Question Three: On the Cause of Infused Habits and Virtues

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 62, a. 3; q. 63, a. 2; q. 65, a. 3; q. 114, a. 4 and 8; II-II, q. 24, a. 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12; De Virt., q. 1, a. 11; q. 2, a. 12-13.

638. Thesis I. Infused virtues are infused by God together with sanctifying grace. - This is established from the documents of the Church adduced above (n. 624, 3), and is easily understood, because they are powers derived from sanctifying grace. For he who is elevated to divine being and nature and life through grace must also acquire virtues for divine operations, for every nature tends to operation and life imports activity. Whence from grace supernatural virtues flow into the powers of the soul for divine operations.

Therefore those are not to be heard who say that faith and hope are infused into him who, from actual grace, exercises an act of faith or hope, although he does not receive grace and charity. For:

1. he who does not sufficiently dispose himself to receiving supernatural being, by which he participates in the divine nature, is not sufficiently disposed to supernatural virtue, by which he participates in divine operation;

2. furthermore, since the works of God are perfect, He never infuses faith and hope without charity.¹

¹ This is the obvious sense of the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 6: "They are disposed... while, conceiving faith..., believing..., they are raised up into hope..."; and c. 7: "Justification follows this disposition... and then at the same time he receives infused... faith, hope, and charity." Therefore an act of faith and hope can be had before justification and before the infusion of faith and hope.

639. Thesis II. Our acts do not produce infused virtues. - It is proved:

A. Our natural acts 1. do not cause a supernatural habit or virtue, because the effect cannot surpass the cause; 2. nor do they dispose to it, because they are not proportioned to it.

B. Acts done from supernatural grace:

1. Do not effect supernatural virtue, because a) an operative power toward several acts, such as supernatural virtue is, in its entity (as principle) is more perfect than one of its acts, whence it cannot be caused by that act; - nor b) by several acts, for they do not do this unless each one causes something; but the first act cannot produce a disposition to several acts. - Besides c) those acts, although they can be elicited by the help of actual grace, require that they be elicited by a faculty and habit; but nothing produces that which is its connatural cause.

2. Nor do they produce increase, because an operative power cannot produce a greater power.

3. Nevertheless those acts can a) dispose to the infusion of virtues, which an act of charity does proximately; and b) they can merit their increase, insofar as they are done from charity. But God alone effects their production and increase, though He can use others for this as instruments, such as Christ and the sacraments; whence these virtues are called infused per se (q. 63, a. 1; a. 2, ad 3; a. 3, ad 3; q. 51, a. 2, ad 3).

640. What about the increase of infused habits? - Habits infused per se and virtues are not increased extensively, because they give the power for all corresponding supernatural acts which can be done, or the power of acting supernaturally for all circumstances. But they are increased intensively, not by addition but by greater rootedness and participation in the subject, and indeed by the same causes by which they are produced. Therefore God alone is the efficient cause of this increase; but the sacraments produce it instrumentally (ex opere operato), and our supernatural acts done from charity, even the least (Mk. IX, 40), can be dispositions and merit for increase (ex opere operantis), as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. 6, c. 10 and 16, can. 24 and 32. Whence they are increased together with grace and charity; and therefore the Church prays: Give us, O Lord, an increase of faith, hope, and charity (cf. Prov. IV, 18).

Concerning the time at which the increase of charity and infused virtues is given on account of our good works, there are chiefly two opinions among theologians. Certain ones, considering an act done from charity only as the sole moral and meritorious cause of increase, say that it is conferred immediately when the act is posited, whether this act is intense or is not; whence they also say that a sinner, because all his works revive, always rises again in charity greater than that which he had before. They certainly admit this, although it seems incredible; but on the other hand, they deny that all the good acts of the just are done from the influence of charity and are meritorious. Thus, after the Nominalists, Vasquez, Suarez, De Lugo, Mazzella, and the greater part of more recent authors. - Others, holding our acts not only as moral and meritorious causes, but also as dispositive causes, say that every act done from charity merits increase, but not in a determinate grade, except under the condition that the due disposition for the said increase be present;² but this is only an act more intense than the charity had, or equally intense, because by such an act alone does man strive toward increasing charity: for God established that He would cause the increase of charity when our power would cause it, if it could. But less intense acts do not sufficiently and immediately dispose to increase, but only mediately, "insofar as from one act of charity man is rendered more prompt again to acting according to charity, and, as aptitude increases, he breaks forth into an act of more fervent love by which he strives toward the progress of charity, and then charity is increased,"³ not only (from one title) on account of that act, but (from several titles) also on account of all the preceding acts. Whence all works revive in an equal grade of charity, provided that the disposition to that grade is present; but if the disposition is lesser, they revive in an inferior grade; if greater, in a superior grade.⁴ Thus St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Cajetan, and almost all the older authors; and among more recent authors, the Thomists.

² St. Thomas, q. 114, a. 8, ad 3.

³ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 24, a. 6. - Every remiss act per se disposes, although insufficiently, to increase, because it disposes to an intense act; per accidens it disposes to diminution, insofar as it easily gives place to contrary causes.

⁴ III, q. 89, a. 2.

The chief argument of the former opinion is that the merit of good works cannot be understood unless to each work there is given a special reward, that is, a special grade of grace, charity, and glory; otherwise we would not merit more by many works than by one,⁵ nor would all the merits of good works revive totally. - The chief argument of the second opinion is: Virtue is increased by the same causes by which it is generated; therefore, just as for the infusion of charity and of infused virtues there is required a disposition proportioned to the quantity of charity to be infused (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7), so also for increase there is required a disposition proportioned to the increase. And indeed:

⁵ The argument is not compelling. For a reward is not a gift according to itself, but a gift formally as given on account of works. Therefore if it is given on account of two works, or on account of a greater one, the reward is greater. It is morally more: for it is a great perfection to have eternal life as a crown for works, and greater in proportion as it is conferred by more titles of works. Therefore the reward is greater if the same thing is given by more titles, and from this also accidental joy increases. Thus for Christ, for whom there was an innate right to the glory of the body, He willed to merit this same glory by many titles of sufferings and sorrows and of His death. - Besides, in the natural order it would certainly be so, since acquired virtue would not be increased by one but only by several repeated good works; therefore what would be in the natural order is not repugnant in the supernatural order.

a) qualities which admit more and less exist in a greater or lesser grade according to the diverse disposition of the subject. But just as less intense acts of acquired virtue do not immediately dispose to its increase, but an act equally intense disposes to this and a more intense act produces this; so also a less intense act of infused virtue or charity does not immediately dispose to its increase, but only a more intense or equally intense act does this;

b) otherwise we would have more power for disposing ourselves as to the increase of infused virtue than of acquired virtue; - and

c) we would be converted to God our end, and would tend to Him and have friendship with Him, more than we would will or strive to do.

Therefore, in order that charity and infused virtue be increased, a more intense or equally intense act is required. - There is added that it is very probable that all works of the just are meritorious, and yet it is incredible that charity is increased in each almost without interruption, nor could anyone assert this with any probability.

641. Observation. - It can be added with probability (after Gonet, Billuart, and Masi), although it is not necessary, that the increase of charity and infused virtue which in this life was merited by less intense works, but on account of the absence of a proportioned disposition was not obtained, is conferred upon us in the first moment after death, when the soul with the whole intensity of its charity tends into an act of love of God. This act is not meritorious, because the separated soul is not in the state of wayfaring, but it would be a disposition for obtaining the increase which by the prior merit of this life is due.

642. Infused virtues can be lost and per se are lost by sins directly contrary to them. Hence divine faith is lost only by infidelity, hope by despair and presumption against hope, moral virtues by a grave sin contrary to them,⁶ for example, justice by grave injustice, charity by every mortal sin.

⁶ St. Thomas, in II Sent., d. 42, a. 2, ad 4.

Per accidens a virtue is lost when another virtue is lost which is presupposed to it and on which it depends as on a foundation. Thus hope is lost by infidelity, and infused moral virtues are lost when charity is lost, with which they are connected.

Faith and hope are not lost when charity has been lost, because they are presupposed to it; namely, God from goodness conserves them in those who cast away the supernatural life of grace, as relics by which they may be converted more easily.

643. Infused virtues cannot be diminished. - Charity and the other infused virtues cannot be diminished directly and in themselves, for mortal sin, which is contrary to them, totally takes them away; venial sin, because it is not contrary to charity and infused virtues but is outside them, cannot diminish them. Hence venial sins, or non-use of infused virtues, do not even per accidens effect their diminution, but only dispose to their corruption, and this disposition to corruption can be called indirect diminution and diminution improperly so called.

644. Corollary. - The gifts of the Holy Spirit, connected with charity, are infused together with it, are increased intensively, and are lost in the same way as infused moral virtues.