Question Six: On Modesty of External Equipment

S. Th. II-II, q. 169.

1063. Modesty of external equipment is the virtue which applies the moderation of reason in the equipment of external things, for example, clothes, furniture, horse, carriage, banquets, etc., with attention to the state and condition of persons, of place, time, custom, etc. For although in exterior things themselves there cannot be virtue or vice, nevertheless there can be in the man who uses them well or badly. But he can use them badly in two ways: in one way by comparison with the custom of men of the same condition with whom someone lives; in another way from the inordinate affection of the user, whether he observes custom or does not observe it.

Exterior equipment, namely, is ordered 1. to the protection of the body against injury of the air (necessity on the part of the body); 2. to covering the shameful parts of nature (necessity on the part of the soul); 3. to preserving the decorum of one's state according to the custom of the country (fittingness of honorableness and honor); 4. to fostering and raising up beauty (fittingness of beauty): for it is fitting and conformable to reason that man proceed honorably in political life, so that he may adorn his state fittingly.

1064. To this virtue by defect is opposed neglect of external equipment (slordigheid): a) if from negligence man does not apply care or labor to this, that he use exterior equipment as is fitting, for example, if from sloth he drags a garment along the ground, or thus provides tedium or scandal to others, which is more indecorous among those who, by force of function or office, ought to enjoy the good esteem of others; b) if he orders defect of exterior equipment to glory, which pertains to hypocrisy. Hence to use more vile things on account of boasting or pride is a sin, but not on account of mortification of the flesh or humility of spirit, for example, if someone exhorts others to penance.

1065. By excess is opposed luxury (weelde; prachtliefde) above one's state, namely beyond condition and received custom: a) if someone from superfluous adornment of clothing seeks an evil end, for example, human glory; b) if in these things he seeks delights, according as clothing is ordered to the protection of the body; c) if he applies excessive solicitude, care, or time to his equipment, whether by seeking, preserving, or arranging it, as happens to not a few women and to certain effeminate young men. But it would not be excess to wear extraordinary or costly garments, not indeed for glory but for signifying the excellence of ministry.

Hence three parts or species of the opposite virtue can be distinguished: 1. as to quantity in use, humility in clothing, which excludes intention of glory: it is a habit not superabounding in expenses and preparations; 2. as to instruments and helps which we need, per se sufficiency (zuinigheid), which excludes intention of delights: it is a habit content with the things with which one ought to be content; 3. as to the mode of seeking, simplicity (eenvoudigheid), which excludes superfluous solicitude for these things: it is a habit content with the things which occur.

1066. On worldly adornment. - Specially, excess can be given and modesty must be regarded in adornment, which theologians are accustomed to consider in women, to whom it more pertains to adorn themselves; nevertheless the same principles, with the same conditions granted, are to be applied to men. Now the adornment of women, even for fostering and raising up beauty, per se is an indifferent thing, and therefore good if it is done according to right reason; hence excess per se is only a venial sin, yet it can be mortal both by reason of intention or of an evil end mortally evil, and by reason of danger or grave scandal. To estimate this, three principles must be regarded:

1. Adornment is licit or illicit, venially or mortally evil, according to a diverse end: if it is done for an honorable end and according to the custom of the country, it is good, for example, so that a woman may please her husband or find a spouse; if it is done on account of levity alone, vanity, or displaying beauty, it is venial; if for provoking concupiscence and impure love, mortal.

2. For estimating danger or scandal, the custom of the country has much force; hence those things which in such a region provoke scandal and strongly incite to lust can elsewhere be excused from sin or from grave sin: for accustomed things entice less; yet to introduce immoderate adornment is not licit, because that is not done without the scandal of many.

3. A certain fiction in adornment is licit for concealing ugliness or covering a defect, arising from some cause, for example, sickness; but not for simulating a quality or beauty not possessed (which nevertheless is not mortal unless it is done on account of lasciviousness or in contempt of God): except if there were already a general custom of applying fictitious adornment, because then it would deceive no one.

Hence St. Thomas, a. 2, ad 1: "Sober and moderate adornment is not prohibited to women, but superfluous (by reason of mode), and shameless (by reason of scandal), and immodest (by reason of the end)."

1067. Practical applications. - With these things presupposed, we say:

A. Women sin mortally: a) if they adorn themselves with the mind of provoking to lust; b) if they use clothing so thin and fine that the dishonorable parts are not sufficiently covered; c) if they have the breast immoderately bared so that the middle parts of the breasts or almost the whole breasts are uncovered, or covered only with a transparent veil; which holds for cultivated regions, not for barbarous peoples among whom such is the custom; d) if they have the breast not altogether immoderately bared and display only the upper part of the breasts, but apart from the custom of the country, or introduce such a custom: for extraordinary and unaccustomed things move more. Which custom is not praiseworthy, and therefore is rather to be extirpated.

B. On the contrary, they sin only venially: a) if from levity, vanity, or boasting they adorn themselves according to the custom of the country; b) if the adornment is apart from the condition of their state; c) if without sufficient reason they bear the breast not altogether immoderately bared according to the custom of the country (for accustomed things entice less); and also if, apart from this custom, they have the breast moderately bared or the arms bared, or garments so made that the form of the breast entirely appears, or introduce such a custom: yet such a custom is not praiseworthy; d) if in adornment there is fiction or simulation properly so called, for example of beauty, as if without an excusing reason, at least of legitimate recreation, a woman uses masculine clothing, puts on masks and costumes, smears the face with rouge and pigments, uses another's hair in order to lie about her own, wears false breasts, etc., unless these things have been introduced by general custom; e) if they invent or make new and curious ornaments (modes ridicules) or introduce them.

C. There is no sin: a) if right intention, legitimate custom of the country, and condition of state are observed: hence, in many regions, to go forth today with hair unveiled is no sin; yet this custom is not praiseworthy (1 Cor. 11:6); b) if a woman adorns herself so that she may please a man, a married woman for pleasing her husband (with him commanding, or lest he turn aside to other women), or an unmarried woman for obtaining a husband; yet if she does not wish to have a husband, she should also leave behind superfluous adornment; c) if there is only dissimulation and someone uses an ornament for covering or concealing a defect, for example, another's hair for covering baldness, a false breast if the other has been cut off, rouge for concealing ugliness arising from a defect.

1068. Remark. - Let it be noted that there is no obligation of putting away decorous adornment according to the custom of the country, even if certain determined persons would be enticed from it to concupiscence; because this would be too burdensome. But if it is apart from the custom of the country, or if it is immodest, yet not altogether dishonorable, such an obligation is present for avoiding the scandal of a determined person at least on some occasions, according to the principles explained in the treatise on charity, I, n. 966.

We put an end to the complete exposition of all the cardinal virtues with their annexed virtues, according to the natural order of their respective perfection: namely prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. For in the order of generation one must proceed in an inverse way in the exercise of these virtues, namely by making a step from the less perfect to the perfect. For first the passions must be restrained, and the order of reason must be established in the concupiscible appetite, consequently in the irascible appetite, finally in the operations of the will toward another; and only when all these things have been placed will prudence be perfect.

By the moral virtues man becomes perfectly apt and disposed for leading the moral and Christian life excellently, whether active or contemplative. For the exercise of the moral virtues constitutes the essence of the active life; but they dispose toward the contemplative life, which especially consists in the exercise of the theological virtues and of the gifts of understanding, knowledge, and wisdom under the influence of the Holy Spirit.

"The active and contemplative life," says St. Thomas, "are distinguished according to the diverse pursuits of men tending to diverse ends; of which one is the consideration of truth, which is the end of the contemplative life, but the other is exterior operation, to which the active life is ordered. But it is manifest that in the moral virtues contemplation of truth is not principally sought, but they are ordered to working... Hence it is manifest that the moral virtues pertain essentially to the active life" (q. 181, a. 1). "But dispositively the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life. For the act of contemplation, in which the contemplative life essentially consists, is impeded both by the vehemence of passions... and by exterior tumults. But the moral virtues impede the vehemence of passions and quiet the tumults of exterior occupations. And therefore the moral virtues pertain dispositively to the contemplative life" (q. 180, a. 2).

Thus man is well instructed for the perfect life, active and contemplative. But concerning this it is now customary to speak in ascetical and mystical theology; but concerning the states of the life of perfection, of bishops, clerics, and religious, and their obligations, in canon law.