Article VII: On the Interpretation of Ecclesiastical Law

367. Ecclesiastical law, as being human, often needs interpretation, which can be merely declaratory or comprehensive, or extensive and restrictive, and by reason of the author by whom it is made, it is denominated authentic or legal, usual, judicial, or doctrinal (cf. n. 294). Moreover in ecclesiastical right not only legal interpretation is authoritative, but also usual interpretation from the subsequent use of the law, once the conditions required for custom have been given, concerning which we shall speak below (can. 27-29); likewise judicial interpretation, but only as to the parties of the case; doctrinal interpretation, however, is merely private.

368. The Supreme Pontiff can delegate the Roman Congregations to interpret laws authentically, from a special mandate, or even from a general mandate, such as he gave to the Congregation of Rites for laws pertaining to rites, and to the Congregation of the Council for the decrees of Trent regarding morals and discipline; now, however, according to the constitution Sapienti of June 28, 1908, each exercises this right for the competence committed to it, the approval of the Roman Pontiff being saved (can. 244); moreover a special commission was instituted for declaring the canons of the Code (from the motu proprio of September 15, 1917). Their acts do not enjoy the same authority, but such and so much authority as they themselves attribute to individual acts.

For:

1. Either they issue a solemn and general decree, approved by the special authority of the Pontiff, by which they settle a controversy: it has the same force as law and can also extend it.

2. Or, under approval in common form, they hand down resolutions, declarations, and general decisions, by which they expressly explain the sense of the law: these are merely declarative but authentic interpretation, which is valid for all cases.

3. Or they give responses to doubts proposed for a particular case, without issuing a general decree: these are authoritative in relation to the case proposed and for the persons whom it regards, like judicial interpretation (can. 17, § 3). For others and with regard to similar cases they are not authoritative interpretation nor per se obligatory; nevertheless they exhibit a probable and prudent manner of acting and have a doctrinal value greater than if it were given by private doctors, and greater in proportion as it rests upon firmer arguments, has been repeated more often, and the cases occurring are more similar. Indeed, if there were a uniform, general, constant practice, it would be wrong to contradict it: then the contrary would not be probable; whence in responses there is sometimes added: "with attention to the constant practice of the Sacred Congregation."

369. Does interpretation need promulgation? - Authentic extensive (or also restrictive) interpretation requires a new promulgation, because in reality it is an extension (or change) of obligation which was not contained in the law, or a new law in relation to some point: such an interpretation made by him who is deputed simply to interpret laws does not have the force of law, unless it is given from a special mandate of the legislator and is legitimately promulgated by him, as usually happens for decrees of Congregations (can. 17, § 2).

Comprehensive interpretation, which declares a sense that is sufficiently clearly contained in the law or necessarily drawn out of it, does not require promulgation because it was sufficiently promulgated with the law; but that which declares a sense which is obscurely contained, so that before and of itself it was doubtful or only probable, requires a new promulgation. According to natural right this can be disputed: according to others it does not require promulgation because it does not establish a new law, but uncovers the sense which previously lay hidden; according to others it requires it because that which was doubtfully or probably contained in the law was not sufficiently promulgated, whence the law was not totally promulgated. But with regard to the new ecclesiastical right, it must be promulgated from can. 17, § 2.

370. Doctrinal interpretation must be made according to the rules established in law; namely:

1. "Ecclesiastical laws are to be understood according to the proper signification of the words considered in the text and context; but if this remains doubtful and obscure, recourse must be had to parallel places of the Code, if there are any, to the end and circumstances of the law, and to the mind of the legislator" (can. 18).

2. "Laws which establish a penalty, or restrict the free exercise of rights, or contain an exception from the law, are subject to strict interpretation" (can. 19).

3. "If concerning a certain matter an express prescription of law, whether general or particular, is lacking, the norm is to be taken, unless there is question of penalties to be applied, from laws enacted in similar matters; from general principles of right observed with canonical equity; from the style and practice of the Roman Curia; from the common and constant opinion of doctors" (can. 20).

4. "Laws enacted to forestall a general danger urge, even if in a particular case the danger is not present" (can. 21).

5. "A later law, enacted by competent authority, derogates from a prior one, if it expressly says this, or is directly contrary to it, or orders anew the whole matter of the prior law; but a general law (of itself) in no way derogates from the statutes of special places and singular persons, unless something else is expressly provided in it" (can. 22).

6. "In doubt, the revocation of a pre-existing law is not presumed, but later laws are to be drawn to earlier ones and, insofar as it can be done, reconciled with them" (can. 23).

371. Ecclesiastical law admits the private interpretation of epikeia, and indeed in a threefold case: 1) if the law in a particular case becomes harmful or evil, e.g., if it cannot be observed without sin, as if you wished to leave a sick person wholly needing your help for the sake of Mass;

2. if it is impeditious of good, or very burdensome and too difficult to be urged by an equitable legislator, as if it exceeds human powers or causes grave disproportionate damage, e.g., if one gravely sick were bound to fast;

3. even if it is not so burdensome that it cannot strictly be imposed, if, after the circumstances of time, place, persons, and especially the ordinary mode of commanding with moderation have been inspected, it is presumed that such was not the mind of the legislator: thus you are not bound to hear Mass lest a great extraordinary profit have to be lost.

But ordinarily epikeia is not given in invalidating laws, on account of the common good, from which no ignorance excuses, unless it is expressly said (can. 16, § 1).

The interpretation of epikeia can be made by any private person if the cause is evident; if it is doubtful, it is full of dangers, since a man in his own cause is accustomed quickly to incline to the more benign part; whence the superior must be approached, who on account of such cases has the power of dispensing (can. 15). But if there is a cause which does not allow delay in recurring to the superior and is sufficiently founded, so that there is positive doubt whether the law still obligates, necessity itself dispenses: then, namely, it suffices that probably the law has ceased to obligate.