Question One: On Sacrifice

S. Th. II-II, q. 85 and q. 86, a. 1; I-II, q. 102, a. 2, 3, 4.

692. Sacrifice (offer) is said from making sacred, and therefore signifies an act by which man makes something sacred; hence:

1. in the broadest sense it signifies an act or work of any virtue whatever, done in honor of God, and commanded by religion, for example, works of mercy or obedience (Heb. XIII, 15-16; Ps. L, 19);

2. in a stricter sense it is every act elicited by the virtue of religion, namely, one which has no other goodness except because it is done in honor of God; in this sense internal sacrifice (Ps. XLIX, 14; I Pet. II, 5, 9), by which the soul offers itself to God, is more sacrifice than external sacrifice: for exterior worship is nothing except the expression of the interior;

3. in the strictest and proper sense it is the principal act of external and public worship, distinct from all others, most solemn and most excellent, because it more perfectly testifies to the supreme dominion of God and the full dependence of all things upon Him; hence it is to make sacred by excellence (Os. VI, 6; I Reg. XV, 22).

Consequently, by extension and improperly, sacrifice also designates the term of the sacrificial action, namely, the thing sacrificed or victim, the host, insofar as by sacrifice it has been offered to God and made sacred; or the sacred thing made itself.

693. Sacrifice strictly so called is of natural law. - It is proved:

If the excellence of the person to be worshiped differs from the excellence of others not only in degree but in order, then in society special signs of honor must be exhibited and reserved to him for testifying to his excellence.

But such is the excellence of God, who is the first principle and last end, from whom all things have being and acting, and who is the supreme lord of all things, who can create all things and also destroy them.

Therefore in external and social worship special signs of honor must be exhibited and reserved to Him, by which we testify to His supreme dominion and our subjection.

Now that God is the first principle and end, the supreme lord of all things, and has the power of destroying all things just as of creating them, we signify most fittingly by sacrifice, especially because no other external sign of oblation or adoration exists which of its nature represents the supreme dominion of God and our dependence in every mode, and in fact is reserved to God.

Therefore this sign, which is sacrifice, must be exhibited and reserved to God. - History proves that this has been done at every time among all peoples (Cf. C. Trid., sess. 22, c. 1).

It is confirmed: External and public worship is ordered so that a right estimation of God may be formed in us, and so that we may be stirred up to a special reverence of God. But for this a special worship reserved to God is required. "We see this," says St. Thomas, q. 85, a. 2, "observed in every republic, that they honor the supreme ruler with some singular sign, which, if it were offered to anyone else, would be the crime of lese-majesty."

694. Sacrifice strictly so called is defined: The external oblation of a sensible and permanent thing, through some alteration or destruction of it, made by a priest to God, for testifying to His dominion and our subjection. In this definition there is indicated:

1. The genus to which sacrifice pertains: oblation, by which something is offered to God to be deputed to divine worship; and indeed external oblation, because it pertains to external and public worship. Thus it differs from devotion and from merely internal sacrifice.

2. The matter: of a sensible and permanent thing; sensible, indeed, because sacrifice is a sensible sign, since it is made for signifying the internal oblation of the mind, by which man offers and subjects himself to God as supreme Lord; and permanent also, namely, something apt both for signifying the permanent dominion of God over man and over all creation, and for representing man himself, who hands himself over to God.

Through this, oblation differs from adoration, because the latter exhibits to God a transient action, for example, genuflection, while the former exhibits to God a permanent thing, which in sacrifice is offered as the substitute of our sensible and permanent substance; hence it is understood why especially those animals and other things were employed for sacrifices which serve for the sustenance of man.

3. The form: through some alteration or destruction, by which, namely, in order to signify God's supreme dominion over all things, the thing is withdrawn from every human use and totally and in perpetuity passes into the dominion of God, and thus is made sacred: whether it be said that the oblation is made to God formally through the alteration itself, which seems truer; or whether it be said that the alteration is a condition prerequired for sacrificial oblation, as pleases some more.

It is not required that the alteration always be had through real or physical destruction, but an equivalent can suffice, namely, one which as to exterior form or according to human estimation is equivalent to a real alteration in the order of signifying: thus a thing which is rendered unfit for natural uses, such as wine poured out, or is placed on the way of destruction, and whatever bears the appearance of destruction so that it is apt for expressing the signification proper to sacrifice. These things are customarily explained more where the Mass is treated.

By destruction or alteration sacrifice is distinguished from all other oblations: in a simple oblation the thing, while it is offered, remains whole, although afterward it can be consumed; in sacrifice the oblation itself is made formally through destruction. Hence St. Thomas, q. 86, a. 1: "The name of oblation is common to all things which are exhibited for the worship of God, so that if something is exhibited for the worship of God, as to be consumed in some sacred thing which ought to be made from it, it is both an oblation and a sacrifice; but if it is exhibited so that it may remain whole, to be deputed to divine worship or to be expended for the use of ministers, it will be an oblation, not a sacrifice." And again, q. 85, a. 3, ad 3: "They are properly called sacrifices when something is done concerning the things offered to God, as that animals were killed and burned (bloody sacrifice), that bread is broken and eaten and blessed (unbloody sacrifice). And this is what the name itself sounds forth, for sacrifice is said from the fact that man makes something sacred. But oblation is directly said when something is offered to God, even if nothing is done concerning it, as coins or loaves are said to be offered on the altar, concerning which nothing is done. Hence every sacrifice is an oblation, but not conversely."

4. The efficient cause, namely, the minister: by a priest. To express the public sense of religion in the name of society, a public person is required, that is, one who enjoys public authority or is legitimately deputed by it, so that he may act for all or in the name of all.

Thus, before cities and kingdoms were constituted, when there were only families and tribes, the father of the family or the firstborn were as it were naturally indicated for offering sacrifice; afterward kings also sometimes did this, as Melchisedech; but for the most part distinct ministers were designated for this: for it is fitting that in society there be ministers separated from the people, permanently instituted for this, who in the strict sense are called priests; once these have been instituted, such an act of sacrifice would be attempted invalidly by others. But since Christ was constituted the head of all men, He was naturally the priest of all humanity. But if God reserves to Himself the ordering of all worship, as was done in the supernatural order, no other can institute sacrifice or priesthood (Heb. V, 1-4).

5. The end of sacrifice, both the end to whom: made to God, for sacrifice is an act of religion; and the end which: for testifying to His supreme dominion and our subjection.

695. Diverse species of sacrifice. - Every sacrifice is essentially and primarily latreutic, because it is made in honor of God, to testify that He is the first principle upon whom man totally depends and by whom he is whatever he is. From this it follows that man has from God whatever he has, and awaits whatever he will receive, and, if he turns himself away from God by sin, is worthy of the penalty of death; sacrifices can also be offered for acknowledging these things. Hence by reason of the end, sacrifice is divided into latreutic (huldeoffer), which is specially offered for the worship of God; and eucharistic (dankoffer), for benefits received; and impetratory (smeekoffer), for benefits to be received; and propitiatory (zoenoffer), which is also specially made for placating God offended and repairing sin.

In the Old Law, by reason of form and end, there were distinguished: the holocaust, which was a latreutic sacrifice; the host for sin or for offense, which was offered more specially for sins; and the pacific host for benefits received or to be received.

696. The sacrifice of the New Law is more eminent than all others. - Sacrifice, although considered in common it is of natural law, nevertheless is not so as a particular sacrifice to be offered in such a thing or in such a mode. But by human or divine institution, in various times and among various peoples, sacrifices have been diverse. Under the law of nature they were determined from the choice of men; under the Mosaic law, by God; under the new Christian law there is only one sacrifice: the death of Christ on the cross and symbolically renewed in the Mass, which is proved in the treatise on Redemption and on the Sacrifice of the Mass.

The sacrifice of the New Law differs from the ancient sacrifices:

1. in dignity, by which it is infinitely distant from them: a) on the part of the one offering, who is the Son of God made man, and b) on the part of the thing offered, which is His body and blood;

2. in end, because it is offered at the same time for the fourfold end;

3. in efficacy: it is not only of value from the work of the men offering, but by intrinsic dignity is always acceptable to God, whom it infallibly honors; hence from the work worked it not only removes legal uncleanness, but, as far as is of itself, also infallibly obtains grace;

4. in perfection and stability, because it prefigures, announces, and prepares no other, but itself is prefigured by all others, which therefore, when it came, had to cease (C. Trid., sess. 22, c. 1).

697. The sacrifice of the New Law exists under a twofold form: as bloody on the cross and as unbloody in the Mass. - The sacrifice of the New Law is simply and substantially one, that is, by reason of the principal offerer, by reason of the thing offered, and by reason of the merits and satisfactions; modally and secundum quid, that is, by reason of the form under which the victim is offered, it is diverse (C. Trid., sess. 22, c. 1 and 2):

a) The bloody oblation of the cross (Mt. XXVI, 28; John XVII, 19), whose victim was the Son of God made flesh so that He might be substituted for men (Heb. II, 11, 17; I Tim. II, 5, 6; Rom. V; Eph. V, 2); - the form was not so much the material killing as the voluntary laying down of the soul and disposition of His own life, made in honor of God, and externally manifested in the free permission of death; - the minister was not the killers themselves, but Christ, who voluntarily admitted the death being inflicted, while He could have impeded it (John X, 17, 18); - the value (namely, the honor of God, merit, and satisfaction) was infinite. Hence there will never be a new sacrifice, meritorious and satisfactory, because Christ satisfied for the sins of all and merited for all the graces of salvation as to sufficiency (Heb. VII, 27; IX, 25-28; X, 10, 14); but as to efficacy, the application of the merits and our own cooperation are required.

b) The unbloody sacrifice of the altar, which is made both for acknowledging the supreme dominion of God, and for applying to us the merits and satisfactions of the cross, and consequently is not a blasphemy against the sacrifice of the cross nor does it derogate from it (C. Trid., sess. 22, c. 2, can. 4).

Yet they differ:

1. Christ on the cross was the sole offerer; but in the Mass the minister offers in the name of Christ as head, and of the faithful as members of the Church (C. Trid., c. 1).

2. Christ on the cross was the sole one offered; in the Mass the Church also is offered, which is represented by the victim who is its head: Christ.

3. Christ on the cross was offered in His own species, mortal, passible, bloodily; in the Mass He is offered under the species of bread and wine, immortal, impassible, and unbloodily; there real death intervened, here symbolic death intervenes.

4. The sacrifice of the cross was meritorious and satisfactory de condigno, and indeed infinitely, on account of the dignity of the one offering and of the one offered; hence it was offered once. The sacrifice of the Mass only applies the merits and satisfactions of the cross; hence it is to be offered until the consummation of the age.

5. The sacrifice of the cross was offered directly for all; the sacrifice of the Mass is offered directly only for the members of the Church.

6. The sacrifice of the cross is not significative or representative of another; the sacrifice of the Mass is representative and commemorative of the cross, just as the sacrifices of the Old Law were prefigurative of it.

698. There is an ecclesiastical precept of assisting at the unbloody sacrifice and of hearing the whole Mass on Sundays and feast days, obliging under grave obligation all the faithful of both sexes, after they have arrived at the years of discretion.

The precept was introduced by custom, which already flourished in the apostolic age, and which in the course of time gradually became obligatory, and afterward was confirmed by written law (can. 1248). This is altogether congruent 1. with natural law: sacrifice is an act of public worship, offered in the name of all, prescribed by natural law; hence it is necessary that all come together some times to render divine worship through sacrifice; 2. with divine law: there is a divine precept of offering the unbloody sacrifice of the Mass in the Church, according to the words: Do this in commemoration of Me. Therefore it is necessary that the members of the Church sometimes participate in this sacrifice by cooperation or at least by assistance. Therefore this time is conveniently determined by ecclesiastical law.

The precept is imposed from the motive of religion, of which virtue sacrifice is an act.

699. The precept obliges one to hear the sacred rite whole and entire.

1. Whole; hence the hearing is prescribed not only as to the substance or essential and integral parts of the sacrifice itself instituted by Christ, namely, the double consecration and communion, but also as to the integral parts of the whole liturgy from the beginning up to the Last Gospel, but exclusively, because formerly it was not read.

2. Entire; and therefore it does not suffice to hear parts of two Masses, whether simultaneously, as is clear from prop. 53 condemned by Innocent XI,¹ or successively, if the consecration and communion do not pertain to one and the same Mass: for from the parts of two sacrifices, for instance from the consecration of one host and the communion of another, there is not made one integral sacrifice.

¹ "He satisfies the precept of the Church concerning hearing the Sacred rite, who hears two parts, indeed four parts, at the same time from different celebrants."

If, however, the consecration and communion pertain to one and the same Mass, the hearing is more probably valid, provided the part omitted is supplied from another Mass. For on the one hand there is an integral sacrifice; on the other hand, the Church does not seem to prohibit under grave obligation that a lesser and accidental part be added from another sacrifice; yet to do this without reason is a light fault.

700. The precept obliges under grave obligation, because its matter and end are grave, namely, both that God may be honored by sacrifice insofar as the people join their affection with the celebrant, and that the memory of the passion and resurrection of Christ may be recalled. Hence not to hear an entire Mass is a mortal sin from its genus, that is, grave if a notable part is omitted, light if a modest part is omitted. Therefore:

1. An omission is notable qualitatively if a part principal in itself, pertaining to the substance of the sacrifice, is omitted:

a) If the consecration and communion are omitted at the same time.

b) If only both consecrations are omitted, because in them the essence of the sacrifice consists.

St. Alphonsus regards the contrary as probable, because he judges communion to be the more essential part, but this opinion does not seem solidly probable, for the symbolic immolation is perfected in the consecration. Hence one who arrives after the consecration, even if he cannot hear another Mass, is not bound to remain, because the essence of the sacrifice is now lacking, and the other parts are prescribed only by reason of the essence; - on the contrary, if he arrives later but before the consecration, he will be bound to remain, because he can be present for the substance of the sacrifice.

c) Likewise the omission of communion alone seems grave: for this pertains to the integrity of the sacrifice, was instituted by Christ, and without it the sacrifice is incomplete. A fortiori the omission of either consecration is grave, because both consecrations are not only of the integrity but, far more probably, also of the essence, as necessary for the representation of the bloody death of Christ and therefore for His symbolic immolation.

Some, however, deny these things, because they say that they are not essential parts, and it is not sufficiently clear whether the Church prescribes being present at these under grave obligation. But the reply is easy: the Church prescribes according to the matter, under grave obligation for grave matter, such as the other consecration is, and also communion, as being a part of great importance. Hence it seems certain to us that the omission of communion is notable and grave, at least if both communion rites are omitted; but in practice the question is of lesser importance, for one who is absent from communion also omits the prayers following, and thus certainly there is already a notable omission by reason of quantity, as will be said under 2, a.

d) Even voluntary distraction during the consecration does not impede the hearing of Mass, provided it does not totally take away all attention so that one cannot testify concerning the things done.

2. Omission can be notable quantitatively, if a great part is omitted comparatively to the whole. The third part is judged notable, which is not to be understood materially from the duration of time alone, but also from the greater or lesser dignity and proximity to the consecration, or necessity for the sacrifice. Hence:

a) The omission is judged grave of those things which precede the Gospel together with those things which follow communion; - or communion with those things which follow; - or one half of the Canon, whether from the preface to the consecration, or from the consecration to the Pater Noster; - or those things which are had from the beginning up to and including the offertory.

b) On the contrary, the omission is judged light, at least probably, of those things which precede the offertory, because they are only the Mass of the catechumens; - or of those things which are had up to the epistle together with those which follow communion; - or only the offertory; - or the Gloria and Creed, or other musical parts, even if they are prolonged for a long time, because they are not ordinary parts of the Mass. Likewise the memento of the priest is not of the substance of the Mass.

c) Per se there is no sin, with scandal, contempt, or the necessity of instruction set aside, in omitting the sermon, because it is not part of the sacrifice; likewise the Last Gospel, since the people are already dismissed before it.

One who was present for the substance of the sacrifice but omitted a great part is bound to supply it from another Mass. But one who omitted a modest part, according to many, is bound to nothing, because the precept is substantially fulfilled, nor are lighter things to be demanded so rigorously; nevertheless he sinned if he voluntarily omitted it, for example, from culpable negligence; yet others say that he is bound under venial obligation to supply, unless it is a matter of a very modest part.

701. For a valid prescribed hearing of Mass there is required moral presence of the body, for which three things are required and suffice:

1. That one, according to the estimation of men, be judged united to the celebrant: either directly, from a place not very distant, by seeing or hearing him; or indirectly, by joining himself to the crowd of those assisting or to those who are in sight of the altar, so that he can be said to be among those standing around, or part of the multitude.

2. In a place apt for fulfilling the precept, which is indicated in can. 1249: "He satisfies the law concerning hearing the sacred rite who is present at Mass, in whatever Catholic rite it is celebrated,1 under the open sky or in any church or public or semi-public oratory,2 and in private chapels of cemeteries; but not in other private oratories, unless this privilege has been granted by the Apostolic See," but only those who are comprehended in the indult, and only on the days conceded. Yet one satisfies in the private oratories of Cardinals or Bishops, because they enjoy the rights and privileges of a semi-public oratory, and also in a "decent place" of which can. 822 § 4 speaks, where for a just and reasonable cause, in some extraordinary case and by way of an act, Mass is celebrated by permission of the local Ordinary or major Superior of a religion (Com. I. C., 26 March 1952); but the priest himself satisfies everywhere by celebrating.

3. And that at least in some way by external signs, whether through sight or hearing, whether by himself or through the actions or movements of others standing by, he can discern what is being done by the celebrant, even if per accidens he hears, sees, or understands nothing, as happens among the deaf and blind.

Hence A. he is morally judged present:

a) Who is in the church, even in a place very distant from the altar, provided he can see or hear the celebrant.

b) Or who, existing there, neither sees nor hears the celebrant, but perceives something of those things which are done, by the sound of the bell or the movement of those assisting, or who stands behind a wall or column, provided he is united to one of those assisting.

c) Or who remains outside a church not containing the multitude, even with the doors of the church closed, provided he is joined to the multitude assisting outside: according to some, one who is distant from it by a space not greater than 30 paces is probably still joined to the multitude, but according to St. Alphonsus this is perhaps too much.

d) Or who is in the vestibule, sacristy, room, or another part of the church, provided through an open door he distinguishes some parts of the Mass from sound, the movement of the people, or otherwise; indeed who from a neighboring house sees the priest or the movement of the people through a window, even probably if some road intervenes, provided the distance is not great, say beyond 30 paces.

e) Or who, while it is celebrated under the open sky, stands at the altar or in proximity to the priest, or, if this is impossible, at least is joined to the multitude of those assisting, in the mode in which it was said.

B. But he would not be morally present who by means of a telescope observed Mass in a distant place, or by means of a radio heard the prayers, chants, or sound of the bell.

1. Vermeersch notes: therefore even if it is done by a schismatic, it suffices, but a sin of communication in sacred things is committed.

2. For semi-public oratories it does not follow from this that it is licit to open them to all.

702. There is also required human religious assistance, or religious presence of mind, which includes intention and attention.

A. Intention is necessary, because the Church prescribes assisting at Mass as a sacred or religious act; but assistance at Mass is in itself an indifferent action, which can be done for diverse things, for example, only for waiting for a friend, for hearing music, for curiosity, for lust, for profit, etc.; therefore, so that it may be an act not profane but sacred and religious, and also be done for the worship of God, it must be determined by the intention of worshiping God. And indeed:

1. On the part of the object: a) The intention of placing the external act, which he who waits for a friend has, does not suffice, but in addition there is required in some way the intention of worshiping God, or of offering sacrifice, or of hearing Mass as a sacred act, etc.

Hence he satisfies who, from the evil end of taking delight in the sight of a woman, nevertheless comes to hear Mass in the manner of the faithful: for although he sins against chastity, nevertheless he also intends to hear Mass; likewise he who comes from fear of a father, master, or teacher, otherwise not going to hear, provided in the church he now wills to hear; - on the contrary, if meanwhile he resists and does not wish to consent to the hearing, because then in no way does he intend the sacrifice, indeed such assistance would not be a human act.

b) The intention of satisfying the precept is not required, but it suffices to place that which is prescribed.

Hence he satisfies who is ignorant that it is a day of precept, or who does not wish to satisfy the precept by this Mass but afterward to hear another: for he who hears Mass by that very fact satisfies, since he places what is prescribed. But one who hears Mass, if it is not clear that he has intention, is presumed to have sufficient intention.

2. On the part of the subject: a) An actual intention had here and now is not required, but a virtual one suffices, by which from the influx or power of a past intention one begins or continues to assist at Mass.

b) Nor is an explicit intention required by which one says: I intend to offer sacrifice, to participate in that which the priest acts for the people, to pursue the four ends of sacrifice (which is best), but an implicit one suffices, contained in another act, which he has, for example, who in the manner of the faithful proceeds to the place in which Mass is celebrated: in this is included the intention of worshiping God or offering sacrifice.

B. Attention also is necessary, because reverence toward God requires that the one assisting apply his mind to the worship to be offered to God and do nothing which is alien from the worship of God; hence:

1. External attention is required, by which the mind is applied to avoiding external actions incompatible with the religious hearing of Mass and with internal attention.

2. More probably internal attention also is required, at least minimal, which is either to the words or actions of the priest, or to the sense of the words and actions (or to the mysteries of the sacrificial action), or to divine things and to God, who is worshiped by the sacrifice: for one who in no way, not even confusedly, attended at least to the principal parts of the Mass would not place a human act. Yet it suffices to attend to the actions of the priest in general: for the Church prescribes no prayer or meditation during Mass, but only that one assist at Mass.

3. Virtual attention suffices, namely, attention which, had at the beginning, perseveres by its power so long as it is not revoked, or there does not occur so great a wandering of mind that the force of the prior intention wholly perishes.

In practice, as long as the intention of hearing Mass is not revoked, and no act incompatible with internal attention is placed, this is judged sufficiently to remain: one must stand for the validity of the act until it is proved invalid. Nor is greater internal attention required than that which in fact is usually joined to external attention.

With the required attention the following are incompatible: sleeping, being perfectly drunk, painting, teaching, writing, reading history, profane matters, or speculative questions, attentively and fixedly considering images or reading inscriptions, talking about a serious or difficult matter, playing, doing or treating some business with great application of mind, memorizing even a sacred text, making calculations, etc.; but for these things to be a grave sin, they must be prolonged through a notable part of one Mass heard.

On the contrary, the following are compatible, insofar and if they do not necessarily remove all attention:

a) serving the sacrifice, as acolytes or the sacristan do, even if they withdraw to bring the necessary things, provided they do not withdraw from the church except for a brief time: for they also cooperate in the sacrifice;

b) likewise playing music, playing the organ or the bells, provided the actions of the priest in general at least are in some way noticed;

c) collecting alms, walking in the church, clothing oneself;

d) being lightly drunk or dozing;

e) examining conscience, reading the canonical hours or an imposed penance, or a spiritual book (unless it is done from a profane end), making the way of the cross;

f) probably: hearing confessions, celebrating sacrifice, confessing sacramentally, provided it is possible that they do not remove all attention to the priestly acts in general;

g) talking discontinuously about a light matter, or even being voluntarily distracted, provided they do not remove all attention; - yet these things are a venial sin against religion, because it is irreverence toward God to divide attention during worship between worship and alien things without reason; but if the conversations or distractions are gravely sinful, for example, if they are about a shameful thing, the irreverence is greater, but it is not proved mortal nor does it impede assistance at Mass.

703. The causes exempting from the obligation of hearing Mass are:

1. Physical or absolute impossibility, whether

a) spiritual, as among the excommunicated or interdicted by name; and among others, if there is no priest present except one to be avoided; or

b) bodily, as among the sick fixed in bed, those navigating at sea, the incarcerated (such also are children whom the father keeps shut up in punishment, and whom he can detain even on Sunday), those living in places in which Mass is not celebrated.

2. Legitimate custom of the fatherland, by reason of which women after childbirth are excused, and children and widows or nearest blood relatives on account of mourning when the father, husband, or brother has died, according to the diverse custom in diverse places, provided they do not go out for other causes; likewise in some places those who are about to marry, on account of the proclamation of the banns, but this is valid only concerning the Mass in which the proclamation is made.

3. Legitimate dispensation, granted to subjects by the Supreme Pontiff, Ordinary, pastor, or religious superior, according to the norm of can. 1245.

4. Necessity, that is, any moderately grave cause involving a notable inconvenience or damage, spiritual or bodily, one's own or another's:

a) Moral impossibility, such as: notable inconvenience of health or bodily condition, for example, a notable heaviness of the head, weariness of strength, on account of which someone prudently omits visiting friends or fears a delay in convalescence; notable damage to goods of fortune, reputation, honor, or even modesty, as can be the case in an honest pregnant girl who hides herself at home for that reason, and in the poor who lack decent clothing according to their state, unless they could hear Mass in another place or very early without infamy; grave offense of parents; an occasion of relatively great and extraordinary profit; confession of a mortal sin which otherwise could not easily be made; great distance, unless a carriage or another means is had without great expenses: a distance is judged great at 1 1/4 leagues, and a lesser distance according to the qualities of the person, such as age or infirmity, the conditions of the air and roads and the inclemency of the weather, yet in such a way that habitual omission is excused with more difficulty.

b) Office, by which stationed soldiers are excused; guardians of infants, towns, or flocks when they are necessary and others are lacking; servants and workers who must labor: all of whom, if they were often compelled, would be bound, if they could without great inconvenience, to seek another master.

c) Another's necessity, or charity, excuses those who assist the sick, while these need their help or bear their departure with difficulty, so that they cannot withdraw without danger or great annoyance of the sick person; those who bring help in case of fire or flood; those who have hope that by their presence they may impede grave quarrels, thefts, shameful acts, or who thus avoid the mortal sin of some determinate person, for example, a wife the great indignation of her husband (unless she would yield in contempt of religion), a girl the shameful desire in such a young man.

704. Observations. - 1. He who is legitimately excused from hearing the sacred rite is not bound to supply by saying other prayers or by hearing the sacred rite during the week, because the ecclesiastical precept ceases to oblige. But if the cause is perpetual, by force of the natural and divine precept obliging to sacrifice, he is bound sometimes to alternate with another (for example, spouses change turns), and if he cannot even do this, he ought sometimes (three or four times in a year) to assist during the week; - otherwise, besides, there would be danger that little by little he would abstain from every religious practice.

2. Every precept in some way obliges one to employ the means so that it can be observed, and to avoid the impediments which stand in the way of its being fulfilled. Hence:

a) directly to place an impediment, whether proximate or remote, is illicit, namely, for the end that the precept cannot be satisfied;

b) indirectly, that is, for another end, yet with the foresight that Mass cannot be heard, it is illicit to place a proximate impediment, that is, while the time of obligation is present or is now morally close, for example, to begin a journey on a feast day or on the preceding day in the evening; unless there is a proportionate cause, namely, a grave inconvenience, as if otherwise the occasion of a convenient journey or useful assembly would be omitted;

c) indirectly to place a remote impediment is not prohibited, for example, to begin a journey on Friday or Saturday morning: for it would be a grave inconvenience also to be obliged to avoid remote impediments.

3. With regard to means: a) no one is bound to employ extraordinary means, for example, a sick person for recovering health, or even to use the privilege of a private oratory (although he could conveniently do so), in order to be able to fulfill the precept; - b) to neglect ordinary means for the end that the precept cannot be fulfilled is a sin; - c) to do this for another end is not a sin unless it is done when the precept is already pressing.