Article III: On the Habit and Cause of Prudence

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 4, 5, 11-16.

15. Prudence is virtue properly and simply so called, because it gives not only the ability to act well, but also to use well and to act honorably.

For virtue simply so called is that which renders one simply good, and therefore tends to the good under the aspect of good; but the good insofar as it is good is the object of the appetite. But through prudence there is made the application of right reason to the work, namely to willing and operating it, which does not happen without a right and good will. Therefore prudence also tends to the good under the aspect of good, namely through the mediation of the appetite, and is virtue properly so called. Whence, in the Scriptures, it is numbered among them (Wis. VIII, 7); it is commanded and praised (Prov. III, 13-14; IV, 5-9; Wis. VI-IX; Ecclus. VI, 18-37); and by the Fathers it is called the fountain of virtue (a. 4).

Hence one understands why perfect prudence is necessarily connected with all the moral virtues, as was shown in the treatise on Virtues, I, n. 605. "Prudence imports order to right appetite, both because the principles of prudence are the ends of operable things, concerning which someone has a right estimation through the habits of the moral virtues which make the appetite right..., as was shown in I-II, q. 58, a. 5; and also because prudence is preceptive of right works, which does not occur unless right appetite exists" (a. 13, ad 2).

16. Prudence is a special virtue distinct from all others. For it is distinguished

1. from the moral virtues by reason of formal object and subject together, because it inheres in reason and immediately is concerned with the true, while those virtues are concerned with the good and inhere in the appetite;

2. from the intellectual virtues by reason of the material object, in that a) the speculative habits of the understanding of principles, science, and wisdom are concerned with necessary and universal things which are known more by the speculative intellect, while prudence is about contingent and particular things to be done, which are touched by the practical intellect; but b) art is concerned with things to be made, which are constituted in exterior matter, while prudence is about things to be done, which consist in the one operating himself;

3. from the theological virtues, by reason of material and formal object together, because they are concerned with the ultimate end itself, God, on account of God Himself, while prudence is about the means to the end; especially from faith, which inheres in the speculative intellect and is not immediately about things to be done here and now, whence it does not express conformity to right appetite (a. 5; a. 13, ad 2).

17. Prudence is an intellectual virtue and therefore always touches its object: the practical true, and has certitude of truth.

For although it is concerned with particular and contingent things about which perfect certitude and truth cannot always be had, but only as in the majority of cases, and therefore it sometimes has a speculative error joined to it, nevertheless it can be practically true and certain, indeed altogether evident, that even with that error, in these circumstances, one must act in such a way according to prudence for such an end. Thus if someone in good faith but erroneously thinks theft is sometimes licit, or that this exposed money or that woman is his own, although he errs speculatively, nevertheless it is practically true and certain and evident that in these circumstances he can steal, or take the money or the woman. This judgment of prudence is not false but true, as conformed to right appetite (I-II, q. 57, a. 5, ad 3); and this is the proper certitude of prudence.

1. Cajetan, on II-II, q. 47, a. 3, ad 2. From these things it follows that an opinion of the honorable is not a judgment of prudence, because it is not borne toward its object in such a way that it cannot be false; for which reason it is not virtue, as Aristotle rightly has it, book VI of the Ethics, c. 3.

18. Prudence is not one virtue in the lowest species, but has several diverse species according to the diversity of object or end, as will be said later, q. 2, a. 2.

For diverse ends are the proper good of one person, the good of the family, the good of the city and kingdom; and therefore there is monastic, economic, or political prudence. This last, whose office it is to rule and govern, is not only in superiors directing and commanding, but also in subjects; not indeed insofar as they are subjects and servants (thus they do not direct or command), but insofar as they are men: for insofar as they are rational, they participate in some way in the rule of reason. Whence political prudence, says St. Thomas, is architectonically in the prince, but in subjects after the manner of an art working by hand; or, as Lessius says, as in the master of a work and as in the ministers executing the work (a. 11 and 12).

19. Perfect and supernatural prudence, which counsels, judges, and commands for the good end of the whole life, cannot be in sinners; but it inheres in all the just according to habit, and in adults it exists according to act as to those things which are of the necessity of salvation (a. 14, ad 3); and if some "need to be ruled by the counsel of another, at least in this they know how to counsel themselves, if they have grace, that they seek the counsels of others, and discern good counsels from evil" (ad 2).

Nevertheless in sinners there can be imperfect prudence as to right disposition to some particular end, for example for trading, or that which sometimes rightly counsels and judges concerning those things which pertain to the whole life, but does not efficaciously command (for otherwise they would be converted). Moreover, false prudence is often present, which disposes well things to be done for an evil end (a. 13).

20. The cause of prudence. - Supernatural prudence can be infused by God alone. Natural prudence does not inhere in us by nature but is acquired by our acts, because the cognition of particular means and circumstances is not acquired except by experience and time; whence it cannot be in youths either according to habit or according to act (a. 14, ad 3). Nevertheless, from nature there can be a disposition or aptitude for easily acquiring it: an aptitude either for the right end or for right judgment, by which it is easily acquired (a. 15).

Nevertheless supernatural and natural prudence are distinguished not only: 1) on the part of the cause, in that the latter is acquired, the former infused; but also 2) by reason of extension, on the part of matter, both because infused prudence extends itself further to supernatural acts for the supernatural end, and because it can dictate a diverse mean, according to conformity not only of human reason, but also of law or divine reason (cf. treatise on Virtue in general, I, n. 628); and 3) on the part of foundation or root, because natural prudence arises from synderesis and the natural inclination of the will to the good, supernatural prudence more from faith informed by charity.

"Thus, therefore, is the genesis of supernatural prudence and of its effects," says Prummer, Moral Theology I, n. 628: "Prudence has as its highest principles the theological virtues, and especially formed faith (since this shows the end as practically certain and moves efficaciously to the end); these principles are scientifically explained and illustrated by the science of theology...; prudence deduces the conclusions of this science as to singular and contingent things; conscience finally, as an act of prudence, judges and dictates what in individual cases is to be done and omitted."

21. Observation. - Prudence is not totally lost directly through forgetfulness, because it includes right will, but through passions which dispose one not to command; indirectly, however, it can be lost through forgetfulness, which can impede prudence, insofar as prudence proceeds to commanding from some cognition which can be taken away through forgetfulness (a. 16).