Article — Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis
Article V: On the Time When Restitution Must Be Made
S. Th. II-II, q. 62, a. 8 and q. 66, a. 3, ad 2.
332. Principle. - Restitution must be made at once, whether it is owed from a thing received or from unjust receiving, unless there is present a just cause of deferring or a delay is sought from him who can grant the use of the thing. The reason is that the owner has a right of possessing his own thing and of enjoying it; but he is unjustly deprived of the use of both rights if restitution is deferred without cause: for it is not licit to retain another's thing when the owner is reasonably unwilling.
"To detain," says St. Thomas, "that which is owed to another has the same nature of harm as unjust receiving; and therefore under unjust receiving unjust detention also is understood... As to receive another's thing is a mortal sin against justice, so also to detain it; because by the fact that someone detains another's thing against the owner's will, he impedes him from the use of the thing, and thus does injury to him. But it is manifest that not even for a little time is it licit to remain in sin; but everyone is bound immediately to leave sin... And therefore everyone is bound immediately to restore, if he can, or to seek delay from him who can grant the use of the thing," q. 66, a. 3, ad 2, and q. 62, a. 8.
It is said: at once, and indeed physically if there is question of the purpose of restoring, which someone must conceive in that instant in which he knows himself to be liable to restitution; but as soon as morally possible if there is question of the act of restoring, namely, at the first opportunity given, where it can be done without excessive inconvenience, yet in such a way that all damages following from culpable delay must be repaired.
333. Delay of restitution constitutes a sin grave from its genus. - Whence a) he is gravely guilty who without a just cause notably defers restitution: for then grave damage for the owner from the nature of the thing and per se is present; b) likewise he who, being able to restore the whole, wishes to restore only by parts; c) on the contrary he is lightly guilty if he defers briefly and does not inflict grave damage on the creditor.
He who defers restitution:
- If culpably, is bound also to compensate the damages which the owner undergoes therefrom, and which could have been foreseen, namely, ordinary damages commonly occurring in these circumstances; but not extraordinary ones, unless the debtor who is in delay has been sufficiently warned or has foreseen them.
- If restitution is deferred without fault (for example, because one does not have the means for restoring), damages arising therefrom per se are not to be repaired, at least as often as the burden of restitution does not arise from delict or bad faith.
- But if it arises from delict, there is controversy: the common opinion with St. Alphonsus affirms it, because such damage truly arises from unjust receiving which is a formally unjust cause; nevertheless certain persons hold the excusing opinion as probable, because, although the first cause of the damage was unjust, nevertheless the delay now is just and consequently the one deferring is not the unjust cause of the subsequent damage. Yet this reason does not hold, because he is its cause, if not immediately, nevertheless mediately unjust.
334. How must one act with those who wish to defer restitution until death, and especially with the sick who are burdened with the onus of restitution? - Resp. Per se they sin gravely and are not to be absolved who, without sufficient reason, defer restitution until death, not only because of the delay of restitution, but also because of the danger lest the heirs omit restitution; or who, doubting whether the thing is another's, defer resolving the doubt until death.
Therefore the confessor ought prudently to exhort penitents that they themselves before death restore as far as they can. In these cases, however, let the confessor take care lest especially the sick be fruitlessly disturbed from good faith: for it can happen that they do not attend sufficiently to those damages or dangers, especially when restitution is to be made not to the injured owners themselves but to the poor or pious causes. Wherefore for the sick:
- if they are in good faith and there is not time remaining for prudently warning them, or there is not probable hope of a good effect, then they are to be absolved without warning (for this would be an action useless for the innocent owner, and harmful for the dying);
- if they are in bad faith, or if the fruit of warning is hoped, then they are to be warned and helped to restore immediately;
- if restitution cannot be made immediately and the obligation is hidden, let them commit the money to the confessor, or rather to another faithful man. But if the money is not had, let care be taken that restitution be made through the heirs, or through a written note to be transmitted to the creditor.