Treatise: On the Cardinal Virtue of Temperance and On the Virtues Annexed to It

933b. Object of the treatise. - Just as the virtue of fortitude rules and restrains the repulsions of the irascible appetite, strengthening the soul against them lest it decline from pursuing the arduous good which reason dictates on account of sensible and corporeal evils joined to it, so it is necessary that there be a virtue which moderates and restrains the concupiscible appetite, lest it impel too much toward delectable good, against the good of reason or more than reason dictates, and this is temperance. Therefore, just as the virtue of fortitude chiefly consists concerning fear of corporeal evils, and consequently concerning daring, which attacks them under hope of some good (n. 903), so also temperance chiefly consists concerning corporeal concupiscences and pleasures, and consequently concerning sadnesses which occur from the absence of such pleasures. Hence just as fortitude removes the impediments of the rectitude of reason in the irascible appetite, so temperance removes them in the concupiscible appetite. Therefore by these two cardinal virtues with their annexed virtues all the passions are rectified, so that the whole man is perfectly disposed in order toward himself (a. 3).

From these things it follows: a) that temperance is necessary, namely, for restraining the passions of the concupiscible appetite;

b) that it is a virtue, because it moderates them according to reason;

c) that its subject is the concupiscible appetite, to be restrained by reason;

d) that its object primarily is the concupiscences and pleasures of the concupiscible appetite to be moderated.

934. Temperance etymologically signifies a certain tempering, that is, moderation; hence in the most general sense it indicates the moderation of reason in any matter whatsoever, whether of operations or of passions, and thus it is a condition of every virtue, because it belongs to every virtue to moderate or to act according to the mode of reason; in the strict sense it signifies moderation in a matter which by immoderation most greatly rises up against reason, and therefore needs special moderation, and this by excellence is called temperance (sophrosyne; matigheid).

Temperance strictly so called is customarily defined: a virtue moderating the appetite concerning the principal concupiscences and pleasures of touch conformably to the due end; or, mediocrity in corporeal pleasures. In this definition there is indicated:

the genus: virtue, whether natural and acquired, or supernatural and infused;

the subject in which it is: the appetite. For it is not in the will, which from its nature is an inclination conforming to reason, but in the sensitive appetite itself, concerning passions, which are to be moderated when they rise up against reason: thus it is distinguished from prudence and the intellectual virtues;

the proper act by which it is distinguished from others: moderating or restraining according to right reason, and thus it is distinguished from fortitude, which strengthens the appetite;

the material object concerning which it is exercised: concerning the principal concupiscences and pleasures of touch, and thus it is distinguished from the virtues annexed to it, which concern other pleasures, and from justice, which is concerned with exterior operations;

the formal object or proximate motive: according to right reason, or conformably to the due end, which end will be natural in acquired temperance, supernatural in infused temperance.

That this definition is real the whole treatise will show.

935. Division of the treatise. - The treatise is divided into five parts: 1. on temperance in general; 2. on abstinence; 3. on sobriety; 4. on chastity and pudicity; 5. on the virtues annexed to temperance.

The first Part is on temperance in general: 1. on temperance in itself; 2. on the vices opposed to temperance; 3. on the parts of temperance.

The second Part is on abstinence: 1. on fasting in general; 2. on ecclesiastical fasting; 3. on abstinence from meats; 4. on the subject of fasting and abstinence, where a) on an excusing cause or impotence, b) on an exempting cause or dispensation; 5. on the violation of fasting and abstinence; 6. on the sin opposed to abstinence, or on gluttony.

The third Part is on sobriety: 1. on sobriety in itself; 2. on the opposed sin, or drunkenness: a) on drunkenness itself, b) on sins committed on the occasion of drunkenness.

The fourth Part is on chastity and pudicity: 1. on chastity and pudicity in themselves; 2. on the opposed sin, or lust in general; 3. on the species of lust, namely, a) on lust according to nature, b) on lust against nature; 4. on internal lust; 5. on immodesty.

The fifth Part is on the virtues annexed to temperance: 1. on continence; 2. on meekness and clemency; 3. on humility; 4. on studiousness; 5. on modesty of exterior movements; 6. on modesty of external equipment.¹

¹ Usefully one can compare: St. Thomas, II-II, q. 141-170 with the commentaries of Cajetan, Sylvius, Billuart; Lessius, De Iustitia et Iure et de ceteris virtutibus cardinalibus; Waffelaert, De Virtutibus cardinalibus; Janvier, Conf. de N.-D.: La Temperance; besides, for practical questions, St. Alphonsus and the modern manuals which everywhere are in use.

Nothing special occurs to be said concerning the precepts of temperance and concerning the gift of the Holy Spirit corresponding to it. For this is the fear of the Lord, which already corresponds to hope and was explained in the treatise on Hope (I, n. 828); but the precepts are the sixth and ninth of the decalogue, as we said when treating of the decalogue (n. 897).