Question IV: On the Goodness and Malice of Passions

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 24; De Veritate, q. 26, a. 6 and 7.

178. Principle I. Passions also can contribute to the morality of human acts, and indeed not only to the morality of the interior act but also to that of the exterior act.

1. Concerning passions the following can be consulted: Mercier, Psychologie; Bain, The Emotions and the Will (Les Emotions et la Volonte, trans. Lemonnier); Paul Janet, Morale; Ribot, La psychologie des sentiments; Janvier, Conf. N.-D.: Les Passions; Noble, Les Passions dans la Vie morale: I. Psychologie de la Passion; II. Moralite de la Passion; Gardair, Les Passions et la Volonte; Descurets, La Medecine des Passions; Payot, L'Education de la Volonte; Lejeune, Les Passions. Also Bossuet, Connaissance de Dieu et de soi-meme; Schram, Theol. Mystica; Scaramelli, Directorium ascetico-mysticum.

For passions can be considered in two ways:

1. as to the being of nature or physical being, insofar as they are common to us with brute animals, and thus they are physically good, since they are implanted by God;

2. as to moral being, insofar as they are proper to man, and thus a) they are not per se evil, nor good, but indifferent: for the movements of the sensitive appetite are not per se from reason, and consequently are not human; b) if they are considered insofar as they are subject to the command of reason and will, thus they are good or evil, insofar as they are voluntary, either directly insofar as they are commanded by the will, or indirectly insofar as they are not prohibited by it.

It is proved: 1) "For the sensitive appetite is nearer to reason and will themselves than the exterior members are." But the acts of the exterior members are morally good or evil according as they are voluntary. Therefore much more the passions themselves, according as they are voluntary, are morally good or evil (a. 1).

2. From the Scriptures, which a) commend certain passions (Ps. IV, 5; II Cor. VII, 9; Rom. XII, 15); b) assert that they are found in Christ, although bound by reason (Mt. XXVI, 38; Mk. III, 5; XIV, 33; Lk. XIX, 41; Jn. XI, 33); c) and praise men because of them or reprehend them because of their absence (Exod. XXXII, 19; Num. XXV, 11; I Kings II-III).

Hence to be ruled by passions is not evil because they are evil of themselves, but because the order is inverted according to which the superior part ought to rule the inferior; but it is good to rule them provided this is according to the order of reason (a. 2).

179. Corollary. - Therefore passions, if they are considered as to the being of nature, are not morally good or evil according to species, but indifferent; but if they are considered as regulated by reason, they can be, like exterior acts, good or evil according to species, according as their proper object will be fitting to reason or not fitting: thus, for example, shame, or fear of disgraceful things, is good, and envy, or sadness concerning another's good, is evil (a. 4).

180. Principle II. Voluntary passions increase the goodness or malice of the act. - It is proved: the more perfectly the good of reason or the moral good is derived to more things which befit man, the more perfect it is; hence it also pertains to moral perfection that exterior acts be directed by reason. But the sensitive appetite can obey reason. Therefore it pertains to moral perfection that passions be regulated by reason. Thus, just as it is better that man will the good and do it by an exterior act, so it is better that he be moved to good both according to the will and according to the sensitive appetite, in order to operate more promptly (a. 3).

This, however, must be understood of willed passions, which are chosen and commanded by the will (in the respectively diverse way in which this ought to be done for good and evil; cf. n. 146). For a passion which moves man toward sensible good, if it precedes the will, diminishes liberty and consequently goodness and malice; if it follows by redundance, it is not a cause but a mere effect of the will: not a cause, namely, but "a sign of a more intense will (or of a greater voluntary), and thus it indicates a greater moral goodness" or malice; if it follows by election, it adds to goodness or malice (ad 1).