Question Four: On the Effect of Contrition

St. Th., III, q. 86, a. 6; Suppl., q. 5 and q. 9, a. 1.

504. Contrition is the cause of the remission of sins and of the infusion of grace. - Since contrition can be considered in two ways, as it is a part of the sacrament and as it is an act of the virtue of penance, in each way it obtains the effect, but in different ways: ex opere operato and ex opere operantis.

1. Insofar as it is a part of the sacrament, together with the remaining parts, namely confession and absolution, it is an efficient instrumental cause, which works instrumentally unto the very infusion of grace and the very condonation of sin and punishment.

2. Insofar as it is an act of virtue, it is not the formal cause of justification, which is one only, the justice by which God makes us just, as is certain from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7, or sanctifying grace; nor is it the efficient cause, because God alone justifies, c. 7; nor the meritorious cause, c. 6 and 7, can. 3 and 4; sess. 14, c. 4. For although contrition effects the retraction and compensation of sin, and thus efficiently concurs toward the removal of the offense, which is the impediment of remissive grace (III, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3), nevertheless it is only the dispositive or quasi-material cause as regards the reception of grace; for disposition is reduced to the material cause. Yet this disposition of ours is principally from God moving us through grace. - For:

a) Perfect contrition, even outside the sacrament, with only the desire of it, nevertheless causes dispositively, as the last disposition or "quasi-necessity" for grace; once this disposition has been posited, according to the liberal ordination of God, grace is immediately infused.

b) Attrition of itself causes dispositively but remotely, and sufficiently causes grace together with the sacrament.

"And thus it is clear that remission of fault is an effect of penance insofar as it is a virtue, but more principally insofar as it is a sacrament" (III, q. 86, a. 6).

505. Contrition, even small or remiss, is sufficient:

1. for blotting out even great sins, provided that it reaches the nature of contrition, because sin displeases as much as it ought, i.e., above all evils;

2. nevertheless, the greater and more intense it is, the more it obtains the remission of sin and punishment and the infusion of grace;

3. indeed, it can be so great and intense, both on the part of charity and on the part of sensible sorrow which it voluntarily excites, that it suffices for blotting out every fault and every punishment.

506. Question: Whether the sacrament of Penance can be at once valid and unformed or infructuous?¹ - Modern theologians ask about this on the occasion of the doctrine concerning the endowments and effect of contrition.

¹ On this, consult Revue Eccl. de Liege, Nov. 1909 and July 1910.

a) Many more recent theologians deny this, because the disposition required for grace is also a part of the sacrament; hence if this is valid, the disposition sufficient for justification, namely attrition, is present, and consequently the fruit also is immediately obtained. But if attrition is not present, neither is the sacrament valid.

b) Yet many others think that contrition, which is the necessary part for the validity of the sacrament of Penance, is not altogether the same as that which is the sufficient disposition for justification and the fruit of the sacrament. Several more recent authors restrict this opinion to two cases: 1) when someone guilty of a twofold sin, from invincible forgetfulness, grieves only for one of them on account of the baseness special to it and confesses this alone; 2) when someone from invincible ignorance would believe that it is not a mortal sin to approach the sacrament without sorrow for all sins, while nevertheless sorrow from a special motive would be present concerning some sin. In these cases the sacrament seems to them to be valid, because the man supplies the matter, namely, confession formally integral and true efficacious sorrow for some sin with an absolute purpose; and yet grace is not conferred, because an obstacle is given: for contrition is not universal, since the other sin has not been retracted. Thus Suarez, Lugo, the Salmanticenses, and others, whose doctrine St. Alphonsus considers probable. - Yet one may very much doubt whether there can be a supreme and efficacious contrition for some sin on account of God which is not universal. Moreover, if the unformedness of the sacrament of Penance had to be restricted in this way to two very rare and quasi-metaphysical cases, it would contribute little to practice and could practically be neglected.

c) But the older theologians admitted unformedness more broadly, and distinguished otherwise: between contrition which is a necessary part for the being of the sacrament, and contrition which is the necessary disposition for justification. The first, as being part of the sacramental sign, is contrition as it can be externally and sensibly manifested and judged with moral certitude by the confessor, namely, that it be internal and sincere, supernatural and universal. But for justification more is required, namely also supreme contrition, by which man is so disposed that he holds sin as the highest evil and efficaciously wills to suffer all evils rather than commit it; but this is not sensible and escapes human experience, nor can it be morally judged. Hence it does not pertain to the sensible sign of the sacrament. Therefore as often as someone has the former contrition, namely supernatural contrition, and lacks the other, namely contrition appretiatively supreme, here and now nevertheless unconscious of the defective disposition, but thinking himself rightly disposed (otherwise contrition would be simulated and feigned), the sacrament is valid but infructuous. But when a further disposition comes, it works its fruits and revives. This will happen only once, because by one revival the right to the remission of sin absolutely granted is exhausted.

The doctrine of the Council of Trent (sess. 14, c. 4) is not an obstacle to this; speaking of contrition, which holds the first place among the parts of penance, it recognizes none except that which excludes the will of sinning. For this can be required by the Council insofar as it is necessary that contrition also be sufficient as a disposition for justification. For it does not say that this is required in order that contrition be a part of the matter itself of the sacrament.

The last opinion is not certain, but truly probable, both intrinsically on account of the reasons indicated, and extrinsically from the authority of many, of whom St. Thomas is a witness, q. 9, a. 1, teaching that an unformed confession is given. Thus interpret him Capreolus, Durandus, Paludanus, St. Antoninus, Soncinas, Bernard of Gannaco, Cajetan, Dominic Soto, Sylvester, Candidus, Peter de Soto, Melchior Cano, Ledesma, John of St. Thomas, and several others; most recently Billot, De Smet, Van Noort, Vermeersch, etc.² Hence in practice attention must be given to that opinion, e.g., in the question whether absolution is to be given, or not, under a condition, and under what condition; so that in practice the sacrament should never be given under the condition: if you are disposed, but under the condition: if you are capable, lest, namely, there be impeded any revival of the sacrament, if such would be given.

² Kiselstein also favors it in Revue Eccl. de Liege, Jan. 1924.