Third Question: On the Debt of Punishment

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 87; q. 72, a. 5; Suppl., q. 99, a. 1; De Malo q. 1, a. 4 and 5; q. 7, a. 1 and 8; C. Gent. III, 140-146; II Sent. d. 24, a. 2, ad 5.

521. The third effect of sin is the debt of punishment, that is, the debt of punishment to be paid on account of sin, or the obligation of undergoing punishment. For:

a) In order that law be observed by men, it must have coercive force through fear of punishment; in other words, it is required that law be sanctioned by a proportionate punishment (n. 237). But sin is against the eternal law of God. Therefore before God it induces the debt of a punishment proportionate to it.

b) Justice requires that the equality of order which has been injured be repaired. But the sinner violates the equality of order, while he prefers his own will to the divine will and satisfies it against the order of God. Therefore justice requires that equality be repaired, and that man be compelled to suffer something against his own will according to the ordination of the will of God, "namely, that he who has indulged his own will more than he ought, acting against the commandment of God, according to the order of divine justice should suffer something against that which he would will, whether spontaneously or unwillingly" (q. 87, a. 6); and this is punishment.

c) He who rises up against some order ought to be repressed by the prince of the order. But by sin man acts not only against the order of reason, and sometimes against the order of a human legislator, but also against the order of God. Therefore he incurs a threefold punishment: one from himself, which is remorse of conscience; another sometimes from man; but the third from God (q. 87, a. 1; - Exod. XVIII; Ps. XXXI; Matt. XII, 36; XXV; Rom. II, 9).

522. Punishment is an afflictive evil inflicted in vengeance of sin against the will of the one suffering, or the privation of a delectable good which the will unwillingly suffers against the natural appetite.¹

¹ It is, namely, against the habitual tendency of nature, and not always against the actual and elicited appetite of the will, since someone can be ignorant of it, indeed can voluntarily undergo it, in which case nevertheless it remains involuntary in a certain respect.

One punishment is 1. concomitant, which guilt itself, as efficient cause, brings with itself intrinsically (Wis. V, 7; 2-13; Luke XV, 18), for example, privation of health, shame, remorse of conscience, privation of grace as a stain; - 2. another is inflicted, which is brought from without by God or man as efficient cause and of which guilt is the meritorious cause, for example, privation of grace as the physical destitution of a supernatural principle by God. This regards either only past sin, and then it is a) either punishment simply and strictly so called, or merely vindicative, if evil is inflicted from justice alone, solely in vengeance of the violated order, namely, in punishment of one's own sin (Ezek. XVIII, 20) and for restoring the injured order of justice, for example, the punishment of the future life; or b) satisfactoria, if the evil inflicted either by the judge or by the sinner upon himself is voluntarily sustained, for one's own sins or even for the sins of others, for compensating the injury brought upon God, for example, sacramental penance, fasting, an evil sent by God: this, involuntary in a certain respect, is voluntary simply, which diminishes the account of punishment; - or c) it also regards future sin, and then it is medicinal, if evil is inflicted or tolerated also from mercy, as a remedy of salvation, as censure is: namely, for correction and healing against future sins, whether of him who is punished or of others, for example, a punishment of the present life inflicted by God.

523. Thesis I. Mortal sin per se induces the debt or obligation of eternal punishment, as inducing an inordination of itself irreparable. It is of faith.

It is proved 1. from the Scriptures: Matt. XXV, 41, 46; Mark IX, 42; Is. LXVI, 24; Apoc. XIV, 11; XX-XXII; II Thess. I, 9;

2. from Tradition, namely, from the Athanasian Symbol, and from the definition of the Fourth Lateran Council (cap. Firmiter), and Trent, sess. 6, can. 24 and 25; sess. 14, can. 5;

3. by reason: Mortal sin induces an inordination of itself irreparable; therefore eternal punishment is owed to it. Proof: Mortal sin takes away the principle of moral life by which it could be repaired, namely, ordering to the ultimate end (in the present order: grace and charity), by which man adheres to God and by which he can obtain pardon from God by satisfying. But no one can recover the principle of life, in the case, ordering to the ultimate end (or charity), by his own powers. Therefore mortal sin of itself is irreparable, so that from its nature its disorder remains forever. But while the cause remains, the effect remains. Therefore, while the disorder of sin remains, the debt of punishment remains, and therefore mortal sin from its nature can be punished forever² (q. 87, a. 2).

² It is no objection that the inordination perpetually remaining after death is no longer voluntary, because the time of meriting and demeriting has passed; whence it ought not to be punished perpetually. For the perpetual disorder is voluntary in its cause, because one sinning voluntarily cast away ordering to the end, and indeed irreparably.

It is confirmed: a) The first principle of moral life is ordering to the ultimate end, just as the soul is the principle of animal life, and truths evident of themselves are the first principles of intellectual life. But sickness can be repaired because something of the vital principle remains, but death, which removes the principle of life, cannot be repaired by nature; similarly error in conclusions can be repaired from reduction to principles, but error in first principles is irreparable. Therefore similarly sin which turns away from the ultimate end, or inordination concerning the ultimate end, is irreparable for man; although it can be repaired by the power of God.

b) The sinner voluntarily places himself in a state from which, unless divinely aided, he cannot be rescued. Hence from the very fact that he wills to sin, as much as is in him, he binds himself to remain always in sin, and consequently implicitly wills to remain in sin perpetually. Just as he who would take away his own eyes would deserve to lack sight forever, so he who voluntarily turns himself away from God deserves to be deprived of God forever.

c) The sinner constitutes his ultimate end and perfect happiness in a creature against God, and consequently wills to order his whole life to it and always to adhere to it; he prefers the fruition of created good to the eternal fruition of the ultimate end, and consequently much more would have willed to enjoy that created good forever. And therefore he implicitly has the will of sinning forever, and deserves to be punished in his own eternal thing, since he has sinned against the eternal good.³ - For he totally turns himself away from God, the ultimate end, and renounces him. But he who renounces the end because he adheres to another, deserves never to obtain it, because the ultimate end from its nature is perpetual. Hence he who renounces it, renounces it forever.

³ It is no objection that the one sinning sometimes has a contrary will of not always adhering to the created good, or even of converting himself. For when there are several opposed wills, the predominant intention elides the others; but the will of sinning is efficacious and has effect, whence it is predominant; and therefore the opposed intention is only conditioned, or even a mere velleity. For knowing that these things cannot be composed, the sinner simply prefers and chooses created good as the ultimate end. "Just as if someone were to throw himself into a pit, from which he could not get out unless extraordinarily aided, it could be said that he would will to remain there forever, however much he might think otherwise" (St. Thomas, IV Sent. d. 46, q. 1, a. 3).

d) The sinner contemns eternal life and rejects charity, which is the bond by which he is united to the heavenly society; therefore he deserves to be excluded from that society in perpetuity.

We have proposed the argument for the present order, in which ordering to the ultimate end is made by grace and charity; but it is valid also in the natural order, because no creature can offer condign satisfaction for sin, nor therefore by itself recover the due ordering to the end, as is usually shown in the treatise on the Incarnate Word (n. 536).

524. Thesis II. The punishment of mortal sin is twofold: the punishment of loss and the punishment of sense. - For sin consists in aversion from God and undue conversion to created good. Insofar as it is aversion from God, the infinite good, it justly deserves to be deprived of the infinite good (punishment of loss: I Cor. VI, 9; Matt. XXV, 41; Apoc. XXI-XXII); insofar as it is undue conversion to a creature, a finite good, it justly deserves the punishment of affliction from creatures (punishment of sense; Is. LXVI; Mark IX, 42; Apoc. XIV, 11; Matt. XXV, 41). But since sin is not of infinite gravity on the part of conversion, punishment of infinite bitterness is not required (a. 4).

525. Thesis III. Venial sin of itself does not merit anything except temporal punishment. - For since it does not take away order to the ultimate end and charity from which it can be repaired, of itself it is reparable and therefore of itself does not merit eternal punishment, but temporal. Per accidens, however, according to St. Thomas, it is punished by eternal punishment, if it becomes irremissible because it is joined to mortal sin (a. 5).

526. Thesis IV. When guilt has been remitted, not always is every punishment remitted, as is proved in the treatise on Penance, and is clear from the definition of the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 14, can. 30, and sess. 14, can. 22; but satisfactoria can remain, because the sinner cannot be converted to God unless his will accepts the order of divine justice, according to which "he who has indulged his own will more than he ought, acting against the commandment of God, should suffer something against that which he would will, whether spontaneously or unwillingly" (a. 6). Hence it is required "that he himself spontaneously assume punishment for himself in recompense for past guilt, or also patiently sustain what is brought upon him by God" (Wis. X; Gen. III; II Kings XII, 13).

Hence, although "the stain being removed, the wound of sin has been healed as to the will, punishment is still required 1. for the healing of the other powers of the soul, which through preceding sin were disordered, namely, that by contraries they may be cured; 2. it is required for restoring the equality of justice; and 3. for removing the scandal of others, so that those who have been scandalized by guilt may be edified by punishment" (ad 3).

527. Remark. - Let it be noted that punishment does not correspond to guilt according to the dignity of him against whom one sins (because thus to any sin whatever there would be owed a punishment infinite in intensity), but according to the disposition and inordination of the sinner, - and indeed a) the quantity of punishment or bitterness corresponds to the quantity of guilt, which is not infinite simply but greater or lesser in various degree according to diverse gravity; b) the duration of punishment corresponds not to the quantity but to the duration of guilt, not on the part of the act which passes away, but on the part of perpetual inordination (a. 4, ad 3, coll. a. 3, ad 1; IV Sent. d. 46, q. 1, a. 3, ad 6).

528. The evil of guilt and the evil of punishment differ:⁴ a) guilt is prior to punishment, because it induces punishment; b) guilt is according to the will (to operate evil), punishment against the will (to suffer evil); c) guilt is evil in action or a deficient act, punishment is evil in the agent according as he is deprived of permanent perfection; d) guilt is opposed to the honorable good, punishment to the delectable good. Hence:

⁴ Cf. De Malo, q. 1, a. 4 and 5.

1. The evil of guilt is greater than the evil of punishment; whence it is never licit to commit sin, even venial sin, to avert any punishments whatever, even those of hell.

2. The same thing according to the same respect cannot at the same time be punishment and guilt, but under a diverse respect there is no repugnance. Thus the privation of habitual grace is at the same time sin and punishment: it is habitual sin insofar as it is the voluntary privation of ordering to God or habitual aversion from him; it is punishment insofar as it is the privation of an adornment granted by God, and indeed in two ways: as the privation of brightness and an adhering stain, it is concomitant punishment; as the physical taking away of supernatural life by God, it is inflicted punishment. In other words: morally, as a voluntary lack or habitual aversion of the sinner from God, which is passively in man, it is sin; actively and physically, as the aversion of God subtracting grace from man, it is punishment.

3. It is understood why sin, according to St. Thomas (a. 2), cannot be the punishment of sin per se or by reason of guilt, both because sin is voluntary, punishment against the will; and because punishment is intended by the judge, but God can in no way intend guilt.

Nevertheless per accidens and indirectly it can be the punishment of sin:

a) by reason of the antecedent, or on the part of the cause (which is the removal of what restrains), insofar as God, in vengeance of preceding sin, subtracts grace which would impede sin (Rom. I; II Thess. II);

b) by reason of the concomitant, namely, on the part of the substance of the act or material element, insofar as the act of sin brings difficulties and afflictions, whether it is an interior act, as happens in anger, envy, etc., or an exterior act, if man must sustain great labors or expenses and undergo dangers in order to perpetrate sin;

c) by reason of the consequent, or on the part of the effect, insofar as sin is called punishment on account of consequent effects, such as anxieties of conscience, infamy, poverty, diseases, etc.

In these last two ways sin is not only the punishment of preceding sin, but also of itself.

529. Every punishment is on account of guilt (a. 7 and 8). - And indeed:

1. Punishment strictly so called, that is, merely vindicative, is on account of the proper guilt of him who is punished: for no one is punished simply and properly for the sin of another (Ezek. XVIII, 20).

2. Satisfactory punishment can also be for the sin of another, since one can bear the punishment of another, insofar as one joined to another by the bond of charity assumes the punishment owed to the sins of others (Gal. VI, 2).

3. Likewise medicinal punishment, if it is corporeal and of the present life, can be inflicted for the sin of another upon those who are his: thus children are punished for parents, subjects for masters, citizens on account of the city or king (or vice versa), insofar as they are certain things of theirs; in which case the punishment is as to him for whom one is punished, not as to those who are punished; unless, however, they have been participants in his guilt (original or actual) or have imitated the sin, because then they are punished on account of their own sin and on account of the sin of another (Exod. XX, 5; Matt. XVIII, 32).

4. Indeed every penality is in some way on account of guilt, at least original guilt. Penality is not true punishment because it is not inflicted on account of sin, but on account of obtaining a greater good, namely, a spiritual good (cf. prop. 72 of Baius); but it has a likeness to punishment, because it is a temporal afflictive evil repugnant to the natural appetite, for example, the miseries of the Blessed Virgin or of the Saints (Heb. XII, 6; Ps. XXXIII, 20). Penality is inflicted by God a) for the exercise of virtue and greater merit (Tob. XII, 13); b) for turning away from sin (Luke XXIII, 31); c) as an example of virtue and patience for others (Tob. II, 12); d) in punishment of another's sin, as if parents are punished in their children; e) that God may show there is another life; f) that the glory of God or grace may shine out more (John IX, 3).