Question First: On the Essence and Necessity of Satisfaction

St. Thomas III, q. 86, a. 4; Suppl., q. 12 and 13; q. 18, a. 2.

535. Thesis I. Satisfaction is necessary for repairing the injury inflicted on God through sin and for redeeming temporal punishment, which ordinarily, after the remission of fault and of eternal punishment, remains to be paid in this age or in purgatory. - Therefore satisfaction is not instituted only for the example of others, the edification and satisfaction of the Church, and for guarding against future sins, as Protestants hold.

For Protestants, although they cannot deny the severity of penitential discipline in the first centuries of the Church, nevertheless hold it as an ecclesiastical institution (for the edification and satisfaction of the Church, and for guarding against sins), and deny its divine institution and necessity for the chastisement of sin; for, they say, sin cannot be forgiven by God without at the same time a full remission of the punishments due, eternal and temporal; besides, if our satisfactions are said to be necessary, by that very fact an injury is inflicted upon the infinite satisfaction of Christ, since it appears insufficient, whereas nevertheless he fully satisfied, not only for fault but also for every punishment. The root of this theory is the doctrine of justification by faith alone: for if faith alone fully suffices for justification, satisfactory works become useless; whence no meritorious or satisfactory force is recognized by Protestants in our works. But erroneously.

It is proved: 1. From the examples of Scripture brought forward above, and from the words by which Scripture, by exhorting, counsels and indeed commands penitential satisfaction (n. 463, 1).

2. From the ancient and constant practice of the Church (ibid., 2).

3. From theological reason, because by contrition and confession, although aversion from God is totally remitted, nevertheless sin, as to conversion toward the creature, is not always completely repaired, and therefore temporal punishment remains to be undergone (ibid., 3).

Reason further shows the fittingness of satisfaction:

A. On the part of the penitent sinner. For as the Council of Trent explains, sess. 14, c. 8, satisfactory punishments call one back from sin (past and future), 1) for a) they restrain as by a bridle, b) they make us more cautious and vigilant for the future, c) they heal the remains of sins and remove vicious habits by contrary actions of virtues (and exterior occasions of sin), in a word "they are medicine curing past sins and preserving against future ones" (St. Thomas, q. 12, a. 3); - 2) they effectively inculcate that sin is a great evil worthy of terrible punishment: if sins were dismissed without penance, they would be judged light, and by the facility of pardon itself many would fall into more grave sins.

B. On the part of God, who is offended through sin: he is not only a private friend and merciful father, but also the public legislator, ruler, and judge of the whole human society. But it befits God, as a private person, to forgive the offense inflicted on him; yet at the same time it befits him as ruler and legislator not to remit offenses without temporal punishment, both for the vengeance of the sin committed and for the restitution of due honor and violated right, so that not mercy alone is exercised by remitting fault, but also justice by exacting punishment for the restitution of violated honor, and for fostering the common good, so that in the future laws may be better observed and others deterred from evil. - Likewise in punishments there shines forth both the holiness of God and his clemency. Holiness, because from them the gravity of sin appears more, the license of sinning is restrained, the remains of sins and evil habits are taken away, and the ingratitude of one sinning after Baptism and the faith given to Christ is punished more. Clemency, because the punishments are lighter in this life and at the same time meritorious.

C. On the part of the passion of Christ, who redeemed sin. The passion of Christ is as a universal cause, which of itself is sufficient for the remission of fault and punishment, but must be applied to individuals through their own cooperation, by which they become conformed to Christ, who satisfied for our sins by suffering (Rom. VIII, 17); whence the passion of Christ works the remission of sin (of fault and punishment), according to the mode of one's own acts or the disposition of the penitent, more or less perfect. And thus the efficacy of the passion appears greater, if it not only of itself produces goodness and furnishes satisfaction, but also renders men themselves operative of good and satisfying.

536. Satisfaction is an act of virtue. - For 1) satisfaction pertains to penance and works toward the destruction of sin (Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 3); but an act pertaining to penance and working toward the destruction of sin is an act of virtue; therefore. - 2) Satisfaction preserves the mean: it places equality and gives enough, neither more nor less; but equality imports the notion of the mean, and consequently of virtue (q. 12, a. 1).

It is an act of justice: for this virtue establishes equality in things; but this is done through satisfaction, by which the equality of amends to the preceding offense is established; therefore (a. 2).

It is as it were a species of vindicative justice, which alone regards a preceding offense and establishes equality in the one who suffers what is just;¹ but satisfaction imports equality in the one acting, who punishes himself and thus suffers what is just (a. 2).

¹ According to this it pertains to commutative justice (III, q. 85, a. 3, ad 3).

Yet it is not a species of justice strictly so called, because we are not able to render to God what is equal according to quantity, as much as is due. Hence a) just as we cannot give God an equivalent for benefits received, so, a fortiori, neither can we for the debt of sin committed. Especially b) because an injury inflicted on infinite God is in some way infinite, and therefore is greater than every finite compensation of a creature. But it suffices that man render what he can, because friendship does not exact the equivalent, but what is possible, and this is also in some manner equal according to proportion. Hence, although it is not equivalent, nevertheless we can offer sufficient satisfaction (q. 13, a. 1). - And although man according to himself owes all his acts and his whole power to God, nevertheless God does not require, of necessity of salvation, that he spend his whole power on one thing, since he must be solicitous about many things; but a certain measure is required from him, namely the fulfillment of the commandments of God, and above this he can add something by which he satisfies (ibid., ad 3).

Therefore God could strictly exact our satisfactions by another title; whence by the grace of God they are satisfactory, and therefore we do not offer satisfaction to God from our own but from his (q. 13, a. 1). Therefore satisfaction pertains not to justice strictly so called, but to a potential part of justice, namely to the virtue of penance joined to it, which imitates the virtue of justice deficiently.

537. Remark. - Although from strict justice we cannot satisfy God, because we are not able from our own things to render an equivalent for that which was taken away, nevertheless, supposing the gratuitous ordination of God, who wills to accept as sufficient the satisfactions made according to our power from his grace, we now can satisfy, and indeed

a) for aversion from God and mortal fault only de congruo, because contrition, even when made from habitual grace and charity, does not furnish, for the violated friendship of God and the infinite injury of withdrawal from the Infinite Good, a compensation equivalent according to quantity, but only according to proportion;

b) also de condigno for inordinate conversion to the creature, and consequently for venial fault and for the temporal punishment due to remitted sin, because finite satisfaction can furnish an equivalent for finite punishment and is able to render as much as is due; whence such satisfaction preserves the mode of justice. And surely, if we can merit de condigno eternal life itself, which is greater, a fortiori we can satisfy de condigno for temporal punishment, which is less. Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 8; prop. 77 condemned of Baius.²

² "The laborious satisfactions of the justified are not able to expiate de condigno the temporal punishment remaining for forgiven faults."

Hence 1) the Scriptures promise remission of sins to good penal works (Is. I, 16, seq.; Ezech. XVIII, XXXIII; Joel II, 13; Tob. IV, 11; I Cor. XI, 31-32; II Cor. VII, 10), indeed they command satisfaction (Joel II, 12; Job, last chapter; Dan. IV, 24; Mt. III, 2; Lk. III, 8; XI, 41); but God neither promises nor commands the impossible;

2. the tradition of the Church has also always understood this, as is evident not only from penitential discipline, but also from explicit testimonies: of Tertullian, de Poen. 7, c. 7, 8, 9, 11; Cyprian, de Lapsis, 35 and 36; ep. 11, n. 1 and 2; ep. 55, n. 20; Origen, in Ps. XXXVII, hom. II, 5; Ambrose, de Poen., l. II, c. 6, n. 48-49; in Lk. VII, 156; Augustine, ep. 153 (al. 54), n. 6; Enchiridion, LXX, 15; serm. 19, n. 2; serm. 20, n. 2; Gregory, in Ev. hom. 34, n. 16; Reg. part. III, 30; Caesarius of Arles, serm. 104, n. 4, etc.

3. and therefore Councils have defined the possibility of satisfying for the punishments of sin: Florence, in the decree of union; Trent, sess. 14, c. 8 and 9, can. 13.

Yet do not conclude from this that satisfaction is an act of strict justice, and not of the annexed virtue, Penance: a) because we do not satisfy God from our own things, but from his and from his grace, and therefore the satisfactory value supposes the voluntary acceptance of God; b) because one must judge of the nature of virtue according to the primary act; that act is contrition, which does not render the equivalent of mortal sin, and therefore Penance is not strict justice, even if the secondary act derived from the primary act can render the equivalent as to the secondary object, temporal punishment.

538. Protestants object:

1. The earlier ones contended that penitential punishments were formerly only canonical, imposed for satisfying the Church, for guarding against the fall of the faithful, and for proving the sincerity of conversion. - But the assertion is not only gratuitous, but also openly false, since the cited texts of Scripture, the Fathers, and the Councils explicitly speak of satisfaction to be furnished to God, and of remission to be obtained from him through punishments.

2. The more recent ones, with Harnack, say that the notion of furnishing satisfaction had its origin from juridical principles, and together with them was introduced into the Latin Church by Tertullian. - Yet they speak thus inconsiderately; for a) even in the Eastern Church the same doctrine was proposed, as is evident, e.g., from Origen, in Lev. hom. XI, 4, and Sozomen (H. E. VII, 16); b) before Tertullian the value of good works for obtaining from God the remission of sins was not unknown, as is clear, e.g., from Prov. XV, 17 and XVI, 6; Tob. III, 21 and XII, 9; Lk. XVI, 9; and from ps.-Clement II to the Corinthians, XVI, 4; Doctr. Ap. IV, 6; and ep. Barn. XIX, 10.³

³ Cf. Galtier, de Poenitentia, n. 480-481.

539. Thesis II. Satisfaction in purpose or vow is essential and absolutely necessary to the sacrament of penance, so that if it is lacking, the sacrament is null; satisfaction in reality is necessary only for integrity, so that if it is lacking, the sacrament is not invalid but only incomplete. - For satisfaction is not required a) on the part of justification, which is compossible with liability to temporal punishment; nor b) on the part of the sacrament, to whose essence the purpose, not the execution, of satisfaction pertains. Hence:

1. Penitents who have the vow of satisfying can be absolved before they have fulfilled satisfaction, as is evident both a) from proposition 5 of Peter de Osma, condemned in the year 1478 as contrary to the Catholic faith; and from proposition 16 condemned by Alexander VIII, and 35 of the Synod of Pistoia condemned by Pius VI, against the Jansenists who, wishing to restore the rigorous penitential discipline of the primitive Church, contended that penitents were not to be absolved unless the laborious and lengthy penance enjoined upon them had first been completed;⁴ and also b) from the practice of the Church, even of the primitive Church in certain cases, e.g., in danger of death (Council of Nicaea, can. 13; Innocent I), with persecution pressing (St. Cyprian, ep. 54, n. 25), in danger lest because of the delay of absolution the penitent pass over to the heretics (St. Cyprian, ep. 52, n. 15; cf. 2nd ep. Clem. and Council of Ancyra, a. 314, can. 5), in the hope that from indulgence more would return to the Church (ep. Corn. among the Cyprian letters 46). Cf. can. 886.

⁴ Proposition 5 of Peter de Osma sounded thus: "Penitents are not to be absolved unless the penance enjoined on them has first been completed"; and the 16th condemned by Alexander VIII: "The order of placing satisfaction before absolution was introduced not by the polity or institution of the Church, but by the law and prescription of Christ itself, the nature of the thing in some way dictating the same." The 17th and 18th propositions condemned by the same Alexander VIII can also be compared, and the 87th and 88th among the Quesnellian propositions. Finally the doctrine of the Synod of Pistoia under n. 35, "insofar as it suggests... that in the ordinary way it is fitting that acts of humiliation and penance, which are imposed by way of sacramental satisfaction, ought to precede absolution: false, rash, injurious to the common practice of the Church, leading into the error branded with a heretical note in Peter de Osma," is declared by Pius VI.

2. Sins remitted through absolution do not return, even if satisfaction is voluntarily omitted, but in this case a new sin is committed.

It should be noted that a confessor who noticed that the penitent was negligent in fulfilling satisfaction, or doubted concerning his legitimate disposition, as could happen in habitual sinners and relapsers, can bind him to perform satisfaction beforehand, at least in part.

540. Thesis III. The confessor can and regularly is bound to enjoin satisfaction on the penitent. - He can, both because from the institution of Christ (Mt. XVI and XVIII) he has the power not only of loosing but also of binding to punishment, and because the operation of the priest in the use of the keys is conformable to the operation of God, whose minister he is; but God can bind to punishment. That he is bound is evident, because the priest in this tribunal is the minister of God, and the judge and physician of the penitent. As minister of God, he is bound, so far as is in him, to effect that the sacrament be integral through satisfaction, which is an integral part; as judge he must preserve equity between God and the sinner by avenging his sin; as physician he must cure the wounds of the penitent and guard against future ones.

The Council of Trent defined this, sess. 14, can. 15, c. 8: "the keys were granted also for binding," not only "for the keeping of new life and as medicine of infirmity, but also for the vengeance and chastisement of past sins." This holds of the case in which the priest absolves the penitent, because if no absolution is given, it is not necessary to enjoin penance, since the sacrament is not confected; nevertheless it is very useful, so that the penitent may thus be better prepared for absolution, and a shorter satisfaction can be imposed when he is going to complete his confession.

Thus regularly; for accidentally the confessor is not bound to enjoin satisfaction: 1) if the penitent morally cannot fulfill it, e.g., if he is deprived of his senses or mentally deranged, or near death and at the same time very weak; in which latter case nevertheless it is expedient to impose a very slight penance, which the priest himself may immediately absolve with the penitent, such as to strike the breast, invoke the name of Jesus, or kiss an image of the crucified; - 2) if the confessor by divine revelation knows that all temporal punishment of the penitent has already been remitted; - 3) if the penitent immediately after absolution accuses a sin omitted from forgetfulness and receives absolution again, at least if this sin does not substantially change the state of the penitent: for there it seems that there is present only one morally sacramental judgment; in practice nevertheless it is better to impose a new penance, even if light. Similarly, if a scrupulous person repeatedly within a short interval of time returns with new faults omitted from forgetfulness and is absolved, it is not necessary to impose a new satisfaction when the confessor judges that the one already enjoined suffices for this new absolution; - but it is better not to absolve the scrupulous so frequently.

541. The obligation of imposing satisfaction of itself is grave, - For a priest, by abstaining from imposing satisfaction, acts directly against the intention of God, the author of the sacrament, and thus a grave irreverence is done to the sacrament, which remains mutilated; and grave harm is inflicted on the penitent, who from this is deprived of great goods, since he remains liable to graver temporal punishments and is deprived of a fitting remedy against future sins.

Hence 1) certainly it is a mortal sin not to impose penance for necessary matter of confession, or mortal sins not yet declared.

Indeed 2) probably also for free matter, or for venial sins, or for sins already declared, because it is grave irreverence toward the sacrament to render it mutilated and to deprive it of an integral part; and although satisfaction not imposed is of itself light, with respect to the sacrament it is always grave in the notion of irreverence. Nevertheless the contrary is held by others as probable, because it is not grave to deprive a sacrament of a merely integral part or complement in a light matter, just as a judge does not gravely fail in his office who omits to impose a light punishment or a complement of lighter moment. In practice, however, it will easily be mortal if it is omitted knowingly and without reason, because contempt can easily be present.

542. Regularly satisfaction must be enjoined before absolution. - This is evident from the Roman Ritual and from the custom of the Church, and besides the order of judgment demands that the guilty one, before he is absolved, promise satisfaction, by which he may become worthy of absolution. Nevertheless:

1. If it has been omitted, it can and must be enjoined immediately after absolution, because then it is morally united to the absolution.

2. But if the penitent notices that the confessor has forgotten to impose penance, he must demand it, lest the sacrament remain incomplete, either immediately, namely before departure, or shortly after, if he can still conveniently approach the confessor.

3. But if this defect is not noticed until after a few days, in the next confession satisfaction can be imposed, which may extend to the sins declared in both confessions; nevertheless it is not necessary, since it is uncertain whether from this the incomplete sacrament is integrated, because perhaps the moral union between the absolution given earlier and the imposition of penance now made is lacking. But penitents are not to be disturbed about this, since satisfaction in reality is not required for the validity of absolution.