Question — Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis
Question Five: On the Mode of Obtaining Beatitude
S. Th. I-II, q. 5.
43. Thesis I. Man is capable of arriving at beatitude, even supernatural beatitude; nevertheless he cannot attain this by natural powers, but by the help of divine grace he is able to obtain it, and indeed in various degrees. - It is proved:
- Man is capable of arriving at beatitude, even supernatural beatitude, because he is capable of perfect good, since his intellect can know universal and perfect good and his will can seek it (a. 1). It is of faith, explicitly defined in the Vatican Council, session 3, chapter 2, canon 3; and it is included in the fact that the vision of God is the ultimate end of man, which is of faith from the Council of Florence, from Benedict XII, and from the Council of Trent, session 25.
- Nevertheless he cannot attain supernatural beatitude by natural powers. It is of faith from the Council of Vienne, article 5, and from the Second Council of Orange, canons 7, 10, 18, 19, 20 (cf. Vatican Council, session 3, canon 3; and the condemned propositions of Baius). To see God through His essence is above the nature not only of man but of every creature. For natural knowledge is proportioned to the nature of the one knowing and therefore comes about according to the mode of the one knowing. Every knowledge which comes about according to the mode of a created substance cannot know God as He is in Himself, but falls short of the vision of the divine essence, which infinitely exceeds every created substance. Hence neither man nor any creature can attain supernatural beatitude by natural powers, but needs the help of divine grace (John I, 18; VI, 46; Mt. XI, 27; I Cor. II, 11; I John IV, 12). - From this it also follows that we cannot attain beatitude immediately by the action of creatures, but only by that of God, although we can be aided by them ministerially and disposed toward its attainment (a. 5 and 6; I, q. 12, a. 4).
- Man can obtain beatitude in various degrees, so that one is more blessed than another: not, indeed, according to objective beatitude, because there is only one Highest Good, God, by whose fruition all are blessed; but as to possession and fruition, because the more someone enjoys God, the more blessed he is. But it happens that someone enjoys God more perfectly than another from the fact that he is better disposed or ordered to His fruition according to diversity of grace and charity and merits (a. 2). This also is of faith from the Council of Florence (decree of union) and from the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 16, canon 32 (cf. John XIV, 2; I Cor. XV, 41-42).
44. Thesis II. Perfect beatitude is not possible in the present life, but only in the other life. This is of faith from the Council of Vienne, article 4 (cf. Benedict XII and the Second Council of Orange). - It is proved:
- From the notion of beatitude in the abstract: beatitude, since it is the perfect and sufficient good, excludes every evil and fulfills every desire. But in this life a) not every evil is excluded, such as ignorance on the part of the intellect, disordered affection and concupiscence on the part of the appetite, infirmity and afflictive labor on the part of the body; b) not every desire is fulfilled, since goods are essentially unstable, even spiritual goods, such as virtue, which is liable to vice because of the mutability of freedom, and science, which is lost by forgetfulness; indeed earthly life itself, although we would will to remain perpetually and naturally flee death (a. 3).
- From the notion of beatitude in the concrete: a) the vision of God in Himself is now impossible (I Tim. VI, 16; I Cor. XIII, 12; I John III, 2); indeed even perfect natural knowledge of the highest truth and of God is impossible, because it is liable to very many impediments and difficulties, is often obscured and mixed with doubts and errors, nor does it give certainty of permanence, without which happiness is not had.
b) On earth the will is not so firmly established in goods that it never deflects from the true object of beatitude and sins, but by the cupidities and necessities of the present life it is impeded from being borne unceasingly by supreme love into God.
Nevertheless there can be in this life an inchoate or imperfect happiness, and a state of inchoate perfection and imperfect beatitude, which more or less approaches to perfect beatitude and consists in the knowledge, love, and imitation of God, or in rectitude of will and the operation of virtue, for which, as if instrumentally, goods of the body and the help of other men are also required (q. 4, a. 7): these furnish to man the friendship of God and the joy flowing from it, peace of conscience and tranquility of heart, and the hope of future beatitude, which surpass all earthly delights. Therefore it is the way and tendency to perfect beatitude or God; just as an intermediate end naturally and necessarily tends to the ultimate end whose goodness it participates;
Thus it is not done necessarily: for absolutely God could have immediately given beatitude and at the same time disposed man for it, that is, in the same moment made the will rightly tending toward the ultimate end and obtaining it, just as at the same time in an instant He can dispose matter and infuse the form (for example, in the resurrection of a dead man). But He did not do so, as is clear from the fact that we do not obtain beatitude in the present life. And moreover the order of divine wisdom demands that it not be done thus.
It is proved: for to have perfect good without preceding motion and disposition belongs naturally to him who has it. God alone possesses beatitude naturally. Therefore it is proper to God that He is not moved and disposed to beatitude by a preceding operation. And therefore, since beatitude exceeds every created nature, no pure creature fittingly obtains beatitude without the movement of a preceding operation by which it tends into beatitude; and thus beatitude becomes the reward of virtuous operation (a. 7).
Hence in the Scriptures good works are constantly presented both as the reason and title on account of which eternal glory is granted (Mt. XXV, 21; 34-36; II Cor. IV, 17), in the same way as punishment is given for evils (Rom. III, 7, 8), and eternal glory as wages for the works of the just (Mt. V, 12; XIX, 29) and as the repayment of the heavenly inheritance (Col. III, 24; Heb. X, 35; XI, 16), as prize (I Cor. IX, 24; Phil. III, 14), crown (Jas. I, 12; Apoc. II, 10), indeed crown of justice (II Tim. IV, 8), which is proportioned to works, greater or lesser (Mt. XXV, 14 sq.; Lk. XIX, 11 sq.; II Cor. IX, 6; Gal. VI, 8; Apoc. XXII, 12). Hence the Apostle, I Cor. XV, 58, says: Labor in the Lord is not vain.
46. Corollary: Earthly life is the way to the end and beatitude. - Therefore earthly life, as being something to be ended, is not the state of ultimate perfection and happiness, but the way by which we must tend to that perfection and happiness by our acts. For exercising these acts:
- In order to attaining the natural end, man would have:
a) internal means, namely, human nature itself with its powers, especially reason and free will, and the moral virtues acquired by the aid of these powers, for operating the good more easily under the ordinary motion of God;
b) an external means: society, whose role is to promote man to a good at once spiritual and temporal.
- But in the present order, in relation to the supernatural end, God bestows upon us:
a) internal means proportioned to this end, namely, habitual grace, both with the theological and moral virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit connected with it, and actual grace both of intellect and of will and the special motion of the Holy Spirit;
b) an external means: the supernatural society, the Church, whose founder and head is Christ, and which leads men to the supernatural end by the proposition of faith, laws, and sacraments.