Article IV: On False Systems Concerning the Foundations of Morality

129. False systems are opposed to Catholic doctrine concerning the nature, rule, and foundation of morality.

This doctrine places moral goodness in the honorable good alone and founds it in rational human nature, in the eternal law of God, and in the tendency toward perfect happiness to be obtained in the other life; false systems are opposed to it either by defect or by excess. The Catholic doctrine itself is conformable to Aristotelian philosophy and can be called rational eudaemonism, because it intends rational perfection, the supreme good of man.

To this:

a) by defect is opposed pure eudaemonism (eudaimonia = beatitude, bien-etre, welzijn), or ethical voluntarism (gemoeds-, begeerte- of strevingsmoraal, geluksmoraal, gelukstrevingsmoraal), which tends toward earthly happiness and places it either in the delectable good: hedonism or sensualism; or in the useful good for temporal happiness: utilitarianism, which subsists under various forms, for example, individual, social, or evolutionary utilitarianism, sociological ethics, progressivism, pragmatism, etc.;

b) on the contrary, by excess is opposed pure rationalism or formalism, namely autonomistic and ethical rationalism, which proposes an exaggerated honorable good, and indeed of autonomous reason, without respect to human nature considered in its totality, to the eternal law of God, or to happiness, or even to reward in the other life. It exists under various forms, of which the chief are Stoicism and Kantianism.

1. Concerning the various systems, historically and individually, something will be said in an excursus by way of appendix at the end of the volume. The following can be consulted: Fouillee, Critique des systemes de morale contemporaine; De Baets, Les bases de la morale et du droit; Sertillanges, Les bases de la morale et les recentes discussions (in Rev. de Phil. 1903); among works of moral philosophy: Meyer, Cathrein, De Bie, Lehu, Manuel de Philosophie neo-scolastique (of the Louvain school); likewise Beysens, Ethiek; Van Hoonacker, Grondslagen der Moraalfilosofie; E. Janssens, Cours de Morale generale; M. Gillet, La morale et les morales; among theological manuals: Prummer, Tanquerey, and Mausbach; likewise Annales de l'institut de Philosophie, III.

130. Hedonism.

Hedonism (hedone = pleasure), or moral sensualism (genietingsmoraal), says: happiness is the sum of pleasures. Good is in sensual pleasure, evil in pain. The supreme good is the greatest present pleasure of the body, and any pleasure whatever is good, even if it is obtained by a most shameful action. Hence the supreme norm is: pleasure is to be sought, pain is to be fled; nature impels to this. Hence actions are good which bring more pleasure than pain; and therefore virtue is good only as a means to pleasure.

Against this system it can be objected:

1. Hedonism is founded upon the system of moral positivism: for pleasure varies and depends much on circumstances, custom, the laws of times and places, and the character of individuals, and corresponds to particular tendencies: each one is drawn by his own pleasure.

2. It falsely supposes that the ultimate end is in the greatest delight of this life.

3. The delectable good is not the first object of appetite, for delight follows from appetition and operation, which naturally precedes it and generates it. Hence delight will be good or evil according to the nature of the operation itself. Therefore it is not the principle or norm of morality.

4. Hedonism denies the classic distinction among the honorable, useful, and delectable good; yet historically and really there is a difference between what is sensibly pleasurable and what is fitting to man. Hence the system is opposed to man's natural conscience; and, reduced to the state of the present life, it justifies all crimes.

5. It considers only one element of man: but man is spirit and heart, not heart alone.

6. The delectable good is relative to individuals, and consequently subjective and variable; therefore it does not constitute a criterion of the objective and intrinsic distinction between good and evil.

7. Delight sought without restriction and discretion destroys itself: experience shows that it brings pain and is transformed into pain. But if delight as such is good, it will never be excessive; and nevertheless delight can be excessive: for its quantity displeases in such a way that it is no longer delight.

They object: 1) Natural inclinations are true; therefore the delight to which nature inclines is the true end and the true good. Resp. Those inclinations are true, not because they tend to delight, but because they show the internal nature of man. Hence it is not absolutely good to follow them, but insofar as they agree with human nature as such and with reason itself, to which all other inclinations must be subordinated, as lower things to higher.

2. Not every pleasure is good or an end, but pleasure of a certain character or quality, which is discerned by reason. Resp. Then pleasure itself as such is already not the ultimate norm, but a determined quality or condition of pleasure. This is already the negation of the system.

There is nevertheless something true in it: namely, the connection between virtue and happiness and delight, not indeed the baser delight of sense, but the nobler delight of the mind. The exercise of virtue alone can procure true happiness: it can cause imperfect happiness in the present life and merit perfect happiness in the other life. But an act will not be good because it renders us happy; it renders us happy because it is good.

131. Utilitarianism (nuttigheidsmoraal; Nutzlichkeitsmoral; Erfolgsmoral).

Utilitarianism in general places the end not precisely in pleasure alone, but in the sum of goods; and moral good in any useful good whatever for the earthly happiness either of the individual or of society, even in pleasure which reason approves as truly useful. Thus pleasure remains a secondary criterion of morality.

Now the aforesaid norm, besides falsely supposing that a created good is the end of man:

1. Is not sufficient, as not universal: for several honorable or dishonorable acts exist without respect to private or social good; for example, pledged faith is preserved against utility. Social utilitarianism denies man's duties toward God and toward himself, except insofar as they are ordered to the social good; individual utilitarianism does not prove duties toward God or toward others. But if they say that individual good is connected with social good, resp.: perhaps this may pass in the abstract; in the concrete, I deny it, for in fact they are often opposed and in conflict.

2. It is practically impossible: for all the consequences, of advantage or disadvantage, present and future, would have to be adequately seen and compared with one another, so that it could be established what is truly useful.

3. It is not immutable: for earthly happiness appears subjective and relative, and therefore it is not conceived in the same way by all, but is understood in a diverse way according to various times and regions and individuals, so that nothing is more changeable than a rule of this kind; hence it would render morality subjective and changeable.

4. It is false: for acts held by all as dishonorable can be useful to man, for example, theft and homicide, or can be ordered to the social good, for example, perjury, homicide, lying; and conversely, acts certainly honorable can be useless. Hence the norm of happiness in life is vague and indeterminate, because it can legitimate everything; and at the same time so restricted that it cannot legitimate many duties, as was already said under 1).

5. It is incomplete and maimed: it considers the empirical and affective aspect, egoism or altruism, more than the rational aspect, to which it assigns a second place and which it places after inclination and tendency; although the rational has the first part in morality, as directing and regulating.

In particular:

A. Individual, private, or egoistic utilitarianism (welbegrepen eigenbelang) places morality in any good whatever which each one, according to his pursuit of happiness, has proposed to himself to obtain. Hence it is not pleasure alone, but that which according to itself and according to its effects and circumstances offers greater utility, even future utility, for the whole life.

Against individual utilitarianism many things can be brought forward which are opposed to hedonism, namely:

1. It is founded upon moral positivism: utility depends upon many circumstances, laws, custom, and personal character.

2. It falsely supposes that the ultimate end is in the happiness of this life.

3. It denies the classic distinction among honorable, useful, and delectable good. And yet the useful as such is not the end but the means. Hence the end must be either delectable good, which is hedonism, or good considered in order to the end of nature, which is rational ethics. Therefore utility is not the first criterion. Hence the system is opposed to the moral conscience of all times, which refuses to admit pursuit of gain as moral perfection, just as it refuses pleasure.

4. It considers only one aspect of man; but man per se is an individual and per se from his nature is social. Hence individual utility alone is not the end of the moral order.

5. The useful good is not a universal criterion: for it is relative and variable, hence it is not a criterion of objective and intrinsic distinction; indeed it can lead to the greatest crimes. On the contrary, the best acts, such as to shed blood for God, for virtue, for the defense of one's country, can be useless.

6. Hence individual utility must be ruled by education and legislation.

7. Whence proposition 58 of the Syllabus is condemned: "All moral discipline and honesty must be placed in heaping up and increasing riches by any manner whatever and in satisfying pleasures."

B. Social or altruistic utilitarianism establishes common happiness as the norm of morality. Actions, therefore, are good or evil according as they promote or impede common happiness, and the more an action contributes to the common good, the better it is; the more it impedes it, the worse.

Against this form especially it can be objected:

1. In order that the happiness of others be the end, it is necessary to know in what that happiness consists. Hence the system does not hand down the ultimate answer, nor does it definitively solve the question, but leads it back again. The useful, namely, is not the measure, because it is a means, not an end. Therefore it is not the supreme criterion.

2. It is not a universal criterion. Ethics precedes the organization of society. Conscience testifies that, even apart from the social good, there are good and evil actions, such as intemperance, blasphemy, parricide, which are evil even in individual or family life. Moreover, the individual and society remain distinct, although they are not disjoined or separated. Moreover, man is directly referred to society only through external acts; and yet internal acts are moral, indeed morality is first in them.

3. It is not the first criterion. For the end of society is the end of individuals. Hence the distinction between social good and evil is subordinated to the distinction between individual good and evil; and if the good of one is not moral, neither is the good of many. It is natural to man to enter society because it is good, that is, conformable to reason. That is properly the end where there is properly operation. Society is not one per se, but has only a unity of order; and therefore as such it is not apt for attaining happiness.

4. It places the end in the present life and legitimates all crimes, for example, those of powerful nations against weaker ones.

5. According to the very principles of empiricism and utilitarianism, egoism equals altruism; and in a case of conflict between social good and individual happiness, from the principles of utilitarianism the conflict cannot be solved.

132. Pure Rationalism or Formalism.

In general, the followers of autonomic rationalism, rejecting the eternal law and excluding every relation to the reason and will of a personal God, deduce morality and moral obligation solely from the conformity of the act with reason itself or with nature as rational, without respect to utility, delight, happiness, and sanction. Hence they proclaim a purely rational morality, and moral good is only in the rational part of man; and therefore it consists in rational decency and must be sought solely from the motive of decency, namely, of virtue or of duty, for its own sake. This is formalism.

It first appeared in Greece, in the Cynic school, but there it especially flourished in the Stoic school.

The foundation of morality is: "to live conformably to nature"; and since human nature is rational, virtue is in a life instituted according to reason. The supreme and only good is life according to virtue; hence virtue is an end in itself: for good is to be loved and sought for its own sake, not on account of another. Virtue and happiness are the same in reality: "to live happily and to live according to nature are the same thing," says Seneca; beyond virtue nothing is needed for happiness. Nevertheless virtue is not to be desired on account of happiness; happiness is never to be desired as an end.

All other things are either indifferent things, such as health, riches, sickness, poverty, to be sought or fled according to circumstances; or vices always to be fled, such as passions, which are evil, against reason: to follow passion or affection or delight is contrary to morality. Virtue is wisdom: the truly wise man patiently sustains all inconveniences and abstains from various joys, "sustain and abstain"; he subjects all affections and passions to reason, indeed he extirpates them through a certain apathy or impassibility, so that he is elevated above all things and cannot be disturbed by any influence of pain or pleasure: thus he is freed from affection.

But against this:

1. The identity of virtue and full happiness or beatitude does not exist here on earth, where there are numerous and excessive pains.

2. The fundamental error by which it teaches that virtue is to be cultivated solely for its own sake, so that every consideration of one's own happiness is excluded, is common to it with Kant; and therefore the arguments to be brought against this point of Kantian doctrine also have force here (cf. next n., 2 and 3).

3. The nature conformably to which one must live, it says, is reason; but it understands reason in an entirely exclusive sense, so that there is not merely a preponderance and dominion of reason, but pure rationality, all other things being excluded from morality.

4. Hence the affective life lacks all morality. The passions must be reduced to servitude and extirpated rather than ruled and moderated, so that there may be perfect apathy, by which man is not acted upon by them, and the proper life of each one becomes indifferent to him.

5. Moreover, several other false things are contained in it. Thus no degree of morality is admitted, but goodness or malice is held as equal in all acts; the passions also are held as evil of themselves.

6. Finally, in applying the principles many errors occurred, and indeed most pernicious ones, since in fact they held lying, suicide, and many foul things against nature to be licit.

133. Kantianism.

Kant (1724-1804), the author of critical philosophy, followed Stoicism in some measure. After he had attempted to show that by pure speculative reason we can know only phenomena, not noumena, or what things themselves are in themselves; but that concerning these there is had a merely subjective cognition without objective value, and consequently that the existence of God, the freedom of man, and the immortality of the soul cannot be certainly proved; he determined to establish the foundations of ethics by another way, by the help of pure practical reason.

From the testimony of the conscience of all men, nothing is simply good except a good will, that is, reason-will; and this alone is moral. But the will is good not from the object, but from the motive by which it is moved to acting; this can be nothing other than duty to be fulfilled; and this duty is nothing other than conformity with the universal moral law. Therefore the will, in order to be morally good, must do what is commanded and solely because it is commanded: "to act according to duty and for the sake of duty." Hence morality is from form alone, which alone is universal, independently of matter: for if it fulfills the law on account of some empirical or eudaemonistic end, such as natural satisfaction of a tendency, fear of power, avoiding evil, or on account of some happiness or utility to be obtained, then the will is already pursuing the useful and has an egoistic motive destructive of morality, and therefore morality is not good; but it is good only when it is impelled from pure reverence for the law. Therefore Kant not only formally distinguishes every eudaemonistic element from morality, but excludes it as something incompossible with it.

1. Lehu notes: According to Kant, "material ethics is impossible. For moral law must be universal. But material ethics cannot be universal, because a) either it concludes the goodness of an action from order to happiness, but not all have the same happiness; b) or it is taken from order to some supreme good, but this opinion contradicts the natural appetite for happiness. Therefore the will will not be good except on the part of form, which alone can be universal, and consists in this, that the law is observed on account of the sole motive of law," o. c. n. 320.

Hence ethics a) must be pure from every empirical element of experience and proceed a priori; and consequently it does not depend upon concrete human nature and is without respect to psychology; b) obligation does not depend upon morality, but morality upon obligation.

But the universal moral law shows itself to man as something commanding, not conditionally and hypothetically, "if you wish to be happy, do this," but absolutely and categorically, "do good": hence there is the categorical imperative of practical reason, which must be obeyed simply and without any respect to the object and to the consequences of the act or to obtaining a reward, and without further inquiry concerning its foundation or authority; hence it is called the formal imperative. For the moral law proceeds from reason or rational nature as such, which is an end in itself, so that man cannot be ordered as a means to another end. Morality, namely, is essentially autonomous, by which the will observes its own law; reason, just as it alone is the measure of morality, so also is the only foundation. For in heteronomy, if we are subjected to the law of another, even of God, we are always led by a utilitarian or eudaemonistic motive, of love, hope, or fear, and the imperative will not be categorical but conditioned: "if he commands, if you wish to obey, in order to attain something material, act thus." Hence the ultimate end is the fully possible fulfillment of duty, or the autonomous pursuit of duty, which is an end in itself and has absolute value in itself: in the realm of ends man is both subject and legislator. Autonomy, namely, is the sole foundation of proper value, just as it is the ultimate foundation of morality and obligation.

But the categorical imperative is an unconditioned and universal rule. Hence:

a) the first and fundamental subjective rule, or "maxim," as it is called, which will be the criterion of morality, is this: "Act so that the rule of your will can always become a principle of universal legislation"; that is, before you act, carefully consider whether something absurd would follow from your action, if all were ordered to do the same thing and in fact acted so. From this rule two others follow:

b) the other, which determines the end of morality: "Act so that you hold humanity in yourself and in others as an end, and not as a means which you use"; for if you use yourself or others as a means, by that very fact you act on account of utility or pleasure, not on account of duty, and the imperative will already be conditioned, not categorical;

c) the third, which indicates the source of morality: "Act so that you consider your will, on the part of matter, as universally legislative"; autonomy is altogether necessary, otherwise we would no longer act for the sake of duty.

Now, in order that ethics be possible, there are three postulates of practical reason, which, although theoretically indemonstrable, must be admitted and believed as truths. For:

1. the moral law postulates freedom: for if the will were compelled to act, it could not be morally good; hence there is not phenomenal freedom, but noumenal freedom is given, which determines phenomenal operations;

1. The will in phenomena is not free; insofar as it is above phenomena, belonging to the intelligible world, it is free. Theoretical reason nevertheless does not know freedom, but knows the limitation which furnishes a foundation for thinking the possibility of freedom: it is a notion empty of every objective content, but conceivable. The positive foundation of the existence of freedom is from practical reason. Hence the primacy of practical reason, which reaches the noumenon itself.

2. the necessary object and end of a created will is to effect the supreme good, which consists in the intimate union of happiness and virtue. But this cannot be attained in the present life, for by that very fact obligation would cease. Hence the will is destined to tend by perpetual progress toward the supreme good; for this it is postulated that the soul is immortal;

3. man cannot think the supreme good except joined to supreme happiness. But the moral order is opposed to the order of happiness. Therefore it is postulated that there be some cause which joins morality with beatitude, and this can be nothing other than God. Hence there will be retribution, because virtue is worthy of retribution, although it cannot be exercised with a view to retribution. Retribution in this life is impossible. Therefore it is in the other life, and therefore God exists.

Thus God is introduced as the end of ethics, without being the foundation of morality.

From these postulates there results the primacy of practical reason and of the will over speculative reason.

Many have followed Kant as to the substance, and several of his principles have had influence upon the whole of modern philosophy. Yet not a few things can be objected to his system.

1. Cf. E. Janssens, La morale de l'imperatif categorique et la morale du bonheur.

1. It rests upon three false foundations: namely, it supposes a) an ideological and critical system of speculative reason; b) that the characters "universal" and "necessary" cannot be derived from things known experimentally; c) that all "material" principles place the motive in the lower appetitive faculty and that men are not moved by them except through the mediation of delight; hence man cannot act honorably except "on account of the form" of law, namely, from pure reverence for law. Here there is a twofold error, namely, a) that law does not move except through the lower faculty, although good can be appetized by a twofold faculty; b) that one acts either from mere reverence for law or from a motive of delight, for there are many other motives of the higher appetite, for example, agreement with human nature or with right order, love of God, the excellence of virtue, etc.

2. It does not explain morality or the norm of morality; for a) it removes the real end, beatitude; hence it renders impossible the relation of acts to the end and consequently removes the rule of conduct; therefore b) if a moral rule is not present, there will not be a true law or obligatory rule. For obligation is a necessity of acting. But the will is not solicited except by a final cause or by a willed good. Therefore the categorical imperative, which intends to exclude every real end, cannot found real obligation, and therefore is not law; indeed c) the norm handed down is psychologically impossible. For one must act solely from the motive of duty, without consideration of one's own good and without the affection of the appetitive faculty. But this is impossible. The will has good as its proper object, and whatever it wills it wills under the notion of good. Hence it cannot act from pure reverence for law unless this is fitting and good for it; otherwise it would be a good which remained foreign to the will and could not move it. Therefore it is impossible to exclude the affection of the appetitive faculty: that something is good for man and pertains to happiness, if it is not always the principal motive, is nevertheless a condition without which there is no appetition. Hence Kantian ethics mutilates human nature, and therefore is unnatural and fruitless; truly d) it assumes as known from common persuasion that that will alone is simply good which wills both what the law commands and because the law commands. But such a persuasion does not exist, for men often call actions honorable which are commanded by no law, for example, if someone of his own accord devotes himself to the service of the poor and sick or to the service of his country; moreover, they also hold prescribed actions good if they are done from another motive, not prohibited by another law, such as mercy, love of neighbor, etc.: thus a good will is manifested.

3. The honesty of an action is not necessarily corrupted by a eudaemonological intention. For there is a twofold degree of perfection, namely, a) to act for the sake of honesty or on account of a deontological end; b) to act for the sake of happiness, though not exclusively for its sake alone, but with due subordination to the deontological end, using hope of reward or fear of punishment to pursue honesty more efficaciously. This remains good, because in this way man acts according to nature adequately considered. This nature, by an invincible appetite implanted by the Creator, tends toward its good or happiness. Hence, acting thus in regard to the honorable good, man wills that to which he is brought through nature by the Creator. Otherwise the Kantian rule is not proportioned to nature; for it is impossible that a being which by the whole weight of nature is inclined toward its own happiness should continually neglect this in acting, as is confirmed, moreover, by the universal mode of acting of men, even of the most perfect.

1. If man excluded the motive of honesty, by that very fact he would act badly, and consequently would not obtain reward or avoid punishment. - The question properly pertains to the treatise on hope.

Therefore it is false that reason prohibits following the inclination to happiness or delight; this appetite can be directed by right reason.

4. For it contradicts itself: a) by asserting on one side that an action elicited on account of hope of beatitude is not good, and on the other side that the supreme good consists in the conjunction of virtue and beatitude. For if this is true, why are we prohibited from desiring and seeking it? For it is not evil to seek what is more perfect; but it is more perfect to cultivate virtue and at the same time to be happy. Therefore.

b) Likewise by asserting on one side that the only honorable motive is duty to be fulfilled, and on the other side that man is to be considered as an end, indeed that the rule of acting is to be so constituted by each one that it can have force for all. But this is to introduce a material element distinct from duty, and consequently to render the imperative conditioned.

5. Indeed, from the system several absurdities follow:

a) that human nature is an end to itself, and its perfection is absolute autonomy; for human nature is not autonomous, since dependence is essential to man;

b) that reason is at once superior and inferior, making law and rebellious against itself: "for it is at once rule and at once subject," and "not rarely rebellious";

c) that practical judgments are synthetic a priori, by which, namely, the idea of obligation is joined a priori with action, and these judgments rest upon a blind faith concerning the goodness and sanctity of the law of reason: it is supposed a priori that human reason commands good things, whereas in its judgments it ought to depend upon objective truth. Thus obligation is constructed without an ontological foundation;

d) that the matter of action in no way pertains to morality. For how is it discerned that a rule is apt to become a universal principle, for example, that an act, a lie, is worthy to be prohibited by universal law, unless because the matter or object in itself has baseness and is against reason?

e) that no act is good which is not commanded by the categorical imperative; yet there is a distinction between the licit, the obligatory, and the heroic, between commanded good and non-commanded good; indeed obligation is posterior to morality;

f) that goodness and malice are constituted by the categorical imperative. Is an act evil solely because it is prohibited, good because it is commanded, or on the contrary prohibited as evil in itself and commanded as good in itself?

6. Finally, it leads to fatalism or pantheism. For one must obey reason either blindly because reason dictates, not asking about a further foundation, and this is fatalism; or hold human reason as absolute and God, which is pantheism.

134. Conclusion.

From these things it is now clear what is to be judged concerning morality absolutely independent or lay morality. Besides the fact that it is incomplete, under some respect it seems to include something utopian. For in general:

1. In the logical order, it is impossible to justify ethics without an absolute end which subsists in itself, and which is nothing other than God, the supreme and infinite good; otherwise all our aspirations toward good would go away into emptiness or nothingness. Hence beyond contingent created goods there must be an absolute End, which is the end in itself.

2. In the ontological order, all things are founded in this, that God loves himself with necessary love and cannot will anything except on account of himself; otherwise he could not communicate himself to other beings which participate in his perfection, nor give to them as an end the communication of his goodness.

3. In the order of practical execution, without recourse to God, the observance of morality will not be sufficiently obtained, because of the lack of an efficacious sanction; namely, if man were not certain that God, infinitely just and omnipotent, establishes an eternal harmony and concord between virtue and happiness, vice and unhappiness.

In particular, those who defend independent morality propose, in place of theistic or Christian morality, either:

1. An ethics of solidarity, by which we are bound toward others. Obligation would arise either from contract, or from inheritance by which we obtain all things from preceding generations. Not from contract, for a contract is not valid unless freely entered; but individuals are not bound, because they did not assume the obligation, indeed they did not freely take up society. Not from inheritance, because the patrimony of prior generations does not have determined natural heirs, but pertains to all and to each; hence if we use it, we contract no debt toward others.

1. Lehu notes, o. c. n. 322: "1. It is a law of nature that man live in society; but not all laws of nature induce obligation, for example, winter cold is a law of nature, but man is not obliged not to avoid cold. 2. Certainly man owes something to society, but to determine the quantity of that debt is not so easy. 3. Many men judge society to be badly ordered because from it they have received more evil than good: such persons do not admit society to be the just foundation of obligation."

Or:

2. A sociological ethics, which founds morality upon the idea of society, which is a moral person distinct from individuals and superior to them, which can command. But society is not a person or a being really distinct from individuals, nor is it an absolute end in itself: it exists for the good of individuals, and they are not simply for it. But if individuals are bound to obey, it is not because society has an absolute right of commanding for the sake of commanding, but because the precept contributes to the good of individuals and thus can be legitimated. Or:

3. An ethics of nature, which is founded in man's subjection to his nature. The ultimate end is: to be ourselves, to preserve ourselves and perfect ourselves under the individual respect and in order to society. This can be understood in a right sense of rational nature as such, ordered to the ultimate end, God; but in fact, those who do not acknowledge God and the author of the universe, what do they understand by the name of nature which is the norm? They interpret it in various and opposed ways. Moreover, the instincts which must be reformed for the good ordering of nature proceed equally from nature itself as those which are to be stimulated; therefore there must be another discriminating rule: human reason, an irradiation of divine reason itself.