distinguished: if those motives do not require a contrary disposition of the intellect, I concede; if they require a contrary disposition, I deny. For otherwise, in the same way, the possibility of faith in heaven, or the compossibility of science and opinion, would be demonstrated.
681. Observation. - Therefore the merit of faith is not diminished from the fact that someone does not believe revealed rational truths of which he has evidence. For, as St. Thomas notes, q. 2, a. 10, ad 2: "Demonstrative reasons brought forward for those things which are preambles of faith (not however for the articles), although they diminish the account of faith, because they make that which is proposed to be apparent, nevertheless do not diminish the account of charity, through which the will is prompt to believe them, even if they did not appear, and therefore the account of merit is not diminished."