Question Three: On the Practical Formation of a Certain Conscience

105. Process to be followed in the formation of one's own certain conscience. - In order that man may act prudently and safely from a sufficiently certain conscience, he must follow the following process in forming his own conscience, namely:

1. to judge, or to be conscious, that he is practically certain concerning the honesty of the action here and now to be placed;

2. when he practically doubts, he must examine diligently according to the gravity of the matter and of the doubt and of the other conditions;

3. if, sufficient diligence having been employed, the reasons for doubting appear slight and the doubt is negative, by despising it he can lay it aside according to the principle: The condition of the possessor is better, and act freely if the doubt was concerning the existence of an obligation; on the contrary, he must follow the law if the doubt was concerning excuse from the law;

4. if the doubt appears serious, founded on grave reasons, he must, by attentively comparing the reasons and opposite opinions, by his own investigation if he can, or at least from consultation with the more learned, arrive at direct certitude - for which a most probable opinion, or one much and notably more probable, suffices;

5. if he cannot here and now arrive at direct certitude, that is:

a) either because he is unwilling to examine, or because from defect of means or time he cannot, and then he is held to act more safely, in order to remove the danger of sinning;

b) or the matter carefully examined is truly uncertain, and indeed so that the doubt concerns the validity of an act, because there is question of an end absolutely to be obtained or of harm absolutely to be avoided, for which the action must certainly be valid and perhaps does not suffice; and then from a certain higher law one must also act more safely;

c) or the matter carefully examined is truly uncertain so that the doubt concerns mere honesty, and then he can act freely and apply the principle: "An uncertain law does not oblige": always according to the Probabilists; according to the Equiprobabilists with the restriction: unless the obligation appears certainly more probable or it is not more probable that it has ceased; according to the Probabiliorists: if liberty is more probable.

106. Case. - That the practice of the doctrine may be better understood, let us apply it to the following case: Peter, ignorant of the moral system concerning the formation of conscience, approaches Timothy the confessor, and manifests a threefold doubt:

a) whether he made a vow;

b) whether a vow certainly made perhaps is invalid;

c) whether he has paid a debt certainly contracted.

How can these doubts be resolved?

From the principles explained, the proposed doubts are easily resolved. Timothy is indeed held to institute a diligent examination concerning Peter's doubts, in order to arrive at direct certitude, if this is possible (n. 76); but how he will form Peter's conscience as indirectly certain, if after diligent examination the doubts persist, is what must be investigated in the present place.

a) One doubting whether he made a vow is not held to fulfill it. For if the doubt is negative, i.e., if there is no reason or only a slight reason for thinking that the vow was made, the principle can be applied: The condition of the possessor is better, i.e., of liberty, which before the doubt arose was certain. Therefore in doubt the fact (i.e., the vow) is not presumed but must be proved, and in a doubt of a fact founding an obligation, liberty remains (n. 86). But if the doubt is positive, i.e., if there is a grave but uncertain reason for thinking that the vow was made, the principle can be applied: A doubtful obligation is practically none (n. 92). Therefore Peter is held to nothing.

b) One doubting whether a vow certainly made perhaps is invalid, if the doubt is negative, i.e., if there is no reason or only a slight reason for thinking that the vow is invalid, is held to fulfill the vow, because the condition of the possessor is better, i.e., of the vow or obligation which before the doubt arose was certain, since the vow was certainly made. A slight reason does not impede practical certitude; whence one must stand for the value of the act, and the fact (namely, the vow) is presumed to have been rightly done (n. 86). But if the doubt is positive, i.e., if there is a grave reason for thinking that the vow was not valid, he is not held to fulfill it; for a grave reason renders the validity of the vow and the obligation truly doubtful, whence the principle can be applied: A doubtful obligation is no obligation (n. 92). Therefore in a negative doubt Peter is held to the fulfillment of the vow; in a positive doubt he is not held.

c) One doubting whether he has paid a debt certainly contracted:

1. If the doubt is negative, i.e., if there is no reason or only a slight reason for thinking that the debt was paid, he is held to pay it, because the condition of the possessor is better, i.e., of the debt or obligation which before the doubt arose was certain, since the debt was certainly contracted. For a slight reason does not impede practical certitude; whence the fact (i.e., payment) is not presumed but must be proved, and in a doubt of a fact supposing an obligation and exempting from it, the obligation remains (n. 86).

2. But if the doubt concerning the fulfillment of the obligation is positive, i.e., if there is a grave reason for thinking that it has been fulfilled, according to St. Alphonsus and the Equiprobabilists the one doubting is still held to fulfill, because a certain obligation is not satisfied by a doubtful payment. Yet this does not seem founded, because in the case the obligation itself now becomes truly uncertain, whence satisfaction need not be made to it (n. 93). Therefore it would be better to say that, in a case of positively doubtful fulfillment, generally he is not held: for a grave reason renders the obligation truly doubtful, whence this can be applied: An uncertain obligation is practically none - unless nevertheless some higher law were present which would nevertheless urge the fulfillment of the obligation. But since there is question of the payment of a debt, i.e., of a matter of justice, and justice sometimes obliges in doubts to choose what is safer (n. 91), it must be inquired whether it does not require the payment of a debt which was not certainly paid.

3. Several affirm this, invoking the principle: The condition of the possessor is better, which properly regards the matter of justice: namely, the debt certainly contracted possesses, until it has certainly been paid. - But that principle cannot be invoked in the case; for by the very fact that there is a grave reason for thinking that the debt was paid, it is now doubtful whether the debt still exists, and consequently whether it possesses force of obliging and obliges, and whether the creditor possesses a right to payment. Therefore the possession itself of the right becomes doubtful. But if speech is made of possession of fact, no one ought to be deprived of his own good, and consequently he can retain it until it is certainly proved not to be his.

4. They also invoke the principle: It is the duty of the debtor to attend and watch that he certainly pay the debt, whence the doubt that has arisen must be imputed to his negligence, from which the creditor ought not to suffer harm.¹ This principle is valid, but only in the case of culpable negligence; this case in practice will rather be rare. The reason of the principle is that justice strictly obliges that our action or omission not be, for another, the cause of even probable or doubtful harm (n. 91); but from the negligence of the debtor the creditor will perhaps lose the payment of the debt, or will be exposed to this danger or to uncertainty of payment: this uncertainty or danger is already harm. Whence if someone foresees that this will arise from his negligence, he sins and is held to make restitution, not indeed because a doubtful debt obliges, but because he has brought about certain harm by exposing the creditor to the danger of uncertain payment; and therefore he is not held to pay the whole debt, but only according to the ratio of doubt and uncertainty.²

¹ Thus also St. Alphonsus, Th. M., book I, n. 34 and book III, n. 700, q. 2, and Suarez, Vasquez, Sanchez, Lacroix, etc.

² Several add that the debtor is held to pay the entire debt if he is notably negligent in paying debts, because there is a presumption that the debt was not paid. This indeed is true; but in the case there will be no serious and grave reason for supposing that the debt was paid, and the doubt will now become negative.

5. Others say that equality in strict justice must be preserved as far as can be done, whence they judge that an obligation is present of paying according to the ratio of doubt, just as also a judge decrees that uncertain goods are to be divided.³ This principle also is true, provided that it is certainly established that an obligation of justice is present: then satisfaction is not made by doubtful fulfillment, because it is only doubtfully equal to the debt. But in a case in which the obligation is not established, the principle cannot be invoked without this absurdity: if the debtor pays half, either he defrauds if he truly owes, or loses half of his own good if he owes nothing. Whence the obligation of paying according to the ratio of doubt is not proved, except in the case of culpable negligence, as we said above; or also unless the judge establishes it so: for a superior commanding must be obeyed until it is certainly established that he commands unjustly (n. 91).

³ Thus Laymann, Tamburini, Lehmkuhl, Ballerini, Marres, Vermeersch; Diana, Reuter and Sporer say this is probable.

And so, outside the aforesaid case of negligence, it is not proved that there is a higher law obliging one to pay a debt concerning which it is positively doubted whether it has already been paid, whence Peter is held to nothing, by force of the principle: A truly uncertain obligation is practically none;⁴ nevertheless, it should be counseled that for the sake of equity he pay something. But in the case of a negative doubt Peter is held to pay.

⁴ Thus Tannerus, Waffelaert, Genicot, Salsmans, Noldin, Bucceroni, the Mechlin authors in Th. m. gen., etc.

107. In the formation of conscience and the direction of others, a varied process is to be employed. - One can consider:

A. Counselors, such as theologians or pastors often are. Now, if one is asked concerning a question about a moral matter: a) if he is asked what he thinks in his own mind, he is held to declare this according to the opinion more probable to him; otherwise he would be lying; b) if he is asked about what is licit, he can respond according to the less founded opinion, which nevertheless is not his own, provided that it is solidly probable; c) if he is asked about what is expedient, he must first prudently consider all the circumstances and counsel what seems to be expedient for the greater good.

B. Superiors. These, however, from various reasons of charity, justice, the common good, and right order to be preserved, are often held to propose or follow the safer part, because they must lead the faithful to salvation by certain or safer means. Thus a pastor, as such, because by office he watches over ecclesiastical discipline and the morals of the faithful, is more solicitously held to investigate practical truth, to warn concerning it, and to instruct by public preaching; and because many goods or evils, which by office he must procure or avert, depend on his mode of conducting himself, he will rather often be held to follow the safer part.

C. The simple confessor: 1) since, as such, he is not a legislator but an interpreter of law and a physician, he must not first inquire what is strict or benign, but what is prescribed, or what is expedient.⁵

⁵ "As I do not approve those confessors who, adhering to excessive austerity, easily condemn the use of several opinions which rest on a grave foundation, so on the contrary I cannot approve those who easily proclaim as probable opinions without a certain foundation. A confessor, before he embraces some opinion, is certainly held to weigh the intrinsic reasons; and when some convincing reason occurs to him for the safer opinion, to which he does not see an adequate response supplied, then he cannot embrace the opposite less safe opinion, although the authority of very many doctors favors it, provided the authority is not of such weight that it seems to him that it should be deferred to more than the apparent reason... but this case is very rare." St. Alphonsus, Th. M., book I, n. 82.

2. This having been supposed, if there is question of an obligation to be imposed, generally among probable opinions he ought rather to embrace the benign than the strict, because ordinarily they remove sufficiently from the danger of formal sin.⁶ For he can only persuade to the strict opinions, if he judges them more salutary for the penitent, for example, because they suit him better, or more powerfully induce him to avoid sin or to make progress in virtue. Whence generally the stricter opinions fit better when there is question of obtaining perfection;⁷ with moderation, however, otherwise the yoke would become unbearable.

⁶ Let them attend to the word of Ven. Humbert, O.P., in the gloss on the prologue of the Constitutions, 1, 1: "Men are terrified from this (namely, excessive austerity of opinions) so much that they neglect salvation; for that reason austerity is to be relaxed as much as can be done, and one must act benignly, because thus they are better drawn to salvation, when the milder opinions are held."

⁷ "If a Christian man in the service of God did nothing other than what strictly the law postulates from the principles of Probabilism, he would certainly lead a life little worthy of one of Christ's faithful; but the practice of the Probabilists is this: where there is question of imposing obligation and judging sins, they are benign in order to avoid dangers of sinning formally; but where there is question of attaining perfection and of the exercise of virtues, they strive for the highest things, measuring the service due to God not from the obligation of law, but from love and gratitude toward the divine majesty." Thus the Probabilist Noldin, S.J., Th. M., I, n. 216. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Diss., a. 1755, n. 107; and Th. M., book VI, n. 605.

3. Sometimes he must impose the stricter opinions, if they are necessary for avoiding the proximate danger of sin;⁸ in other cases he cannot impose them unless they are sufficiently certain.

⁸ "Where benign opinions render proximate the danger of formal sin, as are some opinions of authors, for example, concerning avoiding proximate occasions, and others of this kind, then it is always expedient that the confessor use, indeed I say that as a physician of souls he is held to use, the safer opinions, which conduce to preserving penitents in the state of grace." St. Alphonsus, Th. M., book I, n. 83. For there are benign opinions which, although speculatively they seem probable, nevertheless in practice are very dangerous: as in the matter of the sixth precept there are some concerning touches, kisses, dances, comedies, restraining the movements of sensuality, and similar things. Likewise in the matter of simony and usury, where several things seem to be excused by reason of liberal gratitude, but in practice involve great danger. Likewise when there is question of compensation to be made, or of an accusation to be pursued against offenders, where there is easily danger of injustice or vengeance. St. Alphonsus, Th. M., book VI, n. 605.

4. If an opinion which is held probable by others appears to him certainly false or improbable, or is only lightly or doubtfully probable, he is held to respond according to his own opinion. Nevertheless, if he foresees that the penitent will not accept it, he will be able, from charity, to add that others teach otherwise; yet he will never be able to persuade to or call probable an improbable or doubtfully or lightly probable opinion.

5. Finally, if the penitent chooses a solidly probable opinion against the confessor, nevertheless the latter is held under grave obligation to absolve the penitent who is rightly disposed; for he is not the judge of opinions (unless they are openly false), but of the dispositions of the penitent⁹ (Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5). On the contrary, if there is question a) of an opinion which regards the valid administration of the sacrament itself, because in these matters he is judge, and otherwise he would sin against his own conscience; b) or of an opinion which involves danger of formal sin, as was said under 3; c) or of an opinion which is openly false or lightly probable: in which case the confessor must warn the penitent, and not absolve him if he resists. Sometimes, however, if the penitent is in good faith and does not ask, he could be left in good faith when greater evils are feared and no fruit is hoped for (n. 69).

⁹ St. Alphonsus, Th. M., book VI, n. 604; H. A. XVI, 11.

108. Observation. - The penitent of himself can licitly go to various confessors to seek the more benign opinion, not indeed so that he may thus withdraw himself from obligation, but lest the obligation be incautiously imposed upon him. Whence it is required: 1) that he not use deceit; 2) that he act from a right intention; 3) that he not choose an opinion lightly or doubtfully probable. Yet those who act thus easily sin against one of these conditions, and therefore per accidens in practice it will easily be illicit.