Question One: Concerning the Necessity of Restitution

S. Th. II-II, q. 62, a. 2 and 8.

282. Thesis. Restitution is necessary for salvation by necessity of precept, which per se obligates under grave sin to restoring, in fact or in desire, that which is owed to one's neighbor from strict right.

It is said A. necessary, and indeed:

1. in fact or in desire: in fact whenever this is morally possible; but if for the time it is impossible, at least the intention must be conceived in the mind, that is, the desire or efficacious proposal of restoring as soon as possible;

2. per se under grave sin: for just as injury per se is prohibited under grave sin, so its repair per se is commanded under grave sin; unless the damaging injury is light, for then the repair can be owed only under venial sin. Hence one who, in restoring, would retain a part which does not reach grave matter, would not sin gravely by detaining it; nevertheless, even for a light injury or small matter, restitution must be prescribed under venial sin;

3. by necessity of precept, but not, even in desire, by necessity of means, because restitution contributes nothing positive to salvation, but is a mere condition like the fulfillment of every grave precept;

B. for salvation, namely, so that sincere contrition and a firm purpose are impossible without the efficacious will of restoring.

It is proved A. by reason. The first part: Justice forbids that injury be inflicted upon someone or that an inflicted injury be continued. But he who does not restore a thing received from another, or for damage inflicted, when he can, by that very fact causes injury or does not cease to cause it. Therefore justice forbids omitting restitution. For:

a) He who unjustly detains another's thing impedes his neighbor from the use of his own thing, and thus does injury to him: namely, to detain that which is owed to another has the same account of harm as an unjust taking, and is equivalently to steal; — likewise he who does not compensate damage voluntarily continues it in its effect, and does not cease to violate another's right.

b) He who does not restore harms his neighbor, and thus acts against the precept: What you wish men not to do to you, do not do to them.

c) Right reason dictates that to each his own must be rendered. Therefore that which has been unjustly received or is unjustly detained must be rendered.

The second part: a) Sin cannot be remitted without sincere contrition and firm purpose. But he lacks sincere contrition who wills to retain a good unjustly possessed, because he does not retract his sin; — nor does he have a firm purpose of not sinning who pertinaciously refuses to repair damage unjustly inflicted by him.

b) To preserve justice is of the necessity of salvation. But he who does not restore, when he can, does not preserve justice but violates it, because he does not preserve equality. Therefore restitution is of the necessity of salvation.

B. What the Scriptures say: a) the precept of restitution is expressed in Ex. XXII, 1-5 and following: "If anyone shall have stolen an ox, or sheep, and shall have killed or sold it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep... If he shall not have that with which he may repay for the theft, he himself shall be sold...¹ If anyone injures a field or vineyard and lets his animal go so that it feeds on another's... according to the estimation of the damage let him restore..." b) But this is necessary for pardon, Ezech. XXXIII, 14-16: "If... he shall have done penance for his sin, and shall have done judgment and justice, and that wicked man shall have restored the pledge, and returned the robbery, he shall live with life and shall not die." c) Hence those who were held to be holy, or who sincerely wish to return from injustice, are found very solicitous about restitution, for example, Tobias, II, 21: "See lest perhaps it is stolen (the kid): return it to its owners, because it is not licit for us either to eat anything from theft, or to touch it"; and Zacchaeus, Lk. XIX, 8: "If I have defrauded anyone of anything, I restore fourfold." Hence James says, V, 4: "Behold, the wages of the workers who reaped your regions, which has been defrauded by you, cries out, and their cry has entered into the ears of the Lord."

¹ Here it is said that more must be restored than was taken away, but this is by way of penalty, by which the Jews might be more effectively deterred from theft.

C. Tradition states the same thing and has solemnly placed in the law the axiom of St. Augustine:² "The sin is not remitted unless what was taken away is restored."

² Ep. 54, to Macedonius.

283. It is objected: No one is bound to restore another's thing if the owner is unreasonably unwilling that the holder detain the thing. But the owner is unreasonably unwilling who prefers his own temporal good to the spiritual salvation of his neighbor, since the neighbor himself is to be damned if he does not restore. Therefore.

Resp.: 1) I deny the minor, because someone is not bound to prefer the salvation of his neighbor to his own temporal good unless the neighbor, in extreme or grave necessity, could not be saved otherwise; but here the neighbor can be saved, and he suffers the danger of salvation from his own perverse will alone.

2. I distinguish the major: if the owner were bound by justice or strict debt not to be unreasonably unwilling, I concede; if he were bound to this by charity alone, I deny. But in the case, supposing that the owner were bound to this, which is false, he would be bound only from charity alone, and thus the injustice remains (n. 246).

284. The precept of restitution according to the form and sense of the words is affirmative, but according to the thing it implies a negative precept by which we are prohibited from detaining another's thing (a. 8, ad 1). And indeed it is primarily negative: for it commands rendering another's thing precisely because to detain that thing, or to deprive him of it, is evil and prohibited. Hence the negative precept is the reason of the affirmative precept. Hence:

1. Restitution always obligates and must be made as soon as possible; otherwise the owner is unjustly deprived of the use of his own thing; and therefore he who at present cannot restore is bound at least to have the proposal or intention of restoring, and at the same time to take care that he satisfy the obligation as soon as possible; and if he cannot restore the whole, let him immediately restore a part.

2. He who voluntarily omits restitution sins during the whole time of the omission, because he transgresses the negative precept which obligates at every moment.

3. Nevertheless, he who keeps another's thing for a long time commits one sin in number, provided that he always perseveres in the proposal of not restoring; but if he revokes it explicitly or implicitly, he sins as often as he renews the interrupted proposal. Yet let the confessor not be too concerned about the number of sins, but let him ask the penitent how long he has detained another's thing, and whether he persevered in the same will of not restoring.

285. Practical corollaries are deduced from this by theologians for confessors:³

³ Cf. our little work: De Variis Peccatis in sacramentali confessione medendis, c. 11, § B, q. 4.

A. He cannot be absolved:

1. who, conscious of his obligation, without an excusing reason, does not wish to restore another's thing of great price: for he lacks true contrition;

2. who without cause delays restitution, for example, until death; or if he is near death and can conveniently restore by himself, commands his heirs to restore: for by experience it is known that this is dangerous;

3. who cannot restore but neglects to procure for himself the faculty of restoring, such as one who, burdened by debt, makes useless expenses and does not pay debts: for he is bound to live with a certain parsimony, that is, not only to avoid superfluous expenses, but also to diminish daily expenses, insofar as he can according to his condition;

4. who does not wish immediately, when he conveniently can, to restore a notable debt all at once: to will to retain a notable part while the owner is reasonably unwilling is actually to sin.

B. Nevertheless, if the penitent is in good faith, and at the same time it is certainly foreseen that admonition will be useful in no way — which, however, should not easily be presumed — the admonition can be omitted and absolution granted.

C. He who promises that he will morally restore at once can be absolved the first time, unless from the circumstances deception is prudently feared; nevertheless it is generally more opportune that he first be compelled to restore, if this can easily be done, lest afterward he change his mind. — But if he had already promised, especially several times, regularly he is not again to be absolved before restitution has been made, because his disposition is very doubtful and there is great danger of a new delay.

286. Concerning restitution to be made by a dying man. — With a dying man one must act cautiously:

1. If the penitent seems to be in good faith, and no time remains for prudently admonishing him concerning his obligation, or it is foreseen that the admonition will not be useful, it is to be omitted.

2. But if it is hoped that the admonition will be useful, or if the penitent is in bad faith or in vincible ignorance, he is to be admonished concerning his obligation both firmly and gently, and helped to fulfill it at once.

3. If the obligation is hidden and cannot be fulfilled at once, the dying man is to be induced to entrust the money to the confessor himself, or rather to another faithful man, so that it may be sent to the creditor in secret; or, if it can be done prudently, to leave that sum in his testament to the same creditor, with mention of restitution omitted.

4. If the obligation is not hidden, and cannot be fulfilled at once, let the confessor bring it about that it be certainly fulfilled, either through the heirs, or through a note to be handed to the creditor.

287. Notice. — Here the error of the common people must be corrected, who think that souls are detained in purgatory until restitution has actually been made by the heirs: for no one in the other life is compelled to undergo penalties on account of the negligence of heirs.