Question II: On Commanded Acts

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 17; q. 9, a. 2, ad 3.

109. Command properly is an act of practical reason: for it is an expression of the will by which the work to be done is intimated to someone ("do this"), and an ordering necessitating the one to whom command is given to do the work; but to express and to order belong to reason, not to the will. Nevertheless the will is said to command the other powers whose acts are called commanded: a) by taking to command improperly for to move, because the will moves the other faculties to exercise and to the end; b) also properly: for since the election of the will moves reason to commanding, therefore command has from the will the force and efficacy of moving the other powers; but the act is rather to be attributed to the moving power than to the moved power (for example, killing is attributed more to the will than to the hand); hence command is attributed rather to the will than to the intellect.

110. Command and the commanded act are one human act. - For command and the acts commanded by it express an order to one another; and therefore although physically they are several, morally nevertheless they are simply one and the same human act, as a certain one whole: in which the moving command holds itself as the formal element, the commanded act is had materially; yet they are several according to parts.

111. Acts can be commanded which are in our dominion or power, and to which persuasive reason can move us; namely:

1. acts of the will, which is especially in our power and concerning which the intellect can command just as it can judge: for from one act the will can move itself to another, insofar as it moves reason to proposing or commanding this; in this case that act will be at once elicited by the will and commanded by it. The first act of the will is excepted, to which man does not move himself from another act, but is moved by God alone;

2. acts of reason, not as to perception of the object, nor as to assent or adherence to such or such an object unless the matter concerns things not evident; but as to exercise or application: for the will moves reason to acting, and reason reflects upon its own acts and thus can dispose of its own acts, except for the first act of reason, which precedes every act of the will and does not depend upon it, except as to its continuation;

3. acts of the sensitive life, as to exercise and application, not indeed insofar as they are from a disposition of the body, but insofar as they depend upon the sensitive power and upon imagination, and do not forestall reason and will but follow them;

4. acts of the exterior senses and of the members which are moved by the sensitive powers, such as the eye, the hand, the feet, the tongue.

On the contrary, the following cannot be commanded:

a) the first act of reason and of the will;

b) acts of the sensitive powers that forestall reason;

c) acts of the vegetative life, which follow the natural appetite;

d) acts of the exterior members which are moved by a natural power, such as the movement of the heart and of the genital member; except sometimes indirectly, insofar as by the influence of the nervous system and of the sensitive part an acceleration can occur in the circulation of the blood, and thus a commotion of the heart or of the genital organ.

112. The dominion of the will over the other powers can be perfect or despotic (such as is the dominion of a master over a servant), when it is not resisted: in such a way it moves itself, and in itself the locomotive power, the external senses, and the other exterior members; but after original sin it is often imperfect or political (such as is the dominion of a king over free men), which is sometimes resisted or not obeyed: in such a way it moves the intellect, the internal senses, and the sensitive appetite: for thoughts or passions rise up against the will, nor do they always follow if they are chosen and excited by the will.