Article III: On the Distinction of Penance from Other Virtues

S. Th. III, q. 85, a. 2 and ad 1; a. 5 and 6; q. 84, a. 9, ad 3; suppl., q. 3, a. 2.

401. Penance is not a general virtue. - For it is not every virtue or the aggregate of all virtues, or a general condition of any virtue whatever, as William of Auxerre thought; but a well-distinguished species of justice, as was said n. 396; and therefore it does not expel every sin formally (as a habit expels its contrary), but effectively, insofar as it cooperates toward the destruction of sin insofar as it is remissible from divine grace (a. 2, ad 3).

Nevertheless it includes the exercise of many virtues: "for insofar as it is a certain justice of man toward God, it must participate in those things which belong to the theological virtues, which have God for their object. Whence penance is with faith in the passion of Christ, through which we are justified from sins, and with hope of pardon, and with hatred of vices, which pertains to charity. But insofar as it is a moral virtue, it participates in something of prudence, which is directive of all moral virtues; but from the very reason of justice it has not only that which belongs to justice, but also those things which belong to temperance and fortitude, insofar namely as those things which cause delectation pertain to temperance, or inspire terror, which fortitude moderates, come into the communion of justice" (a. 3, ad 4).

402. Penance, as being a special virtue, is distinct from all other virtues. - And indeed:

1° Penance differs from the theological virtues, because it does not attain God Himself, the last end, but is concerned with something created which is a means to the end.

The theological virtues have God as their material object, and as their formal object some divine good, namely, God Himself insofar as He is revealing truth, helping omnipotence, the highest good to be communicated to us, infinitely perfect in Himself. Penance as material object has our acts, and as formal object the created good of man, yet with relation to God, namely, the good of equality to be restored with offended God (a. 3, ad 1).

Specifically it differs from charity: charity detests sin because it displeases God as an extrinsic evil of God, contrary to divine goodness, dissolving divine friendship; penance grieves concerning sin because it is an offense of divine right, amendable and reparable, or an offense of God against the right of the supreme Lord (over all our acts), and thus to be repaired. Nevertheless penance can be commanded by the motive of charity, and then it is perfect (a. 2, ad 1).

Whence charity tends directly toward union with God, indirectly toward the removal of sin; penance tends directly toward the removal of sin, indirectly toward union with God.

2° Penance also differs from religion, to which Cajetan said it was principally identical. For the object of religion is worship rendered to God on account of His excellence; whence it regards God as Lord or benefactor. The object of penance is due compensation for sin; whence it regards God as offended and to be appeased.

Moreover: a) In penance there is present a great and special difficulty, both from the fact that man removes sin to which he voluntarily adheres and in which he has already been delighted, and from the fact that he exercises vengeance against himself unto the punishment of himself; this difficulty is not in religion. But where there is a great and special difficulty, there must be a special virtue (n. 396).

b) To God, who has a right to our honor and worship, there is, once sin is supposed, a new and special title of right, namely, that we restore the due honor withdrawn from Him. Therefore penance is a new and special virtue distinct from religion. For in each the reason of debt is diverse: religion owes to God because we receive something from Him; penance because we have detracted and taken something from Him.

c) Religion abstracts from sin; on the contrary, penance does not. The former regards divine right taken in its whole breadth; the latter regards divine right as wounded and to be repaired.

3° Penance differs from distributive or vindicative justice; this must be held respectively against Gabriel Biel and against Scotus. For this justice is of a superior toward inferiors, and assesses punishments or rewards to one by respect to others who are also punished or rewarded; but penance is of an inferior toward a superior, and of one singular person by respect to God.

Specifically, it must be altogether distinguished from vindicative justice:

a) Vindicative justice is properly in the judge, inflicting upon another's crime the punishment which the guilty one rather often sustains unwillingly; penance is in the guilty one himself, who voluntarily sustains punishment for his own fault committed.

b) Vindicative justice regards offense commonly, which it recompenses through external works; penance regards the offense of God, whence it must consist in voluntary and internal compensation, such as befits God.

c) The public avenger necessarily inflicts punishment proportioned to the crime according to the laws; the penitent, incapable of proportioning punishment to the offense of his own mortal fault, by moderate labor removes hatred of God and eternal damnation owed to sin.

d) The judge intends the punishment of the delinquent on account of the common good of the republic; the penitent intends the amendment of himself and reconciliation with God, and by grieving and raging against himself, he consults for himself alone (cf. a. 3, ad 3; and in IV Sent., d. 14, a. 1, q. 1, qc. 6).

403. Corollaries. - 1. Penance is a moral virtue, and therefore is in the mean. - For although in one sense in its own matter there cannot be excess, namely, according to quantity, insofar as we cannot grieve too much by the will concerning sin committed against God, nevertheless according to other circumstances excess is given, for example if penance is exhibited to whom, where, when, how, etc., it ought not. Whence an excessive mode is also given according to quantity, not on the part of rational sorrow, but on the part of sensible sorrow, which can be too great, casting one into despair (q. 84, a. 9, ad 3).

2. Penance is not the first virtue. - Not indeed in time and as to habit, because all are infused together; - nor in nature and as to act, because according to the reason of efficient and final cause the theological virtues are naturally prior of themselves, both because it is prior to believe, hope, and love God than also from this to grieve concerning sin, and because according to themselves they are necessary for the good of man, while penance is so only once sin is supposed. But as to something penance is first as to act, namely, according to the order of material and dispositive cause: under this reason it is prior to recede from sin than to be converted to God (a. 6).

3. Penance is distinguished from fear of God, whose object is God Himself as powerful to inflict the evil of punishment (fear of punishment or even servile fear), or as not to be offended from reverence (fear of fault and filial fear); but the object of penance is wounded divine right as amendable. Nevertheless the act of penance can proceed from fear, which rightly is called by St. Thomas the principle of penance, insofar as it is the principle of acts by which in penance we cooperate with God. For from servile fear penance is as from the first and remote principle on the part of the will, or as from the first motion of affection ordered to this: not necessarily indeed and always, but regularly and ordinarily, insofar as by fear of punishments man is accustomed to begin to be drawn back from sin, and thus it is imperfect and initial penance; - from filial fear penance is as from an immediate and proper moving principle, insofar as on account of reverence for God someone offers due satisfaction, and thus it is already perfect penance (a. 5).

404. Observations. - 1. The things which we have said hold chiefly concerning supernatural and infused penance: for in the present supernatural order, an act of supernatural penance is required for the remission of sin, and the supernatural virtue of penance is infused by God together with habitual grace. Nor is it useless, although reconciliation with God takes place at the same moment, both because just as the last disposition to form is caused by the form, so the last disposition to grace and the infused virtues is caused by grace and charity and the virtue of penance which is infused; and because afterward it serves for grieving more perfectly concerning remitted sin, for grieving concerning venial sins, for preserving the purpose of guarding against future sins, and for satisfying by penal works by which the guilt of fault of venial sin or the debt of temporal punishment is entirely removed.

In the natural order, an act of penance would also have been necessary, but it does not seem that it would have been an act of perfect virtue, because of itself it is insufficient for taking away the guilt of fault.

2. From the fact that St. Thomas, where he explains doctrine concerning the virtues in general or in species, does not speak of the virtue of penance, it should not be concluded that it is not a virtue distinct from others. The method of St. Thomas can be explained otherwise: either because in the general doctrine of the virtues he speaks of those things which are necessary to man of themselves, while penance belongs to him only incidentally, on the supposition of sin committed; - or because he follows the exposition of Aristotle, who does not place penance among the virtues, since in the natural order this does not seem to rise to the perfection of virtue; but the Philosopher was ignorant of efficacious supernatural penance.