Article III: On Cardinal Virtues

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 61; De Virt. q. 5, a. 1; q. 1, a. 12, ad 26.

597. Principle I. Certain virtues are called cardinal, as principal virtues on which the others are founded: thus metaphorically from the hinge on which a door is turned; whence those are so called on which, as on hinges, moral life turns and the whole right human life is founded.¹ Since they are principal in human life, they are not merely intellectual virtues and virtues in a qualified sense, but are virtues simply so called and moral virtues, which alone contain rectitude of appetite and which, with respect to good, surpass the intellectual virtues.

¹ Ambrose seems to have been the first who called them cardinal, exp. in Luc., l. V, n. 49 and 62.

That there are four cardinal virtues is proved:

1. By reason of the object: the good of reason, which is the object of virtue, can be considered either in the very act of reason which considers it, or in the various matters in which it must be produced, namely, in operations and in passions. But some passions impel toward something contrary to reason; others draw one back from that which reason dictates. Thus, therefore, there will be one principal virtue which makes good in reason itself: prudence; and one which makes good in operations: justice; and one which moderates and represses passions impelling to what is contrary to reason: temperance; and one which strengthens us against passions drawing us back from the order of reason: fortitude.

2. By reason of the subject: there are four faculties of the soul in which virtues reside, and in each there must be a principal virtue: therefore in reason there is prudence; in the will, justice; in the concupiscible, temperance; in the irascible, fortitude.

598. Cardinal virtues are not always understood by all in the same sense. - For some take them in a generic sense, as general modes which are found in several, indeed in all virtues;² either:

² Thus Ambrose and Gregory.

a) as four genera or collections of virtues, under which all the others are contained as species, so that whatever virtue makes good in the consideration of reason is called prudence (for example, eubulia), and whatever virtue makes rectitude in operations is called justice (for example, religion, piety, gratitude), and whatever virtue restrains and represses passions is called temperance (for example, meekness, humility), and whatever virtue makes firmness of soul against whatever passions is called fortitude (for example, magnificence, magnanimity); - or also

b) as general conditions required for any virtue whatever, insofar as every virtue ought to be prudent, just, strong, and moderated.

But although these things are true, nevertheless they do not describe the proper nature of the cardinal virtues in the strict sense.

599. Principle II. Cardinal virtues are to be taken in a specific sense and are special virtues, which have determinate matter and are distinguished from all others. For:

a) In each genus of virtues (of which there has been treatment above) there is something greatest, chief, and more difficult, concerning which there is had a special virtue: thus in the act by which reason considers, the chief and more difficult thing is to command well rather than to counsel and judge well; in operations toward another, the chief thing is the rectitude due to strict equality, in which rectitude most shines forth, namely, in commutations and distributions; similarly it is more difficult to restrain the more vehement delights, namely, the delights of touch, and to strengthen man against the greatest dangers, namely, dangers of death. Whence there are four principal virtues, as being those which are concerned with principal matter: prudence strictly so called, which is preceptive of the good; justice properly so called, which is concerned with due actions between equals; temperance properly so called, which represses the concupiscences of the delights of touch; and fortitude strictly so called, which strengthens against dangers of death.

b) But because he who is well disposed to doing the chief and more difficult thing thereby has a certain inchoate disposition and facility for the less difficult, according to the saying: He who can do the greater can do the lesser (just as he who can restrain the concupiscences of the flesh, which is more difficult, thereby is more apt for restraining other passions, which is easier; and he who is just can already become liberal, grateful, pious, which otherwise he could not), hence he who has these four special virtues has, at least according to an inchoation, all the other moral virtues; and therefore they are the foundation of all the others, and are rightly called cardinal.³

³ Cf. St. Thomas, in III Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 4; and De Virt., q. 1, a. 12, ad 26.

But the others are called annexed virtues, which are concerned with secondary acts or matters, or potential parts, as not having the whole power of the principal virtue.