Article III: On the Letting of Services, or On the Contract of Labor

549. The letting of services and the hiring of workers, or the contract of labor (louage de services et de travail, contrat de travail; dienstverhuring, arbeidsovereenkomst, loonverdrag) is a contract in which for a certain labor a just price is paid, or a contract by which workers oblige themselves to furnish a certain labor in favor of another for a time, for a determined price (a. 1710; 1779-1780). This contract differs essentially from the letting of a work:

1. by reason of the object, which is not the thing produced but the personal labor itself to be furnished, or rather the operative power and activity which one lets to another for a determined time; while in the letting of a work the object is the work itself to be produced, which is the effect of labor;

2. by reason of the letting itself, which is made from the worker to the owner, since the worker offers and lets his labor, which the owner hires; while on the contrary, in the undertaking of a work, the letting is made from the owner to the worker, since the owner offers and lets the work to be made, which the worker undertakes and hires.¹

¹ On the contract of labor, among others, there can be consulted economists such as Liberatore, Perin, Brants, Cauwes, Antoine, Falon; philosophers and cultivators of natural law such as Meyer, Cathrein, Castelein, Rothe, Schwalm; sociologists such as Weiss, Soziale Frage und Soziale Ordnung, and Biederlack, Die Soziale Frage; theologians, such as de Gryse, De contractu conductionis; Lehmkuhl, Le Contrat entre patrons et ouvriers et les greves; Vermeersch, in Quaestiones de Iustitia, q. 10; Msgr. Doutreloux, Lettre Pastorale sur la Question ouvriere; Card. Zigliara, Epist. ad Card. Goossens 1891; Pottier, De Iure et Iustitia, and La morale catholique et les questions sociales d'aujourd'hui; Waffelaert, in Coll. Brug., Jan. 1901; also dissertations or special works, such as Bruin, Het Arbeidsloon, in Studien, 1892; Pesch, Lohnvertrag und gerechte Lohn, in Stimmen, 1897; Perin, Etude sur le juste salaire; Beauregard, Essai sur la theorie des Salaires; Garriguet, Le Contrat de Travail; Le Salaire; A. Verhaegen, Le minimum de salaire, 1892; Vliebergh, in Belfort, 1913; Bus, Relatief Gezinsloon, with annotations by Aangenent in De Katholiek, 1922; Gougnard, Le probleme du juste salaire, 1923 [printed: 1293]; Koenraadt, Rechtvaardig sociales Arbeidsloon, 1929; Rutten, La Doctrine sociale de l'Eglise; and also laws passed among diverse peoples, as the Belgian law of 10 March 1900 de contractu laboris, and 7 Aug. 1922 de contractu famulatus et ministerii professionalis.

Concerning the nature of the contract of labor there has sometimes been doubt:

A. Certain economists have held it as a purchase-sale, by which the worker sells his services, or the exercise of his own activity, for some time.

Nevertheless this cannot be admitted; for 1. the object of sale is merchandise, but human labor in the proper sense is not merchandise; 2. by sale a thing and the dominion of the thing are transferred, but by the contract of labor there is not transferred the power of operating or dominion over it, but only the use of it is promised. Therefore it is not a sale, but a letting. Nor should you say that the fruit of labor can be sold, or that part which the worker has in the effect produced; for this is the proper object of the letting of a work, by which it differs precisely from the letting of services.

B. Others wish, or rather would wish, that it be a contract of partnership, by force of which the owner contributes his capital and the workers their services for completing a common work, and for dividing among themselves the gain received therefrom; which, they say, agrees better with the dignity of workers and with a more equitable division of gains.

A contract of partnership entered into between owners and workers could be conceived, and it would be desirable that such a contract be more widely diffused in the future; nevertheless, as regards fact, the matter does not so stand in the present state of affairs; indeed such a contract generally is impossible. For a) on the one hand, owners contend that the successful outcome of industry depends especially upon the wise management of one supreme director, and therefore they are unwilling to have workers as partners, lest they be forced to adopt their counsels; b) on the other hand, workers cannot take upon themselves the risks of industry, as is essential to the contract of partnership: for, needing a daily and certain wage for sustenance, they cannot wait until the amount of gain and loss is determined and equally divided. Therefore owners take upon themselves a twofold risk; and against that twofold risk workers are made secure: 1. the price is paid to them at once, before the things made are sold; 2. a determined price is paid, whether the outcome of the sale is happy or unhappy. Hence it is just that not the whole of what they have produced be paid to them, but that the price be proportionately diminished: namely, workers renounce a greater benefit so that they may be preserved from damage.² c) Besides, in certain circumstances a contract of partnership is impossible, and only a contract of letting is possible, namely in the case in which it is not entered into for profitable business, as in domestic service or in constructing a work, for example, a house.

² Prummer well notes, Th. M. II, n. 306: "Owners contribute not only money, but also intelligence (at least commonly superior) and many services. Besides, they are compelled to expose their own fortune to very great dangers and often labor for a rather long time without any profit, indeed with damage. On the contrary, workers incur no risk and must receive a daily wage. Therefore it would be inequitable if in prosperous affairs they had a proportionate part of the profit, but in adverse affairs the owner alone had to furnish the whole damage."

C. A few others think that the contract of labor is unnamed: on the part of the worker, I do that you may give; on the part of the master, I give that you may do, insofar as workers oblige themselves to do something for a certain price.

This has a certain appearance of truth, because of the special nature and dignity of human labor. Nevertheless Roman law and modern codes, as also theologians and jurists, hold the contract as a true letting, because, namely, in it the use of a certain thing is promised and conceded for a certain price; which is the very definition of letting.

Therefore the contract of labor is a true letting. For man has full dominion of his labor, or of the exercise and use of his faculties (n. 167). Therefore he can concede that use to another, or let it for a price, indeed also alienate it, and of itself in perpetuity, as in servitude; although this today has no force, as being positively prohibited in all present-day law (a. 1780).

It is indeed, by reason of the object, a letting of a special character, since human services are not common merchandise, but carry something human before them, and therefore must be ruled by other laws than merely commercial things. But, although human labor far surpasses the economic order, and is not simply to be held as merchandise if it is considered as a human action, nevertheless it can be considered as causing economic utility, and under this respect one can make agreement concerning it for a wage (I-II, q. 114, a. 1). And although the worker himself can dispose of labor, as it is a human action, altogether freely, nevertheless not always if in it there is considered the economic utility, which could be necessary to him for sustenance. These aspects are not to be separated, as Leo XIII well notes in the encyclical Rerum novarum.

"And so labor has, as it were, two notes implanted by nature in man, namely that it is personal, because the acting force inheres in the person, and is altogether proper to him by whom it is exercised, and for whose utility it is born; then, that it is necessary, for this reason, that the fruit of labors is needed by man for sustaining life: but the nature of things itself, to which above all one must obey, commands that life be sustained.

"Now, if it is considered only from that part according to which it is personal, there is no doubt that it is within the worker's full right to define more narrowly the measure of the agreed wage: for just as he gives his services by will, so by will he can be content with a slight wage for his services, or with plainly none. But one must judge far otherwise if, with the notion of personality, the notion of necessity is joined, separable from it indeed in thought, but not in reality. In reality, to remain in life is the common duty of each one, to which it is a crime to be wanting. Hence there necessarily arises the right of finding those things by which life is sustained; and for the lowest person the faculty of these things is supplied by no means except a wage sought by labor. Let it be granted, therefore, that worker and master freely consent to the same agreement, and expressly to the measure of the wage; nevertheless there is always underlying something from natural justice, and this greater and older than the free will of those making agreement, namely, that the wage ought not be inadequate for sustaining the worker, frugal indeed and of good morals."

Therefore it is clear that labor is not to be held merely as merchandise without any relation to the person and his conditions, but as a legitimate, and often the only, means by which the worker can sustain life for himself, or also for his own.

550. The duties of justice of workers are indicated by Leo XIII:

"1. What has been freely and equitably agreed concerning work, that they should render wholly and faithfully; 2. not to harm the property in any way; 3. not to violate the person of the owners; 4. in defending their own interests, to abstain from force, nor ever to stir up sedition, nor to mingle with wicked men"; 5. by which words an unjust strike also is prohibited.

Therefore workers must:

1. Furnish wholly and faithfully that amount of work which has been freely and equitably agreed; and therefore a) perform the determined work at the prefixed time; b) complete it with due diligence, which is required by pact, law, or custom; this generally is sufficient when common and ordinary, yet sometimes from the nature of the thing, or by reason of the pact and a greater stipend, special care is owed; c) accordingly obey the commands of the owner given concerning labor in order to the execution of the contract.³

³ Cf. Belgian law of 10 March 1900 concerning the contract of labor, a. 7-10.

The obligations are of justice, as flowing from the bilateral onerous contract itself: for the worker does not make his own the wage, if he does not wholly, faithfully, and fittingly fulfill the work which he promised to furnish. Hence he sins against justice if from carelessness or culpable negligence he spends time uselessly, or furnishes his work defectively; the gravity of this sin depends upon the gravity of the damage inflicted.

2. Not to harm the property in any way, that is, to inflict no damage, whether by using materials prodigally, or by destroying machines, or by damaging or not returning instruments, or by producing defective wares, or by revealing the secret of manufacture; for by means of this sort injury is inflicted upon the owner or also upon buyers.

The gravity of the sin depends upon the gravity of the damage inflicted; this is also prohibited by civil law and sometimes punished by fines. But if damage arises from a fortuitous event, the worker is not held to compensate it, nor on that account does he lose the right to the agreed stipend.⁴

⁴ Ibid., a. 9.

3. Not to violate the person of the owners, that is, to inflict no injury upon the owners themselves, whether by harming, or by calumniating, or by grieving them with insults or threats.

Concerning the gravity of the injury, judgment must be made from what has been said concerning injustice through involuntary commutations, also noting that there is present a special malice against the observance owed to owners by their workers.

4. In defending their rights, to abstain from force, sedition, and mingling with wicked men. It is indeed lawful for workers to pursue their rights by legitimate means, by entering associations, by setting forth their desires to the owners, by having recourse to magistrates and deputies in public assemblies; but they must abstain from sedition and violent or unjust means.⁵

⁵ Ibid., a. 15.

Those acting thus commonly harm not only the owners but themselves, since the ruin of industry by its nature is apt to bring more detriments to these than to those. Hence the Pontiff admonishes them "not to mingle with wicked men, skillfully throwing out immoderate hopes and enormous promises, which generally has useless repentance and ruin of fortunes following."

5. To abstain from an unjust strike, namely, not to cease from labor before the prefixed time, unless there is a grave reason; and if it is indeterminate, to give warning at the due time; otherwise they are held concerning damages.⁶ Concerning this argument, more will be said below.

⁶ Ibid., a. 16 and following.

551. The duties of justice of owners were defined by the same Leo XIII:

"These things, however, pertain to the wealthy and to owners: 1. that workers are not to be held in the place of slaves; that it is equitable to revere in them the dignity of the person, everywhere ennobled by that which is called the Christian character... It is truly shameful and inhuman to abuse men as things for gain, and not to value them more than according as they are strong in sinews and powers. 2. Similarly it is prescribed that regard ought to be had for religion and the goods of the soul in proletarians. Wherefore it is the part of owners to bring it about that the worker be free for piety in a suitable space of time; not to expose the man to the allurements of corruptions and enticements of sinning; nor in any way to draw him away from domestic care and the study of thrift. 3. Likewise, not to impose more work than their powers can bear, nor that kind which is at variance with age and sex. 4. But among the greatest duties of owners this stands forth, to furnish to each one what is just... But to defraud anyone of the wage due is a great crime, which calls down avenging wrath from heaven. Behold, the wages of the laborers... which have been defrauded by you, cry out: and their cry has entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth (Jas. V, 4). 5. Finally, the wealthy must religiously take care that they harm the profits of proletarians in nothing, neither by force, nor by deceit, nor by usurious arts; and this all the more because they are not sufficiently fortified against injuries and impotence, and their goods, the smaller they are, the more sacred they must be held." Among these harms also must be considered unjust dismissal from work.

Therefore owners must:

1. Revere in workers the human, religious, Christian dignity of the person, and not hold them as slaves, or as mere instruments of production, in which there is no other value than what they produce.⁷

⁷ Ibid., a. 15.

Hence a) workers must furnish obedience to owners only in those things which regard the agreed work, and indeed during the time of furnishing labor; b) when that time has passed, they remain free, nor do owners have the right of commanding anything against their conscience or liberty; c) indeed, in commanding those things which regard the work, they must abstain from those which are repugnant to human dignity or are altogether less fitting.

2. Have regard for the goods of the soul in proletarians, and concede to them a suitable space of time so that they may be able to live as men, that is, so that they may be able to attend to religious and moral and familial duties.

Care must be taken a) that rest be conceded on Sundays and feast days, unless true necessity stands in the way; and that to those workers who more often must labor on Sunday from necessity there be granted at least the time necessary for fulfilling religious duties;⁸

⁸ Hence the Belgian law of 17 July 1905 concerning rest on Sunday.

b) that workers not be exposed to the allurements of corruptions and enticements of sinning; especially that occasions of sinning not arise from the promiscuity of the sexes, that scandal not be given by impious or lustful conversations, that superiors not abuse authority to extort something repugnant to good morals;

c) that the time necessary be conceded to men, and especially to women, for rightly arranging domestic life and well educating offspring.

3. Have regard for the powers of the body in imposing work, and for difference of age or sex; and, as much as possible, turn away from workers damages and dangers to life, integrity, and health.

Hence a) in dangerous works or industries, precautions must be applied by which danger is removed for life, security, or health;⁹

⁹ Cf. Belgian law of 20 July 1899.

b) if it is impossible to avert the danger totally, the wage must be increased according to the probability of the danger, or the damage inflicted must be equitably compensated;

c) the owner must take upon himself the dangers arising from the labor itself, and insure the workers against them, except in the case of graver fault in the workers¹⁰ or of an evil intention;

¹⁰ Cf. Belgian law of 24 Dec. 1903. This law extends natural right, so that the owner is held even in the case of graver fault on the part of the worker, unless however the latter acted with the intention of provoking harm; but that disposition of the law obliges in conscience only after the sentence of the judge.

d) daily labor must not be prolonged excessively, lest the worker's powers be exhausted, "the mind grow dull by excessive labor, and at the same time the body succumb to weariness,... but intervals of rest ought to exist";¹¹

¹¹ Hence the law concerning labor for 8 hours, 14 June 1921.

e) there should not be imposed upon women labor which exceeds their powers or is unbecoming to their sex, as are many things to be performed in workshops, while they are rather born for domestic works;¹²

¹² Cf. Belgian law of 13 Dec. 1889 and 10 Aug. 1911, 14 June 1921.

f) nor should works be committed to children for the performance of which they are not yet equal: thus especially in the weaker age, while lighter things rather should be assigned to those more grown.

4. Pay a just wage, and indeed at the established time.¹³

¹³ Cf. Belgian law of 10 March 1900, a. 11 and following.

This is the chief duty, concerning which one must speak expressly.

5. Finally, beware of every unjust harm, especially of unjust dismissal from work.

The owner cannot cast out workers before the prefixed time without a grave reason; but if the time is indefinite, he must warn them at the due time. Otherwise he is held concerning damages.¹⁴

¹⁴ Ibid., a. 16 and following.

552. On the just wage. To determine the norm of a just wage, a threefold system is chiefly distinguished: that of the liberal economists, that of the socialists, and that of Catholics.

A. The system of the liberal economists is ruled wholly by a twofold economic law: the law of what is offered and what is sought, and the law of free contest or, as they say, competition, by which the price of all merchandise is determined. They deny objective value, and say that the wage depends upon the sole and free subjective agreement between worker and master, and therefore that that must be held just which the master freely offers and the worker freely accepts.

Hence in practice it is regulated by the law of competition, by force of which wages are increased or diminished according as owners more or less need the labor of workers. On the one hand, the master estimates the utility which comes to him from the use of the operative faculty of the workers, and the rarity or frequency of this; on the other hand, the worker estimates those things which are required for his honorable sustenance, and if he is truly free, he does not promise his work except to him who pays what is necessary for honorable sustenance. And this is in fact verified almost everywhere, that the wage in use is that which suffices for restoring and recreating the powers of workers.

But now the outcome has proved that individual liberty, left to itself under the law of unlimited competition, is incapable of furnishing to workers the security of congruous sustenance, and that it, even necessarily, cannot always define the just wage; therefore the question must be ruled by higher principles. In particular:

a) The foundation of the system of the liberals is false: that labor is nothing but merchandise.

b) The theory opens the door to tyranny, for it not rarely happens that workers in accepting a stipend are by no means truly free: for since they cannot labor fruitfully without machines or instruments which are in the possession of owners, and otherwise wholly need daily labor for daily sustenance, they are often compelled to accept the conditions imposed upon them, unless they wish to waste away with hunger. In these circumstances the price is not accepted freely, but is extorted from the worker; nor therefore can it be held as just.

c) Even granted that workers freely yielded from their right and accepted a wage insufficient for honorable sustenance, the contract would not be just, because in ordinary circumstances they cannot validly renounce those things which are necessary to them for living honorably.

Wherefore Leo XIII reproved economic liberalism: "Let it be granted, therefore, that worker and master freely consent to the same agreement, and expressly to the measure of the wage; nevertheless there is always underlying something from natural justice, and this greater and older than the free will of those making agreement, namely, that the wage ought not be inadequate for sustaining the worker, frugal indeed and of good morals. But if the worker, compelled by necessity, or moved by fear of a worse evil, accepts a harder condition, which, even unwillingly, must be accepted, because it is imposed by the owner or contractor of works, this indeed is to suffer force, against which justice cries out."

B. The system of the socialists arises from the absurd and unjust principles of Marxism according to which all capital is stolen, and therefore nothing is owed to it in the division of profit. Namely, the Socialists contend that to workers from justice there is owed the whole fruit of labor, with only those things taken away which are sufficient for restoring and recreating capital: namely, after deducting expenses made for the price of materials, the use of workshops and instruments, and their renewal. They cannot sanely deny some part to the intellectual labor of those who preside over the production of things and direct the works; nevertheless they judge that this should not be esteemed more than the work of hands.

But now, they say, it is manifest that the matter does not so stand. Owners retain for themselves the greater part of the profit under the pretext of interest to be received for money, of price for the utility procured from material and instruments, and of a premium for risk of capital; indeed capital is stolen riches reserved from thrift for producing new wealth. Thus workers are deprived of the greater part of the fruits, and, by force of the iron law of wages, they fall into misery, scarcely having the foods necessary for their own sustenance. Therefore workers must be cooperators with masters by a contract of partnership, and thus obtain a greater part of the profit, as is owed to labor, which is the sole cause of riches.

This system a) has a false foundation, namely, that capital of itself is stolen, and that labor is the only source of value (n. 401, 2).

b) Capital is not only a condition but a true cause of economic production. Namely, three causes concur in it: the principal efficient cause, which is labor, both the intellectual labor of those who direct the works and the manual labor of those who execute them; the instrumental efficient cause is capital, or the complex of machines and instruments; the material cause is matter with its powers, from which things are made. To these three causes, taken singly, part of the profit is to be attributed from justice. But now those who hold capital and furnish instruments to workers also usually contribute materials; indeed they furnish a positive subsidy through their money, by which they pay wages to workers before the things produced are sold. Therefore it is not strange if, on account of the manifold utilities conferred, they obtain a rather large part of the profit.

c) Besides, capitalists take upon themselves the risk of capital. This risk, although in prosperous years it is not always very great, during an industrial crisis often happens to be enormous: in truth not a few obtain an unhappy outcome in business and not rarely lose a great part of the money committed to undertakings. Moreover, since no one exposes himself to danger unless he hopes for great profit from it, on account of the risk of capital which masters undertake, they can, when profit has been given, increase that part of it owed to themselves, while workers, instead of uncertain profit, receive less but receive what is certain.

d) Capitalists, in the present-day circumstances of industry, also usually furnish, by themselves or through mandataries, intellectual labor directive of industries. But intellectual labor surpasses manual labor, and has the first parts in economic production, as being the first cause moving all the others. Certainly the happy or unhappy outcome depends especially upon the skill and unwearied labor of those who preside over industrial affairs, and upon whom the whole solicitude rests. Therefore to these a part of the profit, proportioned to their labor, must be attributed.

These circumstances being supposed, such as now generally exist, the system of letting of services, as it prevails today, or the wage system, cannot of itself be accused of injustice, as Pius XI explicitly pronounced in the encyclical Quadragesimo anno; although it is permissible to desire and to strive that, when circumstances have already changed, another contract, namely of partnership, at least mitigated, could be entered into between workers and masters, as more fitting to the human dignity of workers.

C. Catholic doctrine. Between the extreme systems of liberalism and socialism proceeds the Catholic doctrine set forth by Leo XIII, according to which from justice there is owed to workers at least that wage which is necessary to an honorable worker for integral sustenance,¹⁵ to which, namely, labor is first and principally ordered,¹⁶ and this is owed even if such were not the common estimation.¹⁷ Moreover, the practical norm of this wage is the common estimation of prudent men. It is said:

¹⁵ Which seems to include insurance against the dangers of labor, ordinary illnesses, and old age.

¹⁶ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 187, a. 3.

¹⁷ Common estimation is the proximate criterion determining the price of labor; nevertheless, that it not be vitiated but right, it must be founded on other remote criteria, of which the ultimate is necessity, the right and duty of the worker to sustenance.

1. It is owed from justice, which by Leo XIII is called natural justice, that is, a right of nature founded in the very nature of things antecedently to private and free contract. For it is opposed to the justice which arises from the contract itself. Therefore it is a justice independent of the positive will of men, and is derived from the intrinsic constitution of things.

However, it is not expressly declared from what virtue that obligation arises, whether from commutative justice, or from legal justice, or from a virtue annexed to justice; yet of itself commutative justice is to be understood:

a) at least if workers are compelled from necessity to undergo a lesser wage, and cannot validly renounce a just wage, possessing nothing besides it; and thus it would be ordinarily and regularly if a lesser wage were paid;

b) indeed always and from the very nature of things: for labor has as its intrinsic value that which is necessary for repairing lost powers; hence he who gives whole labor must receive what is necessary for integral sustenance.

2. At least a wage sufficient for the worker himself is owed; wherefore, on the one hand, abstraction is made here from the disputed question whether from justice an individual or family wage is owed (which controversy is set forth in the following number); on the other hand, it is affirmed that that wage is owed, even if the worker has from nature or art no special skill worthy of a larger price. But if the worker furnishes something more, a greater wage is owed to him, namely, one equivalent to the economic price of the work furnished.

3. Of itself there is owed a wage necessary for the worker's sustenance, provided that, on the one hand, the worker can labor with common skill and activity, and, on the other hand, the normal state of industry and commerce is had.

For in time of a general crisis, exceptionally, with at least the consent of the workers, the wage could be less than just; and in that case it is not imposed unjustly by the owners, but rather results from extrinsic circumstances, which the owners do not impose but rather undergo, so, for example, that by giving a greater wage they would have to fall from their own state.

553. Disputation among Catholics concerning the family wage. They dispute whether an individual wage, or also a family wage, is owed from justice. Against the family wage as owed from justice, these arguments are proposed:

a) Commutative justice intends equality, here namely equality between the wage and the work furnished. But labor, or the work furnished, is the personal labor of one man, not of a family. Therefore from commutative justice the wage must suffice for the sustenance of the man, not of the family.

b) The duty of feeding oneself, to which corresponds the obligation of giving a sufficient individual wage, is a certain necessity intrinsic and essential to the labor itself, namely, the necessity of repairing the powers handed over to work and lost by labor, and therefore, in estimating the wage of labor, it must of itself be attended to; on the contrary, the duty of feeding wife and children is a certain necessity extrinsic to labor, and therefore in estimating labor it must not of itself be attended to.

c) The duty of feeding a family is hypothetical, namely, if the worker is a father of a family; it is a duty freely undertaken, since the law of entering matrimony obliges no determined man; finally, it is a duty varying according to various families: he must sustain offspring more or less numerous, and sometimes father, mother, brothers. But if such a duty had to be attended to in estimating the price of labor, from justice there would be required a relative wage, varying according to the free choice of the worker and the number of persons whom he sustains.

The arguments for the family wage as owed from justice can be proposed thus:¹⁸

¹⁸ It is not our mode of proposing the arguments, but we have taken them from an excellent and most learned man who, at the same time answering the sayings of the adversaries, defended the family wage with great dexterity in this way.

a) Commutative justice indeed intends equality between the wage and the work furnished, but with attention to the personality and necessity of the one working. But the work or labor furnished is not the labor of one man abstractly and strictly taken individually, but is the labor of man as he in fact exists in the concrete and as he ought to exist according to the general ordering of nature and the moral law; in one word, it is the labor of the worker who is father of a family. Therefore the wage must suffice for assisting the condition of a father of a family.

b) The obligation of giving a sufficient wage is founded not so much in the necessity of providing for the physical labor itself, as in the moral necessity and personal dignity of the agent, for whom the wage obtained by labor generally is the only means of sustaining a family. But this dignity of the person, this moral necessity, is not something extrinsic to the one working, but is intrinsic to the worker and to personal work. Therefore in estimating the price of a just wage it cannot be neglected. Besides, from the very necessity of providing for physical labor and for the physical powers of the one working there already arises the necessity of a family wage; for the procreation of children is necessary for pursuing industrial affairs, and the valid worker himself needed the sustenance and cares of a family for a long time. Hence, just as masters lay aside part of the profit for procuring new machines at an opportune time, so a fortiori they must furnish to workers some part of the profit under the name of wage, so that at an opportune time there may be arms and hands by which machines can be moved and directed.

c) The duty of feeding a family is indeed hypothetical, but that hypothesis is verified commonly and of itself according to the motion of nature and the moral law; but justice regards those things which happen of themselves commonly, not those which happen rarely and by accident, namely, that adult workers remain unmarried. Besides, the duty of feeding a family is indeed freely undertaken, yet according to the motion of nature itself and often according to a moral obligation; it also arises from the use of a primary natural right, which cannot legitimately be impeded by any human law or by any contract. But if workers have a right to matrimony and family, by that very fact they have a right to the only means of sustaining a family. Finally, the family wage must not therefore vary according to the various necessities of each family, just as neither is the individual wage varied according to the various necessities of each individual; but, as has already been said, the price of labor must be estimated according to those things which happen commonly; moreover, to provide for special necessities pertains to natural equity and charity.

Therefore the family wage is not understood as relative, which would have to be increased proportionately to the number of children: namely, that which is required for the sustenance of a family in extraordinary circumstances, for example, if the wife is sick and in no way can contribute to increasing the income of the family, if the offspring is very numerous or oppressed by illnesses, if extraordinary expenses are necessary. But it must be understood as absolute: namely, such a stipend is to be furnished to any worker, so that when he marries and thus constitutes a family, he can sustain his family, provided however 1. that the wife undertakes that kind of work which can stand together with her duties; 2. and likewise that the children, at the opportune time, begin to labor in a way proportioned to their powers; 3. and that the number of children is not extraordinary. In those extraordinary cases, especially of very numerous offspring, the social good demands that societies of beneficence, or even the republic itself, furnish special assistance to such families.

554. Conclusion of the disputation. 1. It does not seem that it can be sufficiently proved that the immediate end of labor (to which it is first, of itself, and principally ordered), and its intrinsic value, or "its equivalent," is the family wage, and accordingly that this is always and of itself owed from justice; for the wage is not immediately founded on the necessities of the worker, but on the value of the labor.

2. Nevertheless the family wage is owed of itself not only from charity, but at least from natural equity or honesty, which demands both that workers be able to feed their family by their labor from the one means of labor which they have, and that the owner, if he receives a great benefit from the workers, compensate this by supererogations; indeed also from legal justice, because the common good requires it.

3. Also from commutative justice, in ordinary circumstances and in the normal condition of industry. For common estimation, in determining the price of labor, must attend to this: namely, that workers generally, in order to fulfill their duty toward their family, have no other means besides labor, which they do not intend to let except for a family wage; hence, in the normal state of the economic order, workers generally do not have the intention of renouncing this wage, indeed they cannot even renounce it, and owners cannot impede workers from using that sole means for fulfilling their duty toward their family.¹⁹ And therefore common estimation will have the family wage as a minimum. But if owners by unjust means compel workers, or abuse their necessity or the abundance of workers, so that they impose a lesser wage, they sin against commutative justice, because they impede workers from exercising their right.

¹⁹ Therefore there is a twofold different mode of establishing the family wage: 1. so that it rests immediately upon the intrinsic value of human labor; although we have heard this mode proposed by the most illustrious Pottier, it is not established for us that it has been sufficiently proved; 2. so that it rests immediately upon the general condition of workers, who, in the normal circumstances of industry, neither intend nor freely can intend to let their work except for a family wage; which mode seems to be proposed by the Illustrious Waffelaert, Em. Van Roey, and others.

We have said: a) in ordinary circumstances, because if in a certain region a sufficient number of workers had another means of sustenance, for example, from the cultivation of a small field or garden, or from some animals: hens, goats, a cow, etc., they could freely renounce a wage in part;

b) in the normal condition of industry, because if the general condition is unhappy, the owners would not impose it upon the workers, but equally with the workers would unwillingly suffer it. Therefore these could prefer an insufficient wage rather than have none.

4. Sometimes from commutative justice a wage greater than the family wage is owed, namely, when the labor furnished is commonly estimated as having greater value, and indeed from a threefold cause, according as production will be more abundant or more perfect, the supply of workers smaller, or the prosperity of industry greater.

5. But if from the theoretical controversy of this question one comes to practice, Catholics now in practice all agree that the family wage is most greatly to be desired for the good of the whole society and to be procured in every honorable way, in which sense Pius XI himself also recently spoke; likewise, that in every Christian society obeying the laws of justice and not laboring under universal poverty, there in fact exists a family wage through common estimation by the spontaneous consent of masters and workers; and when this comes into common use, according to all, the family wage must also be attributed from commutative justice, unless someone is excused from this obligation for particular reasons.

Excuses can be: a) if he hires from mere charity or without proportionate utility: for then he does not hire for profit;

b) if the labor of the worker is not normal labor, but the labor of one younger, older, weaker, or more unfit: then less wage is owed, because he does not receive ordinary utility;

c) if in some region the general condition of affairs is such that industry itself produces smaller, scanty fruits, especially if owners with their own loss pursue industry for a sufficiently long time while awaiting better times; but this must not be taken too rigorously, for example, if they suffer loss for only some months, because sometimes they also have extraordinary profit, and thus compensation is present.²⁰

²⁰ Carefully note that this rule is understood of the general norm of industry, so that it cannot be applied in the individual case, to one particular industry of one owner. It has force concerning industry in general, not concerning one. For if someone begins an industry, he himself undertakes the work (entreprise) and all expenses and dangers, among which are the just wages of workers, just as he also undertakes the probable profits, advantages, and benefits.

On the other hand, in a general way, owners satisfy if they pay the wages customary for such a region: common estimation can indeed be vain, but it is supposed to obey the laws of justice, unless the contrary is morally certain. It can indeed happen that by accident, because of special reasons, that wage is less than just, and of itself a greater wage would have to be given. But in truth, if excusing causes are had, as is supposed, it will rarely be in the power of individuals to remove those causes, for example, the price of labor, and consequently the price of merchandise, can scarcely be increased by one or another owner without his being deserted by his clients because of the competition of others. Yet it would be otherwise if someone had a special industry in the region, or if he were making great profit. But injustice would always be committed if, from some conspiracy of owners for making profit, a wage less than the customary or the just one were established, especially while workers cannot find other labor or change place without grave burden.

555. Means by which the regime of the wage contract can be improved have been devised in several ways, namely:

1. By premiums, conceded to those workers who labor better, or who diligently begin the work at the prefixed time, or remain longer in the same workshop, or within the same time make more things or make them more perfectly, or also use materials more sparingly: for in these cases greater profit accrues to the owner, who accordingly is able to pay a greater stipend without detriment (sursalaire). Therefore this system is advantageous both to owners and to workers, provided it is prudently and equitably applied, so that it does not become a means by which labor too arduous or too intense is imposed upon workers.

2. Likewise, by an increase of wages conceded, or also a diminution, according to a sliding scale, affixed in workshops, and corresponding to the quantity and price of the thing sold.

3. By a certain participation in profits, by force of which workers, besides the usual stipend, each year or half-year receive a quota part of the profits which the owner has made.

The contract of letting of services being supposed, the strict rights of workers, once a just wage has been attributed, are extinguished, nor do they have any title from justice for participating in the profit to be made by the masters. Nevertheless, if the profits are enormous, it is fitting that workers not be wholly excluded from them, and it can be equitable that, after a part of the profit has been set aside for protecting oneself against adversities, the owner distribute the other part between himself and the workers. When this has been done, workers are more strictly bound to the industrial affair, and relations toward owners are rendered more amicable and peaceful.

Today participation can be made through distributions of shares of labor, to be possessed either individually or collectively (actionnariat ouvrier ou de travail collectif).

4. A certain participation in management seems to be the connatural corollary of participation in profits. For if workers hold portions of the capital, which are called shares by name, they can also be represented in the administrative council of the workshop, by which the industrial affair is to be managed and the profit received divided. Nevertheless this form has not been brought very much into practice up to now.

5. Pecuniary subsidies and supplements or allocations conceded to workers (subventions patronales), by which owners, under the form of a subsidy greater than what is owed, contribute something of the profits to various institutes erected for the benefit of workers, and to be managed by these or at least with their concurrence: against fortuitous events, involuntary cessation from work, illnesses, old age, or premature incapacity for working; for fostering professional formation, procuring healthy homes, conducting certain businesses cooperatively, assisting in a special way families burdened with numerous offspring, etc.

Especially as regards supplementary monies or allocations to be made to numerous families (allocations familiales), these could be granted by the republic itself; also, because of the public good, it could be established by law that from the sum of wages a portion be reserved to be attributed to numerous families; this law would not be unjust, especially if the celibacy of many or the violation of matrimonial laws were the occasion why the condition of large families became worse. But in defect of law, owners can from the profits received support funds by which family subsidies are distributed.

That the very opportune means described may be brought more into practice, there can be desired:

A. A moderate intervention of the republic, not indeed by authoritatively defining the wages to be paid universally, but 1. by furnishing an example, insofar as the government, the administration of the province, or the municipality, when they hire workers, furnish a wage fully sufficient for their decent sustenance; 2. or by imposing upon executors of public works a minimum quota of wage to be paid to workers; and in a general way by taking care that wages be defined by mixed councils, in which delegates from owners and workers weigh the matter equitably by common vote.

Especially intervention by colleges of workers, by which the right formation of workers, both moral and professional in their art, is promoted, more equitable conditions are obtained for them from owners, and amicable relations between both are rendered easier. Delegates of these colleges opportunely meet with masters or delegates of the college of masters 1. to set forth their mutual desires and subject these to benevolent examination; 2. to establish a collective contract of labor, that is, an ideal contract to which, as to a norm, as far as possible all contracts which in fact are to be entered into in the region will have to be conformed; 3. to establish some permanent council of the workshop, in which delegates of masters and workers confer concerning everything which pertains to the industrial affair and its prosperity.

556. A strike (greve; werkstaking, strijken) is the common withdrawal of many workers by agreement for obtaining certain advantages from masters. Hence it is, as it were, an economic war; concerning its liceity or justice there can be a special difficulty.

When a contract of labor has been entered into, it is explicitly or implicitly defined how long it ought to last; and workers or owners act unjustly who without a grave reason withdraw from a legitimate agreement, and therefore they are held to compensate the damage inflicted from this.²¹ But a) if the contract from the beginning was unjust, or afterward became unjust, as if it was entered into under compulsion, or then unjustly changed by the owner, or brings an imminent danger of temporal or spiritual damage, those who withdraw from the contract because of the harm which they suffer do not commit injustice: for this is legitimate defense.²² Likewise b) when the time has elapsed, or warning has been given, workers can denounce the contract without injury toward the owner even without any reason: for they can justly let their work to others or even rest from work; although in doing so they can sin against charity, for example, toward their own, on account of which sometimes a lesser evil will have to be undergone to avoid a greater one. c) This also has force concerning owners toward workers, although they can sin against charity if they do this without sufficient reason, for example, because the workers are associated; on the contrary, it would be otherwise if it were done because the workers are a danger to others under the respect of religion or morality.

²¹ Cf. Belgian law of 10 March 1900, a. 16 and following.

²² Ibid., a. 20 and following.

But in the present matter it is asked whether workers can cease from work in bands by agreement, for this end indeed, that they may obtain or extort better conditions from masters.²³

²³ On this argument, Kiselstein, La legitimite de la greve, in Rev. Eccl. de Liege, 1923, deserves to be read.

Moreover, a twofold strike is distinguished. One, defensive, is instituted by workers who are unjustly oppressed by masters, for example, when a truly insufficient wage is paid or the health or morality of workers is not sufficiently consulted; the other, ameliorative, is for obtaining a greater wage or shorter and easier labor, although the wage accepted up to now is not altogether insufficient nor the labor excessive. The first is not of itself illicit, provided that another means is not at hand for defending oneself licitly against the injustices of the owner: for it is licit to defend oneself with the moderation of blameless defense. The other has been held by some to be illicit, as seditious; nevertheless it is rather commonly judged that sometimes it can be licit, provided a proportionately grave cause is present and unjust means are not employed. But in practice, considering concrete circumstances, a strike, even a defensive one, is not easily licit, because of the many and grave damages, both material and moral, which it is accustomed to imply, both for workers and for owners and for the community itself.

These evils are described by Tanquerey:²⁴ during the whole time of the strike "a) workers receive no wage, but b) spend money accumulated by long thrift for the sustenance of themselves and their family; c) owners, however, not only make no profit, but d) often incur burdensome expenses for protecting and repairing their buildings and instruments of labor, e) lose the opportunity of selling their wares not only for the present, but f) often also for the future time, since not a few buyers are accustomed to have recourse to other manufacturers, and often afterward retain this custom. Moreover, g) railways and also certain other workshops, which depend upon those from whom work has ceased, suffer not slight damages from this; h) sometimes the industry and commerce of the whole province are involved in entangled difficulties, and the number of the poor in the whole region is greatly increased; i) Nor must there be passed over in silence the evils of the moral order which arise from this: namely, hatreds which divide citizens, the corruption of morals which naturally flows from long idleness, blasphemies against religion, violent and unjust acts by which persons or things are attacked, and other things of this sort."

²⁴ Th. M. De Virtute Iustitiae, n. 845.

Deservedly, therefore, Leo XIII says: "That kind of cessation affects with damage not only the masters and the workers themselves (and their family), but harms commerce and the utilities of the republic; and since it is usually not far from force and disturbances, it very often brings public tranquillity into danger." But since it is not licit to posit the cause of evil effects, unless the conditions are given, among which especially is this one, that a compensating good arise from it, hence the following principles concerning a strike must be attended to.

I. Common cessation from work by agreement is not licit unless 1. for a legitimate end to be obtained with founded hope, 2. with a just cause existing and proportionately grave, 3. while another way is lacking, 4. and unjust means are not employed.

There is required 1. a legitimate end to be obtained with founded hope: if the legitimate end is lacking, because the conditions demanded are unjust, the strike is intrinsically evil; if founded hope is lacking, it is gravely rash because of the harmful consequences to which it exposes one without likely compensation;

2. a just cause proportionately grave: for since many evils are apt to arise from a strike, there is required a reason of great moment, which ought to be the graver in proportion as greater evils can also be feared. Ordinarily a political cause does not suffice, for example, obtaining the right of suffrage, nor a fortiori obtaining the exclusion of non-associated workers, because liberty of laboring is given to all;

3. absence of another milder or better way: persuasion, peaceful agreement, intercession of the government, appeal to arbiters, etc.; for otherwise the strike would not be necessary;

4. abstinence from unjust means, because evils cannot be done so that goods may come about.

Hence in practice one must not cease from work by agreement except after mature deliberation, when other means and peaceful efforts have been exhausted, and when all advantages and disadvantages have been carefully weighed: for if the aforesaid conditions, and therefore the liceity of the matter, are not established, one should rather abstain from it. But when the conditions are verified, the strike is licit, because it is an act indifferent of itself, from which, in the case, a twofold effect will follow, so that the intended good effect is foreseen as about to surpass the evil. But if, in these circumstances, such a right were denied to workers, they could scarcely protect their rights in another way; on the contrary, experience has proved that a strike begun with mature counsel is an efficacious means.

II. Especially in a strike, one must abstain from all unjust means, whether for inflicting damage upon masters, or for deterring others from laboring. For to use unjust means, whether violent or fraudulent, is illicit, even for pursuing a good end.

Hence they act unjustly a) who by an anticipated cessation violate the contract without a just reason, or inflict damage upon the things of the owners, for example, by burning or invading houses or wares, or harm the owners themselves, even if they are guilty: for it is not licit by private authority to take vengeance;

b) likewise those who by force or by another unjust means compel other workers to cease from work, by beating, persecuting, calumniating, and a fortiori by striking or wounding; but whether the same must be said of those who, because of manifest injustice redounding to the common damage of workers, compel others by merely moral means not to labor, for example, by expelling them from the association without damage, can perhaps be disputed;

c) likewise those who by counsel or common conspiracy cooperate in these injustices; but not those who are compelled against their will not to labor.

III. A strike in public services, for example, railways, is very rarely licit. For it is often prohibited by the government in the stipulations themselves of the contract; and the advantages to be hoped for very rarely compensate the damages which directly harm the public good.

Hence it does not seem to be licit unless it is truly defensive; nor always, but only for repelling an intolerable injustice, for otherwise, since the public good must prevail over private good, the workers must renounce this latter.

557. Observation. The same principles have force from the opposite side concerning the dismissal of workers made by agreement (lock-out; uitsluiting). For if workers can declare "economic war" against owners, these, in similar conditions, can wage war against workers. But a truly grave cause is required, such as grave fault of the workers; because otherwise culpable cruelty would be committed, since workers thus dismissed would now be admitted nowhere in such a region for laboring, and would be compelled either to emigrate, or to embrace another vocation, or to beg.²⁵

²⁵ Prummer, Th. M. II, n. 309.