Question — Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Question I: On Elicited Acts

106.

106. There are six elicited acts of the will: three concerning the end: simple volition, intention, and fruition; three concerning the means: consent, election, and active use. But every act of the will depends upon a previous cognition: for although the will as efficient cause moves the other faculties to exercise (that is, to acting or not acting), nevertheless it is itself moved by the intellect as by a final cause as to specification (or determination of the act), insofar as the intellect proposes to it goods or actions diverse in species and moves the will to operate in this species of action rather than in another. Therefore there are also six acts of the intellect which precede the elicited acts of the will.

107.

107. By these twelve acts the moral work is completed both in intention and in execution. In intention:

107.

A. concerning the end, there is 1) the simple apprehension of the intellect by which it knows something, for example health, as good (or evil); 2) there follows simple volition, that is, bare complacency and an inefficacious appetite of the proposed good (or an inefficacious displeasure at evil); 3) if the volition is strong, the intellect is moved to examine whether the good is fitting and can be acquired (or whether the evil is not fitting and can be fled): this is a judgment proposing the good in such a way, namely, as fitting and possible; 4) there follows the intention of the will, which is the efficacious desire of the good (or the efficacious flight from evil), or of the end to be acquired through means.

107.

B. concerning the means, 5) by force of intention the intellect is moved to inquire into suitable means for obtaining the good, and this is counsel, that is, inquiry and deliberation about means, such as, for example, walking, medicine, good eating, bodily exercises; 6) there follows the consent of the will approving the useful means; 7) by force of consent the intellect is moved to discern the more apt means, and this is the discretive or practical judgment; 8) there follows the election of the will, which accepts one means before another, for example walking, and thus the order of intention is completed.

107.

A. concerning the means, 9) through command: for by force of election the intellect commands the execution of the means, for example of walking; 10) there follows on the part of the will active use, that is, the application of the executive powers, in this case of the locomotive power, to acting; to which in these powers there corresponds passive use, that is, the execution of the means, here the walking itself.

107.

B. From these, 11) there follows the acquisition of the end and the cognition of its acquisition; from which there is had 12) fruition or delight and joy of the will and pleasant rest in the good or end possessed.

108.
  1. All the aforesaid acts concur toward the moral work, when it is not done precipitately, or from imagination or passion, but prudently and maturely, even if they succeed one another so suddenly that they cannot be discerned by the one operating.