Question One: On the Formal Object

S. Th. II-II, q. 23, aa. 4 and 5; q. 25, a. 1; I, q. 60, a. 5; I-II, q. 65, a. 5; de Virt., q. 2, aa. 2 and 4.

874. Thesis. The formal or proximate motive object of charity toward God is the absolute goodness of God in himself, lovable on account of himself, insofar as it is the object of supernatural beatitude.

It is the goodness of God in himself. For:

1. Right love toward God has as motive the goodness of God considered either in himself, or relatively to us. But the love of charity does not have as motive the goodness of God relative to us. Therefore. - The minor is proved: It is true friendship with God. But the dilection of friendship loves the friend on account of the goodness of the friend himself, not so that from him a good may come to us; whence Jn. XV, 13 says: dilection lays down its life for a friend. Therefore.

2. Just as in the state of pure nature we would habitually tend to the natural ultimate end as a good in itself, to be loved above all things,¹ so in the supernatural order it is necessary that through a supernatural virtue we habitually tend to the supernatural ultimate end as a good in itself to be loved above all things. But we do not do this through faith, which tends into God under the aspect of the true; nor through hope, by which we tend to God according as he is our supreme good: for this does not tend to him as the supreme good in himself, nor does it make us love God above ourselves. Therefore through charity we tend to God the supernatural end as a good in himself.

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, I, q. 60, a. 5; and III Sent., d. 29, a. 3.

875. The formal object of charity is called the goodness of God in himself, as the object of beatitude, that is, as the supernatural end. This does not signify the goodness of God insofar as he renders us blessed, for this is no longer the goodness of God in himself but the goodness of God relative to us; but the sense is that the goodness of God which, and insofar as, communicates itself in the beatific vision and is the ultimate supernatural end of all, and can be known only by the light of supernatural faith, is in itself and above all things lovable, and thus is the motive of charity.

For the goodness of God in himself can be considered in three ways: either by abstracting from the fact that it communicates itself, - or insofar as it communicates itself improperly through a certain shadowing of itself in the production of natural things, and according to the exigency of nature could be the end and object of natural beatitude, - or insofar as it communicates itself most properly through the beatific vision and grace making one pleasing. In the first two modes it is only the motive of natural love and benevolence, which would also exist in the state of pure nature; considered in the third mode, it is the motive of supernatural love and friendship. For a) if the goodness of God did not communicate itself according to a mode exceeding all exigencies of nature, it would never be the motive of supernatural love; and b) if the goodness and life proper to God did not become common to us, they would never be the foundation of friendship (cf. condemned propositions of Baius 34, 36, 38).

876. Opinions not to be approved. - 1. A few moderns understood the goodness of God to be the formal motive of charity in such a way that God is our highest good and the one beatifying us, also saying that love of concupiscence is the love of charity. This assertion was made not only without any foundation, but also falsely, for it is against the nature and perfection of true friendship; nor does it seem possible to reconcile it with the doctrine concerning the preeminence of charity above hope. And not only does it directly contradict St. Thomas, as is manifest from the exposition of the doctrine made,² but also before the end of the eighteenth century it seems to have been unknown.

² Especially there can be seen Q. D. de Virt. 4, a. 3, ad 9; II-II, q. 17, aa. 6 and 8; q. 23, a. 5, ad 2; q. 26, a. 3, ad 3; q. 28, a. 1, ad 3; III Sent., d. 29, a. 3, ad 2.

2. Several others undeservedly contend that the motive of charity is nature alone, or some divine perfection abstracted from the rest, insofar as it is lovable in itself.

For although God can thus be loved with a certain love of benevolence, the motive of charity is goodness in itself insofar as it communicates itself; but God in himself is infinitely good with all perfections and communicates himself just as he is in himself, and therefore communicates to us all his perfections to be seen and possessed.

Moreover, the motive of charity is the ultimate end, namely, the highest goodness in itself, supremely lovable, than which a greater cannot be thought, and, when it is possessed, nothing remains to be desired, because it perfectly beatifies and fully satisfies the whole appetite of man. But these things are not verified concerning one or another perfection which virtually contains the others, but only concerning the good which is also formally conceived as the sum of all perfections, at least confusedly. Therefore the adequate motive of charity is the highest infinite goodness of God insofar as it contains all perfections.

877. The formal object of charity toward neighbor is the same goodness of God in himself, as the object of supernatural beatitude, insofar, namely, as it is communicated or communicable to us.

For we can love neighbor on account of the goodness of God in himself, to which he has relation:

a) insofar as he is a thing of God and is destined for his glory: a means on account of the end;

b) insofar as divine goodness is supernaturally participated by him, shines forth in him, and renders him lovable, or at least neighbor is destined to this: the participant to the participated; the image to the truth, exemplar, prototype;

c) insofar as he is loved by God, and at least by destination is a friend of God: the loved to the lover.

To love neighbor with the love of charity is to will supernatural good to him, especially that he may adhere to God as to the ultimate end, and thus in eternity love and praise God; but the motive why we will this is because God in himself, infinitely good and perfect, deserves to be loved, praised, and glorified eternally by all who can do that (cf. I Jn. III, 14 sq.; IV, 12, 21; V, 1, 2).

Thus the ultimate and formal reason for loving neighbor is the uncreated goodness itself of God, lovable on account of itself.

878. How by divine charity we love ourselves. - In the same way it is explained how we love ourselves on account of God. This nevertheless can seem difficult or even impossible, namely, that we love God because he is good in himself: for we do not love except that which is good to us; but to love someone because he is good to us is not to love ourselves on account of him, but on the contrary to love him on account of ourselves. This is clear from the fact that in all acts we naturally and necessarily pursue our happiness.

Resp.: It is true that the condition required in order that we love something is that it be our good, whence also first we naturally love God with the love of concupiscence because he is good to us; nevertheless the principal and proximate motive of love is not always that something is our good, but can be that it is good in itself; and therefore after we have loved God on account of ourselves, as our good, we also consider him as good in himself and love him principally on account of himself, and we refer ourselves to God and will ourselves to God, as God's good.

In other words: the pre-required condition sine qua non is that the act of love of such an object, and therefore the object itself, be our good and befit us (thus it is within the sphere of the will); but this universal reason of love is not the special reason of perfect love: it is not its proximate motive, nor is it that which the will desires. For thus someone does not love the good because it is his own, but because it is good.

This certainly does not signify that in that act we do not seek happiness: for in every act we naturally seek it; but it signifies that we will ourselves to God and refer our happiness to God's happiness, and voluntarily constitute it in that. Therefore charity does not tend so much into God as the good of the lover, but rather as the good of the beloved.

879. Corollaries. - From the aforesaid it follows:

1. Although benefits received or to be received from God are remote motives which induce and impel us to charity, insofar as a) they show that God in himself is perfect and lovable of himself (Eph. V, 2), and insofar as b) they move us to loving the benefactor himself in himself, in which case gratitude disposes to the love of charity; nevertheless to will good to God solely and precisely on account of benefits is not an act of charity, but of gratitude, which pertains to the virtue of religion. Therefore if benefits are considered as goods conferred upon us and we rest there, it is an act of gratitude; if they are considered as communications of divine goodness, it can be an act of charity, if in them we do not love our utility, because we have received them, but the goodness of God which communicates itself, insofar as it is lovable on account of itself.

2. Charity, and the love of concupiscence by which we love God as our good, do not exclude one another; indeed this love is necessarily presupposed to charity, and remotely disposes and moves to it as an impulsive cause (as was said in the preceding corollary) and strengthens it, insofar as goods received or to be received from God show that he is good in himself.³ - Hence love of concupiscence can be elicited by charity itself provided it is subordinated to it, and God is loved principally, while our good is desired secondarily, insofar as we desire to possess God and to be blessed so that through possession we may better love and praise the goodness of God.

³ Concerning these things Sylvius teaches wisely, in II-II, q. 27, a. 3: "Several things must be observed. First. It is not permitted to love God or to do other good works with regard to reward as the end, if the reward is understood as the end of the thing loved, that is, of God; because God cannot be ordered to anything else as to an end. For since the end is loved more than those things which are for the end, it would follow that it is permitted to love something more than God.

3. To love neighbor solely because God commanded it is not an act of charity but of obedience.

4. To love neighbor on account of benefits received from him, or on account of excellent natural qualities, or on account of the natural image of God impressed in him, is not charity but natural love. The same must be said if he is loved on account of his supernatural perfections of grace and charity, not indeed precisely as they are a participation of divine goodness (for thus they are loved by charity, as was said in n. 877), but insofar as they are proper to neighbor, without considering the relation which they have to God.

5. No one from charity can love neighbor without virtually and implicitly loving God, because to love neighbor is to will that he love God eternally; and conversely he cannot love God without virtually and implicitly loving neighbor, because to love God is also to will that he be eternally loved and praised by neighbor. Cf. I Jn. IV, 12, 21; V, 1, 2.

6. The act of charity is an act supernatural as to substance, and truly divine, because as material and formal object it has God himself in himself: for it loves God himself on account of his own proper goodness, by which he surpasses all creatures and the whole of nature, namely, in the same mode by which we will love God in heaven where we will be perfectly participants in his life, and in a mode similar to that by which God loves himself.

"Second. It is altogether permitted to love God on account of the reward of eternal life as the end of our dilection; because eternal life is the reward and end of good works constituted by God, according to that saying Mt. XIX: if you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments; and I Pet. I: receiving the end of your faith, the salvation of souls...

"Third. It is not permitted so to love God on account of reward that eternal life either be constituted the altogether ultimate end of our dilection, or that on account of it we love God in such a way that otherwise we would not love him,... because since God is supremely good, and supremely lovable on account of himself, we ought to love him on account of himself, even supposing that no advantage would come to us from his dilection. Therefore God is to be loved on account of eternal reward in such a way that we indeed exercise both dilection and other good works on account of beatitude as the end of those works, but further order that beatitude of ours into God, as into the simply ultimate end... In this manner we will have regard to God principally and on account of himself, but to eternal reward secondarily, and on account of God and the glory of God.

"Fourth. If by the name of reward some temporal thing is understood, it is not permitted to love or worship God with regard to reward as an end properly so called; nevertheless it is permitted with regard to it as some good either accompanying the principal end or conducing to it, which therefore moves the one acting as some secondary or accessory end..."

After these things have been noted beforehand, he responds to the question itself: "charity is principally a love of benevolence; nevertheless nothing prevents it from secondarily including some love of concupiscence: for true friendship does not exclude regard to some good to be obtained from a friend, provided the friend is loved first and principally on account of himself, and that good is expected secondarily...

"If it is asked whether this is of imperfection? it must be said that indeed it is of imperfection to need such incitement, just as it is of perfection not to need it... Nevertheless to the perfection of dilection (or justice) it simply detracts nothing, in loving (or worshiping) God, to have regard to eternal reward and to love with regard to it...

"But although the principal act of some virtue is worthier than the secondary, nevertheless it is not necessary that the principal alone be worthier than the principal and secondary together."

Cf. St. Thomas entirely, in III Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 4.