Article II: On the Precept of Matrimony

S. Th., Suppl., q. 41, a. 2; II-II, q. 152, a. 2, ad 1; c. Gent. III, 136.

756. State of the question. - Several have said:

1. that matrimony is obligatory for all capable persons. Thus certain men in the time of St. Thomas, whom he refuted by writing against those who attack perpetual continence; but in modern times certain non-Catholics, such as Platen, Nystrom, Voivenel;¹

¹ Platen, Le livre d'or de la sante; Nystrom, Das Geschlechtsleben und seine Gesetze; Voivenel, La castidad perversa.

2. the Scholastics, after Peter Lombard and St. Thomas, said quite generally that the precept of matrimony per se obliges the multitude, but not individuals except accidentally: thus Durandus, Paludanus, Soto, Ledesma, Viguerius, Henriquez, Sanchez, Lud. Lopez, Vivaldus Candelabro, Vega, and generally the Thomists;

3. on the contrary others say that there is no precept of matrimony, neither for the multitude, nor for individuals; except accidentally, in those circumstances in which it would be necessary for the preservation of the human race, as they readily understood in the beginning of creation, and perhaps it would still be so if otherwise the human race would perish.² Thus more recently Palmieri, and after him Gasparri, De Matrimonio, n. 14: "A true precept with obligation which affects the species and no individual cannot even be understood... This obligation is not demonstrated... God obtains his end through natural inclination without a precept." And many moderns hold this, such as Wernz, Noldin, Cappello, at least as more probable, because such a precept is superfluous and inefficacious.

² Not all admit this: St. Bonaventure, in IV, d. 26, a. 1, q. 3, and Durandus, ib., a. 3, q. 3, say that the precept ceased, the human race having been multiplied.

757. Principle I. There is some natural precept of matrimony, or matrimony falls in some sense under a natural precept.

It is proved from Billuart, diss. 1, a. 2, § 2: "A means especially necessary for the end intended by nature falls under a precept of nature. But matrimony is especially necessary for the end intended by nature, namely, for the due and congruous preservation of the species, as has been said. Therefore matrimony falls under a precept of nature. - Nor is the case similar with other animals to which no precept is given, but natural inclination suffices for the preservation of the species, both because they are incapable of precept, and because man, notwithstanding natural inclination, still remains free to assent to it or dissent from it."

Appositely St. Thomas, in II-II, q. 152, a. 2, ad 1:

"A precept has the character of something owed. But something is owed in two ways: in one way so that it be fulfilled by one person, and this owed thing cannot be passed over without sin; but another thing is owed to be rendered by the multitude, and not each one of the multitude is bound to fulfill such a debt: for many things are necessary to the multitude, for the fulfillment of which one person does not suffice, but they are fulfilled by the multitude, while one does this, another that. Therefore the precept of the law of nature given to man concerning eating must be fulfilled by each one; otherwise the individual could not be preserved. But the precept given concerning generation regards the multitude of men, to whom it is necessary not only that it be multiplied corporally, but also that it advance spiritually. And therefore provision is sufficiently made for the human multitude if certain persons devote work to carnal generation; but others, abstaining from this, devote themselves to the contemplation of divine things for the beauty and salvation of the whole human race: just as also in an army certain men guard the camp, certain men bear the standards, certain men fight with swords, which nevertheless are all owed to the multitude, but cannot be fulfilled by one man."

758. Principle II. The precept of matrimony per se and directly does not oblige individual persons, except perhaps in the case in which a scarcity of men would require that each one attend to generation. - It is certain.

The reason is that the precept is not referred to the singular and proper perfection of the individual: for generation is not of the necessity of the individual, but of the necessity of the species and community; but for this it is not required that individuals marry, indeed it is not even possible that it fittingly be done in this way, since provision must also be made for other things necessary to the community.

It is said: a) per se and directly, for accidentally someone can be bound by reason of a peculiar condition, for example, if otherwise he cannot observe continence, or does not will to employ the means of observing it; likewise to repair an injury, or to legitimate offspring, or to fulfill a promise, to reconcile peace between princes, or a prince to avoid civil war, or to preserve the Catholic faith in a region, etc.

b) except perhaps in the case in which a scarcity of men would require it; because just as in a case of necessity each one can be bound to the defense of the republic, so also to the preservation of the species, which is no less necessary.

It is proved from St. Thomas, c. Gent. III, 136: Those things which are necessary to each one must necessarily and obligatorily be used by individuals, for example, food and drink; but those things which are necessary to the multitude, it is not necessary that each one procure, indeed it is not possible. But generation is not of the necessity of the individual, but of the necessity of the species. Therefore it is not necessary or obligatory that all men attend to acts for generation. For:

a) Many things are necessary to the multitude of men, as are food, drink, clothing, a house, and other things, which it is impossible to be procured by one man, both because there are diverse aptitudes, and because diverse activities exclude one another.

b) Therefore, just as in the body diverse members are ordered to diverse things, so in society there must be diverse offices, nor is it necessary that all be farmers, builders, or soldiers.

c) Thus it is not necessary that all attend to generation, especially since on account of a good more necessary or more perfect they can abstain, as on account of military service and the defense of the fatherland, or on account of contemplation, which also concurs for the good of society.

d) Indeed many are in conditions in which they could not fittingly devote themselves to the generation and education of offspring.

Nor does it stand in the way that the inclination to matrimony is natural. For, as St. Thomas says, in Suppl., q. 41, a. 2: "Nature inclines to something in two ways: In one way as to that which is necessary for the perfection of one person, and such an inclination obliges each one, because natural perfections are common to all. In another way it inclines to something which is necessary for the perfection of the multitude; and since there are many things of this kind, one of which impedes another, from such an inclination not every man is obliged by way of precept, otherwise every man would be obliged to agriculture and building, and to offices of this kind which are necessary to the human community; but satisfaction is made to the inclination of nature when through diverse persons diverse things of those named are completed. Since, therefore, it is necessary for the perfection of the human multitude that some serve the contemplative life, which is especially impeded by matrimony, the inclination of nature to matrimony does not oblige by way of precept, even according to the philosophers. Whence Theophrastus proves that it is not expedient for the wise man to marry." Hence the Apostle says, I Cor. VII, 38: "He who does not join his virgin in matrimony does better," namely, than he who does join her.

759. They object: 1. Nature has endowed the individual with organs destined for generation. Not to use organs given by nature is against the order of nature, which requires the function of the organ, since it has given nothing useless, nor is it man's part to emend it. Therefore not to use the organs destined for generation is against the very order of nature.

Resp. I distinguish the major: Nature has endowed the individual with organs destined for generation, for the good of the species, I concede; for the good of the individual, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: not to use organs destined for the necessity and good of the individual is against the order of nature, I concede; destined for the necessity and good of the species, I deny. Cf. Gent. III, 136, ad 2.

2. Every appetite is a necessity of nature to which satisfaction must be given, as, for example, the appetite for food, drink, etc. Every individual feels the appetite of sexual concupiscence. Therefore as satisfaction must be given to the appetite of hunger and thirst, so it must be given to the sexual appetite.

Resp. I distinguish the major: satisfaction must be given to an appetite which indicates the necessity of the individual, I concede; which indicates the necessity of the species, I subdistinguish: by some persons in the community, I concede; by all, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: Everyone feels the appetite of sexual concupiscence, which is ordered to the necessity of the species, I concede; which is ordered to the necessity of the individual, I deny. I distinguish the consequence: therefore satisfaction must be given to the sexual appetite by some, I concede; by all, I deny. Cf. II-II, q. 152, a. 2, ad 1.

3. It is a physiological law that every organ, in order that it may remain healthy and robust, requires normal and moderate exercise, without the excess of abuse, and without the defect of inertia; otherwise it incurs debility and atrophy. Therefore the genital organ also must be used moderately.

Resp. I deny, because the faculty of generating does not cease through non-use. For the genital organ is not subject to atrophy. And semen, which does not serve the ends of matrimony, increases the vigor of the individual, because it is reabsorbed partly in such a way that it is available for the good of the other organs. This physicians also affirm.³

³ Cf. Eschbach, Disputationes physiologico-theologicae; Gemelli, Non moechaberis; Fere, L'instinct sexuel; Moll, Handbuch der Sexual Wissenschaften; Forel, Die sexuelle Frage; La question sexuelle.

760. Principle III. The precept of matrimony per se and directly is imposed upon the multitude or community of the human race, whose part it is to have care for the sufficient preservation of itself; so that individuals are obliged, if it is necessary for the preservation of the human race. This God himself declared, Gen. I, 28: "Increase and multiply...," the reason for which is added, because "he created them male and female."

It is proved: 1. A precept of matrimony is given, as was said n. 757; it does not per se and directly oblige individuals in particular; therefore it obliges the multitude, all in common.

2. A precept has the character of a debt to be fulfilled by a rational creature. It is a debt to be fulfilled by the multitude that the human race be propagated and preserved. Therefore this is prescribed to it, and it is law: for it is an ordination of reason to the common good, promulgated by him who has care of the community, through the mediation of human reason.

It is confirmed: a) that precept was given to all at the beginning of the human race,

b) nor was it revoked when the necessity ceased: for a natural precept is not extinguished when the necessity ceases, although for that time it does not oblige, as is clear of the precept of almsgiving.

The opposition of the adversaries seems to arise from this, that they do not rightly conceive the natural law, or they fashion it as too similar to positive law, although it is nothing other than the inclination of rational nature itself, to be known by reason and enunciated by the dictate of reason (I, n. 246).

Thus, for example, they object:

1. An obligation which affects the species and no individual person cannot even be understood. - Resp.: let it pass, but it affects individual persons in common: for it affects nature, not in the abstract but in the concrete, and therefore it affects all who possess the nature.

2. Once the inclination of the human race to matrimony is posited, law is superfluous; indeed, it is inefficacious because it obliges no one in particular. - Resp.: the inclination of nature itself to matrimony in a rational being is natural law; another positive law is superfluous, let it pass. But the inclination of nature itself is not inefficacious, and it obliges all, not distributively but collectively.

3. What touches all presses no one. A precept which obliges the multitude will be neglected by most. Therefore it is useless and insufficient. - Resp. I distinguish: if it concerns a mere burden, I concede; if it concerns a work to which nature inclines, I deny.

4. A precept altogether indeterminate as to mode, time, age, persons, is repugnant, since it is inefficacious. - Resp.: an indeterminate positive precept as to circumstances is repugnant, I concede; an indeterminate natural precept is repugnant, I deny. Many natural precepts are indeterminate: God is to be worshiped, justice is to be observed, contracts are to be entered justly, etc. For natural law is of itself indeterminate; and therefore positive law is necessary for determining the natural law⁴ (I, n. 263).

⁴ Recently Fr. Agapito Martin de Sobradillo, O.M.C., in the work La Procreation et la Sterilisation, objects three things:

1. An obligation which first belongs to individuals, then to society, then to individuals if there were necessity, is understood with difficulty. - Resp.: It always affects all collectively in the same way; the difference is of application from circumstances.

2. The multitude as such does not have offices, but individuals do: either all are obliged, and this is false; or if others abstain, and in the case it suffices to say that then there is an obligation in these circumstances. - Resp.: Then the obligation is applied, because the general law is that care be taken for the preservation of the species.

3. Society cannot generate, but the individual can. Therefore society itself is not the subject of the obligation of generating. - Resp.: Not society as such is the subject, but all collectively.

761. Observation. - In practice it does not matter whether it is said that a properly so-called precept is imposed upon the multitude, or whether this is denied, since by the inclination of nature implanted in individuals, together with divine providence, sufficient provision is made for the preservation of the human race.